Make your live is better

Make your live is better.

Your Fammily is Your live

Your Fammily is Your live.

Care your future

Be healty .

This is default featured post 4 title

Go to Blogger edit html and find these sentences.Now replace these sentences with your own descriptions.

This is default featured post 5 title

Go to Blogger edit html and find these sentences.Now replace these sentences with your own descriptions.

Showing posts with label ONC. Show all posts
Showing posts with label ONC. Show all posts

Wednesday, March 9, 2011

ONC: "The Benefits Of Health Information Technology: A Review Of The Recent Literature Shows Predominantly Positive Results"

The Office of the National Coordinator for Health IT in the US (ONC) has just published an article in "Health Affairs" entitled "The Benefits Of Health Information Technology: A Review Of The Recent Literature Shows Predominantly Positive Results", Buntin, Burke, Hoaglin and Blumenthal, Health Affairs, 30, no.3 (2011):464-471, doi: 10.1377/hlthaff.2011.0178.

It is available at the hyperlink above, but may not be publicly accessible.

The authors all are, or were, ONC officials:

Melinda Beeuwkes Buntin (Melinda.buntin@hhs.gov) is director of the Office of Economic Analysis, Evaluation, and Modeling, Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology (ONC), Department of Health and Human Services, in Washington, D.C. Matthew F. Burke is a policy analyst at the ONC. Michael C. Hoaglin is a former policy analyst at the ONC. David Blumenthal is the national coordinator for health information technology.

The abstract is as follows:

ABSTRACT
An unprecedented [indeed- ed.] federal effort is under way to boost [coerce? - ed.] the adoption of electronic health records and spur innovation in health care delivery.We reviewed the recent literature on health information technology to determine its effect on outcomes, including quality, efficiency, and provider satisfaction.We found that 92 percent of the recent articles on health information technology reached conclusions that were positive overall. We also found that the benefits of the technology are beginning to emerge in smaller practices and organizations, as well as in large organizations that were early adopters. However, dissatisfaction with electronic health records among some providers remains a problem and a barrier to achieving the potential of health information technology. [Some? That sounds like an understatement - ed.] These realities highlight the need for studies that document the challenging aspects of implementing health information technology more specifically and how these challenges might be addressed.

I have long stated, at least since 1999, that:

Healthcare information technology (HIT) holds great promise towards improving healthcare quality, safety and costs.

The new ONC review article is certainly pointing in this direction. Perhaps Health Affairs will release it to general circulation.

However, I also wrote:

As we enter the second decade of the 21st century, however, this potential has been largely unrealized. Significant factors impeding HIT achievement have been false assumptions concerning the challenges presented by this still-experimental technology, and underestimations of the expertise essential to achieve the potential benefits of HIT. This often results in clinician-unfriendly HIT design, and HIT leaders and stakeholders operating outside (often far outside) the boundaries of their professional competencies. Until these issues are acknowledged and corrected, HIT efforts will unnecessarily over-utilize precious healthcare resources, will be unlikely to achieve claimed benefits for many years to come, and may actually cause harm.

Whether the new ONC article demonstrates that these issues are starting to approach resolution, or is just another opinion paper not fully supported by facts, is not certain.

Two charts are presented that summarize the findings (click to enlarge):


(Click to enlarge.) Evaluations Of Outcome Measures Of Health Information Technology, By Type And Rating



(Click to enlarge.) Health Information Technology: Study Design And Scope Factors Associated With Positive Overall Conclusions

There are several caveats. The first has to do with possible selection bias that can be present in any review article.

On article selection for the review:

... we decided that to be included in this review, an article had to address a relevant aspect of health IT, as listed in the Appendix [7]; examine the use of health information technology in clinical practice; and measure qualitative or quantitative outcomes. Analyses that forecast the effects of a health IT component were included only if they were based on effects experienced during actual use. ... Using this framework, the review team removed 2,692 articles based on their titles. An additional 1,270 articles were determined to be outside the study�s scope after the team examined the article abstracts. For example, 269 abstracts focused solely on health IT adoption.

[What, exactly, does that mean? Were the problems with HIT adoption potentially significant towards causation of lack of benefit, and/or presence of harm, for instance? - ed]

By the third review stage, the review team had 231 articles. An additional forty-three were excluded after further review because they did not meet the criteria, and thirty-four review articles were dropped from the analyses because they did not present new work.

[What does that mean? Did they drop highly comprehensive articles showing uncertainty in the literature about HIT, such as Greenhalgh's "Tensions and Paradoxes in Electronic Patient Record Research: A Systematic Literature Review Using the Meta-narrative Method" from University College London? That article appeared in the Dec. 2009 Milbank Quarterly. I wrote about it at this link.]

This left 154 studies that met our inclusion criteria, 100 of which were conducted in the United States. This is comparable to the 182 studies found over a slightly longer time period that were evaluated by Goldzweig and colleagues.

I should also note that no mention is made of independent reviewers of the article corpus and elimination process. It appears the entire effort was conducted within ONC itself, where a bias towards finding positive results is likely present (and understandable).

Another caveat is the the Health Affairs/ONC article appears to bypass a body of literature, both peer-reviewed and non-peer reviewed, that sheds doubt on health IT in its present form from a number of angles such as I recently aggregated at "An updated reading list on HIT" and at "2009 a pivotal year in healthcare IT." Bypassing literature such as this is a possible major weakness.

Further, in the current political environment, it is not hard to imagine that articles highly critical of health IT, or revealing major mishaps and possibly exposing organizations to litigation, are scarce.

I addressed that in a paper "Remediating an Unintended Consequence of Healthcare IT: A Dearth of Data on Unintended Consequences of Healthcare IT." The paper itself was initially found needing revisions, largely in format, by a small group of blinded reviewers in the Medical Informatics community (with the exception of one faux-newshound who commented that "material like this could be read in any major newspaper", a rather perplexing comment considering the topic). Rather than revise, and not being on the tenure treadmill, I chose instead to publish at the Scribd link above.

The ONC paper does acknowledge this:

A recent study found that for clinical trials, studies with positive results are roughly four times more likely to be published than those without positive findings. Because the articles were limited to health IT adopters, we anticipated that authors more often approached studies looking for benefits rather than adverse effects.

They do, however, then issue a value judgment:

It is important to note that although publication bias may lead to an underestimation of the trade-offs associated with health IT, the benefits found in the published articles are real.

I"m not sure my mother would find that value judgment heartening. She suffered a crippling brain hemorrhage that would not have occurred if paper had been used in the ED rather than an EHR. (I say this from personal experience; I once worked in that ED, pre-EHR.)

I note that if a pharmaceutical company were to issue such a value judgment about a drug as justification for national marketing, they'd likely be nailed to the cross...

The ONC paper also ignores accounts of "near misses" and actual patient injury from impeccable sources, such as in "Health informatics � Guidance on the management of clinical risk relating to the deployment and use of health software (PDF). UK National Health Service, DSCN18 (2009), formerly ISO/TR 29322:2008(E)":

Annex A

Examples of potential harm presented by health software

GP prescribing decision support
In 2004 the four most commonly used primary care systems were subjected to eighteen, potentially serious, realistic scenarios including an aspirin prescription for an eight year old, penicillin for a patient with penicillin allergy and a combined oral contraceptive for a patient with a history of deep vein thrombosis. Using dummy records, all eighteen scenarios failed to produce appropriate alerts by all of the systems, most of the time. The best score was a system that flagged up seven appropriate alerts. The health organization clearly has, in such a system deployment, a key responsibility to ensure that knowledge bases used within a design are correctly populated and aligned with clinical practice within their organization.

Inadvertent accidental prescribing of dangerous drugs (such as methotrexate)
This incident occurred when a user of a primary care system attempted to issue two repeat items. The items were highlighted and instead of the issue selected repeats button, the prescribe acute issues from the formulary button was pressed. This brought up the formulary dialogue which contained the high risk items. Either the issue button was then pressed or the particular items were double clicked. When the warning messages came up, they were all ignored and proceed and issue selected. The user chose the first item presented on the formulary list, which just so happened to be a methotrexate injection. In this particular case, it was determined that patient risk was minimal as the treatment was rarely used in primary care and would, in practice, be rejected by the pharmacist. To preclude any recurrence of the problem, access to the high risk formulary was removed from the formulary part of the acute drug issue dialogue. This example again demonstrates the need to align clinical practice and authority levels with the knowledge and rule bases within the system. Wherever possible, design and implementation of health software systems should be undertaken to improve control and accuracy, note introduce new exposures. Furthermore the hazard and risk assessment of this situation may well not apply in other settings, e.g. prescription issue by nursing staff on a ward versus a pharmacist in a retail store.

Incorrect patient details retrieved from radiology information system
This incident arose from the fact that medical reference numbers (MRNs) are usually prefixed by an alpha code. Some hospitals however do not use these prefixes and identical MRNs can be generated. This gave rise to the creation of shared MRNs and subsequent confusion of records in the central datastore when retrieval key is the Medical Record Number. Four specific instances were found where a patient number had been entered in the radiology information system and incorrect patient details had been retrieved. The manufacturer could have built in an appropriate format check during development. Alternatively, the problem could have been spotted by the health organization if a structured risk assessment had been undertaken.

Drug mapping error
Sodium valproate 200 mg slow release was incorrectly mapped to sodium valproate 200 mg in a formulary encoded into a health software system. These are anti-epilepsy drugs and thus the implications for patient safety could be significant. This particular incident is just one of many that have been reported in relation to drug mapping.

An initial investigation indicated that 35 prescriptions had been generated using the incorrect map. Corrective action included contacting the relevant primary care practices to check upon patient health and the supplier to correct the mapping process to ensure no further incorrect prescriptions were generated. As before, this was a design/coding error by the manufacturer but was compounded by the health organization not checking the mappings and failing either to build in appropriate prescribing controls, or map the controls to health organization individuals with the appropriate experience and authority.

Pre-natal screening
The ages of women who had undergone pre-natal screening were wrongly computed by a health software system. As a result 150 women were wrongly notified that they were at no risk. Of these, four gave birth to Down's syndrome babies and two others made belated decisions to have abortions.

Patient identification
A student died of meningitis because of a misspelling of her name and inadequacy in computer use. The student was admitted and a blood test proved negative for meningitis. The following day another blood test was taken and filed on a new computer entry but the letter ?p was missed in the spelling of the name. When a doctor looked up results they were presented with only the first negative tests result because of the misspelling. If the second result had been seen it would have triggered further investigations and probable diagnosis of meningitis. The investigating panel concluded that problems with the health software system had been greater than first thought and in this case there was a combination of a misspelled name and the doctor not being able to use the computer system property. The health software system could have been designed to use unique numbers either instead of the name or in addition to it.

They also missed consideration of serious IT defects reports as in the FDA's Maude database that I wrote about at my Jan. 2011 post "MAUDE and HIT Risks."

Another confounding factor is the issue of possible unreliability of the medical literature itself as expressed in a recent post on the IBM Watson supercomputer exuberance:

Consider the issue of the medical literature suffering from numerous conflict of interest and dishonesty-related phenomema making it increasingly untrustworthy, as pointed out by Roy Poses in a Dec. 2010 post "The Lancet Emphasizes the Threats to the Academic Medical Mission", at my Aug. 2009 post "Has Ghostwriting Infected The "Experts" With Tainted Knowledge, Creating Vectors for Further Spread and Mutation of the Scientific Knowledge Base?" and elsewhere on this blog.

They do state what I have been writing about for over a decade now:

... In fact, the stronger finding may be that the �human element� is critical to health IT implementation. The association between the assessment of provider satisfaction and negative findings is a strong one. This highlights the importance of strong leadership and staff �buy-in� [which will only occur if the systems are not miserable examples of poor engineering, not due to P.R. or the irrational exuberance of others - ed.] if systems are to successfully manage and see benefit from health information technology. The negative findings also highlight the need for studies that document the challenging aspects of implementing health IT more specifically and how these challenges might be addressed.

Dear ONC: see this site, and the many posts since 2004 on this blog.

I was surprised to see this:

... Taking a cue from the literature on continuous quality improvement, every negative finding can be a treasure if it yields information on how to improve implementation strategies and design better health information technologies.

As in my post at this link, does this mean that 'anecdotal' accounts of HIT problems will no longer be summarily dismissed? I wonder.

I have also written in the past that in order to truly understand a domain, one must look at both evidence of the upside, and evidence of the downside. My concern is that the latter was not well addressed in this paper. A beneficial technology with a significant downside, especially in medicine, is not ready for national rollout (cf. Vioxx).

In summary, the new ONC paper may present a glimmer of hope that health IT is starting to produce real results. On the other hand, its possible deficiencies and biases might also make it more a political statement than anything else. It will certainly be used as such from the high government perch of HHS regardless. This has already started:

... President Obama and Congress envisioned that the HITECH Act would provide benefits in the form of lower costs, better quality of care, and improved patient outcomes. This review of the recent literature on the effects of health information technology is reassuring: It indicates that the expansion of health IT in the health care system is worthwhile.

[Note the use of "is worthwhile" as opposed to "may be worthwhile", a continuation of the "it's proven, nothing else to say" style I noted
at my July 2010 post "Science or Politics? The New England Journal and "The 'Meaningful Use' Regulation for Electronic Health Records." Such statements of absolute certainty are of concern; they remind me of the global warming debate - ed.]

...Thus, with HITECH, providers have an unparalleled opportunity to accelerate their adoption of health information technology and realize benefits for their practices, institutions, patients, and the broader system. [Ditto - ed.]

Does the article truly show a breakthrough, or is it a flawed review by a governmental agency that will be used for political purposes? I simply do not know which.

I am certain, however, that there will be active debate and dissection of this paper and its source articles in the months to come by those with more time, resources, and expertise than I have at my disposal.

-- SS

March 10, 2011 addendum:

Trisha Greenhalgh at Barts and The London School of Medicine and Dentistry and the author of the aforementioned comprehensive review article "Tensions and Paradoxes in Electronic Patient Record Research: A Systematic Literature Review Using the Meta-narrative Method" (link to my essay), had this observation about the following passage in the ONC paper:

�Our findings must be qualified by two important limitations: the question of publication bias, and the fact that we implicitly gave equal weight to all studies regardless of study design or sample size.�

Prof. Greenhalgh relates: "Given these very fundamental acknowledged biases, I�m very surprised anyone published this paper in its present form.�

-- SS

March 14, 2011 addendum:

Dr. Roy Poses had this to say:

Dr Silverstein commented on a new review of research of health care information technology whose results were mainly optimistic. The authors were from the US government agency that promotes health care IT, so its optimism is not surprising. However, its credibility was unclear, since it did not appear to be systematic. [In general, one at least assesses and takes into account the methodologic quality of studies used in a systematic review, and does not "give equal weight to all studies regardless of study design or sample size" - ed.]

Furthermore, the authors had no methodologic standards whatsoever for article inclusion. [They did, sort of, as in my paragraphs "On article selection for the review:", but one might term the standards "loose" - ed.] The review included qualitative studies that were probably not meant to be evaluative, and observational studies subject to severe methodologic bias.

The publication of this review demonstrated how the conventional wisdom is continually reinforced based on the strength of the influence of its proponents, rather than the strength of the supporting evidence. Adaptation of new drugs and devices should be based on evidence that their benefits outweigh their harms, rather than the enthusiasm and financial interests of their proponents.

-- SS

Friday, February 4, 2011

A Somewhat Harsh Farewell to David Blumenthal of ONC, From a Patient Injured by Health IT - My Mother

Well, from me actually, but she agrees with my assessment.

I believe one unfortunate "legacy" of Blumenthal's tenure is the near total absence of consideration of HIT risk.

Risk to patient life and limb.

As I wrote here, the PCAST report itself reflects the same systematic Pollyanna attitude.

My comments about the PCAST report are simple and twofold:

1. The term "risk" is absent from the PCAST report in the context of risk to patients from clinical IT. Instead, the context is largely about the risk to patients of NOT having health IT.

2. The term "safety" is similarly absent in the context of adverse effects of HIT, and only present in the context of how HIT will improve safety, except for one reference (indeed, the match to my search for the term "safety" was in the cited URL itself) ...

... I find this paucity of a certain context for these terms in a report to the President of the United States striking, and think the issue should have been a top ONC priority.

Instead, Blumenthal spoke only with certainty about the benefit of health IT (see my post "Science or Politics? The New England Journal and "The 'Meaningful Use' Regulation for Electronic Health Records") ...

The widespread use of electronic health records (EHRs) in the United States is inevitable. EHRs will improve caregivers� decisions and patients� outcomes. Once patients experience the benefits of this technology, they will demand nothing less from their providers. Hundreds of thousands of physicians have already seen these benefits in their clinical practice. (NEJM 10.1056/NEJMp1006114, July 13, 2010) ...

... and about the "anecdotalness" of reports of risk (see my May 2010 post "David Blumenthal on health IT safety: nothing to see here, move along"):

... [Blumenthal's] department is confident that its mission remains unchanged in trying to push all healthcare establishments to adopt EMRs as a standard practice. "The [ONC] committee [investigating FDA reports of HIT endangerment that FDA's head of CDRH said were likely the "tip of the iceberg" - ed.] said that nothing it had found would give them any pause that a policy of introducing EMR's could impede patient safety," he said.

It's a hard job, but he could have done better.

This is a harsh pronouncement, but my mother suffered a cerebral hemorrhage in May 2010 as a result of the technology's interference with her care - sadly and ironically, just days after my May 2010 posting cited above about ONC's Pollyanna attitude towards HIT risk.

This injury nearly cost her her life and she is still suffering from its aftermath. This was despite my explicit written warnings of EHR deficiencies that could result in patient harm to the hospital in question in April 2010, a month before the accident, and where I am well known.

The cavalier atmosphere set by ONC regarding HIT risk (i.e., "nothing to see here") certainly did not help the hospital heed the warnings of a medical informaticist who was also one of its former staff.

-- SS

Addendum:

This MAUDE report was submitted to FDA by me based on another EMR-related incident during my mother's time in extremis. This EMR problem almost caused her dire situation to become worse, and was prevented only because I was present at the time and a physician myself, with a physician's knowledge of drug nomenclature.

Along with other EMR mishaps during my mother's continuing, difficult course (such as I wrote about in my Jan. 2011 post "EHR Problems? No, They're Merely Anecodotal; the Truth Must Be That I Attract Bad Electrons and Stale Bits"), Blumenthal would probably call these matters "anecdotal."

One wonders if he would do so if the victim had been his mother, not mine.

-- SS

Thursday, February 3, 2011

David Blumenthal to Resign as Director of the Office of the National Coordinator of HIT (ONC)

From NextGov.com - TECHNOLOGY AND THE BUSINESS OF GOVERNMENT

Blumenthal Calls It Quits

Dr. David Blumenthal, who has pushed the country's health care providers to give up paper files in favor of electronic medical records, announced Thursday that he is stepping down as the country's de facto health IT czar after almost two years on the job. He will return to Harvard University, according to news reports.

Blumenthal served as National Coordinator for Health IT during a period of tremendous change. In 2009, Congress allocated billions of dollars to expand the Office of the National Coordinator's authority and to make available incentive funds intended to encourage mass adoption of electronic medical records. The first of those incentives payments were disbursed recently.

... Health and Human Services Secretary Kathleen Sebelius, writing in a memo obtained by Kaiser Health News, said that "David will leave his post having built a strong foundation, created real momentum for [health information technology] adoption, charted a course for the meaningful use of [electronic health records] and launched a new phase of cooperative and supportive work with the health care community, states and cities across the nation."

Despite that progress, however, there has been no shortage of impediments to large-scale adoption, including the dearth of qualified health IT specialists, a lack of certified health IT products [which by the way is an artificial, government and industry lobby-created impediment; "certification" does not equal safe or effective; it's merely a hastily-evaluated features check - ed.], disruptions in work flow caused by the switch to electronic health records [which in large part remain mission hostile to clinical work - ed.] and the challenge of meeting "meaningful use" standards that trigger incentive payments.


I wish Dr. Blumenthal well. ONC Chair is not an easy role, as I'm sure his predecessors would confirm.

My final comment is that the last paragraph might be rearranged as follows:


... Despite the impediments to large scale adoption, however, there has been no shortage of irrational exuberance in the technology, nor progress in taking seriously the risks to patients. Many of the "impediments" are probably not surmountable at our present dearth of understanding of this experimental technology and its sociotechnical complexities, with many in government, medicine and the IT industry dismissing a growing body of "inconvenient" literature (such as here), and these same people and IT merchants ignoring those who do understand those issues (or worse, such as here).

-- SS

Friday, January 14, 2011

ONC Workgroup Document Misindentification - Just the Type of Computer "Glitch" That Can Kill People

A provocative title indeed.

The Office of the National Coordinator's Health IT Standards Committee Implementation Workgroup recently had a meeting, Jan. 10-11, 2010.

They've posted the testimony and supporting documents here: http://healthit.hhs.gov/portal/server.pt?open=512&objID=1482&&PageID=17128&mode=2 .

I've copied & pasted these document links directly from the site, at 12:45 PM EST 1/14/2011:


The problem is, some of the URL's are simply wrong, including several of the ones I've bolded.

For instance, I tried to download Dr. Willa Drummond's documents:


The links for "Collection of Problem Scenarios from Professional List Serve" and "Ten Commandments for Computerized Healthcare Information Systems" are simply wrong.

They lead to the incorrect documents as of this writing.

By experimentation (borne of experience!), I found I could locate the correct documents by manually altering a number in the URL.

For example, to locate the "Problem Scenarios" document whose URL is linked as:

http://healthit.hhs.gov/portal/server.pt/document/949972/drumexsum-imwg-11011_pdf

I had to alter the number 949972 to 949973, like this:

http://healthit.hhs.gov/portal/server.pt/document/949973/drumexsum-imwg-11011_pdf

I further had to experiment to find the "Ten Commandments" document, also erroneously listed as at this URL ...

http://healthit.hhs.gov/portal/server.pt/document/949972/drumexsum-imwg-11011_pdf

... but actually here at 949971:

http://healthit.hhs.gov/portal/server.pt/document/949971/drumexsum-imwg-11011_pdf

Presumably these erroneous indices will be fixed at some point. Are they due to computer and/or software error, or human error -- as in medicine, due to busy schedules, cognitive overload from a suboptimal IT user experience, and other factors?

I do not consider these errors "minor" or at all humorous. Leadership by example - through fine attention to detail - in a supposed "HITECH" paperless-medicine promoting government organization - is what I expect.

Similar "misidentification" errors in EHR systems can and do cause medications to be missed or given to the wrong patient - such as in the example at the Trinity Healthcare System as mentioned in my post "Huffington Post Investigative Fund: FDA, Obama Digital Medical Records Team at Odds over Safety Oversight" where an EHR "upgrade" caused considerable risk:

... Computers at a major Midwest hospital chain went awry on June 29, posting some doctors� orders to the wrong medical charts in a few cases and possibly putting patients in harm�s way.

The digital records system �would switch to another patient record without the user directing it to do so,� said Stephen Shivinsky, vice-president for corporate communications at Trinity Health System. Trinity operates 46 hospitals, most in Michigan, Iowa and Ohio.

[In other words, data entered by clinicians was going into the wrong charts. How many charts were involved? Does the hospital system even know, I wonder? - ed.]


Less than two weeks later, an unrelated glitch caused Trinity to shut down its $400 million system for four hours at 10 hospitals in the network because electronic pharmacy orders weren�t being delivered to nurses for dispensing to patients, he said.

See the many questions I raised about this episode at the followup post "More on Huffington Post Investigative Fund: "FDA, Obama Digital Medical Records Team at Odds over Safety Oversight." (I understand that the initial "fix" to the problem of "orders going to the wrong chart" was to prevent clinicians from opening more than one chart at a time, thus further interfering with clinicians' work.)

"Glitches" cause sometimes crucial data to be lost, and even patients to be harmed or killed (e.g., see the gray banner at top of my site on HIT failure, and my recent post "EHR Problems? No, They're Merely Anecodotal; the Truth Must Be That I Attract Bad Electrons and Stale Bits" on this blog).

Ironically, the First Commandment in the mislinked Ten Commandments document above is:

"The Computer shall find and collate all data generated by other computers."

Perhaps it should read:

"The Computer shall find and correctly collate all data generated by other computers."

-- SS

1/14 addendum:

I looked specifically for those documents as my first retrievals on the HHS site due to past correspondence with Dr. Drummond. The pinball machine then tilted.

Perhaps it is simply those bad electrons and stale bits that follow me around once more.

Wednesday, October 20, 2010

Medical center has more than 6000 "issues" with Cerner CPOE system in four months - has patient harm resulted?

As I have written at Healthcare Renewal before, computerized physician order entry systems (CPOE's) are known to present risks to patients through induction of medical errors.

This technology is held out to be ready for national diffusion, right up to the POTUS. Per ONC director Blumenthal in the July 13, 2010 NEJM:

The widespread use of electronic health records (EHRs) in the United States is inevitable. EHRs will improve caregivers� decisions and patients� outcomes. Once patients experience the benefits of this technology, they will demand nothing less from their providers. Hundreds of thousands of physicians have already seen these benefits in their clinical practice.

Vendors deny major problems with their CPOE and other health IT products.

The true story is a bit more complex.

Fortunately, there are some medical centers who are open and honest about HIT problems. These medical centers seem a rarity. However, those that do share are actually conducting themselves in an honorable and mission-true manner, per Joint Commission Safety Standards, the ethics of the medical profession, and the expectations of the public. They should be commended.

One such example is Munson Medical Center in Michigan.

From the October 2010 "News for Physicians affiliated with Munson Medical Center" newsletter, a large medical center in Northern Michigan, about more than six thousand "issues" with their Cerner CPOE:

POE Program Continues to be Improved, Enhanced

The Provider Order Entry (POE) program continues to be improved. Since implementation in June [four months ago - ed.], more than 6,000 issues have been reported. Issues are defined as an aspect of the program not working as intended [does that include medication and treatment errors and 'near-misses'? - ed.], process issues [can these 'issues' kill? - ed.], education needs, or PowerPlan [Cerner - ed.] change requests.

About 600 of these remain open. Issues are prioritized by the POE Team and addressed according to existing standards.

One wonders how many of those 6,000, and how many of the 600 remaining "issues" fall into categories of "likely to cause patient harm in short term if uncorrected" or "may cause in patient harm in medium or long term."

I note that Cerner CPOE is not a new product, nor are similar products from other vendors also afflicted with long lists of "issues." That there could be more than 6,000 "issues" at a new site suggests deep rooted, severe problems with CPOE specifically and health IT design and implementation processes in general.

Did patient harm result here or at other CPOE sites (using products of any vendor, not just this one) that had hundreds or thousands of "issues"? We may never know.

That national rollout is mandated as if this technology were proven, safe, and plug and play is a scandal of UK NPfIT-like proportions.

-- SS

Monday, September 20, 2010

Health IT: On Anecdotalism and Totalitarianism

At the article Blumenthal on EMRs: Debate "raging" over competition vs. standards (http://www.massdevice.com/news/blumenthal-emrs-debate-raging-over-competition-vs-standards), ONC czar David Blumenthal is cited as saying several interesting things:

... EMRs make him a better physician, he said, recounting personal anecdotes of discovering patients' allergies through automated EMR alerts and using stored image date to more quickly get a diagnosis for a patient without subjecting them to more radiation and toxic radiation agents ...

It's the EMR "anecdotalists"
(as opposed to the "Markopolists") who say that "anecdotes" of HIT-related injury are meaningless. They deem reports of safety issues and HIT-related misadventures and risk as simply "anecdotal", and that "anecdotes don't make evidence" (or "anecdotes don't make data").

Yet anecdotal reports of EMR "saves" are used by a czar to justify tens of billions of dollars of expenditures?

To the anecdotalists, I say: you can't have it both ways.

That same article concludes with this concerning statement:

... Blumenthal, adamantly pro-EMR, said there is a move afoot to add technical fluency into certification for healthcare providers. "Boards of certification, all the primary care boards of medicine have adopted principles that will lead them to create requirements for the use of electronic health systems as a research requirement, and even the medical licensing boards are beginning to think about whether the maintenance of licensure should be dependent, to some degree, on using electronic health systems," he said. "Information is the lifeblood of medicine, and unless physicians and other healthcare professionals are capable of using the most modern technology available for managing information, I think they will have trouble claiming, in the 21st century, the unique competence that entitles them to being licensed and board certified. I think they'll have trouble holding up their heads as professionals and claiming that they are at the top of their game and capable of providing the best care that technology allows."

It appears that my observation ten years ago of a cross-occupational invasion on Medicine by the IT domain (and its purveyors) was prescient. They've continued the march, and now they're now literally at the castle gates.

I commented on this issue in more detail a few weeks ago at my post "American Board of Medical Specialties to "incorporate tools to promote meaningful use of health IT into its maintenance-of-certification program".

I have two questions:

1) Was it the intention of the Medical Informatics pioneers to prohibit physicians from being licensed and/or board certified on the basis of using health IT? If such a seemingly totalitarian intention existed, that's fine, I just want to hear it debated.

2) Is the mere consideration (let alone enactment) of such a restriction, for all specialties, truly evidence based?

(Note some merely skimming-the-surface "evidence" at my post "
Science or Politics? The New England Journal and "The 'Meaningful Use' Regulation for Electronic Health Records".)

-- SS

Thursday, August 5, 2010

Internal FDA memorandum of Feb. 23, 2010 to Jeffrey Shuren on HIT risks. Smoking gun? I report, you decide.

From the aforementioned Huffington Post Investigative Fund article "FDA, Obama Digital Medical Records Team at Odds over Safety Oversight" and timeline of industry resistance to government oversight of health IT (link), one document stands out in my mind.

The internal FDA memorandum of Feb. 23, 2010 ("not intended for public use") to Jeffrey Shuren on HIT risks. which I have now re-hosted at this link (PDF) is quite fascinating.


Internal FDA Memo ("not intended for public use") on potential dangers of health IT. Download the PDF here.


The memo begins:

This report serves to characterize medical device reports (MDRs) in the Manufacturer and User Facility Experience (MAUDE) database, inclusive of MedSun reports, pertaining to Health Information Technology (H-IT) safety issues as requested by the Office of the Center Director, Center for Devices and Radiological Health (CDRH), in contrast to the previously submitted MedSun and Office of Compliance information.


(I've mentioned MAUDE here and here, including a report of an HIT-related patient death at the latter link.)

To those "anecdotalists" in the healthcare information technology community who believe reports of HIT-related harm are "anecdotal, and anecdotes don't make data" (as opposed to the "Markopolists"):


When an internal FDA review of their own data concludes the following, I invite you to think about the point of view that maintains that reports of HIT-related patient injury and death are so 'fragmentary' as to not merit (actually, demand) significant resources be diverted to rigorously addressing the issue of HIT risk:

In summary, the results of this data review suggest significant clinical implications and public safety issues surrounding Health Information Technology. The most commonly reported H-IT safety issues included wrong patient/wrong data, medication administration issues, clinical data loss/miscalculation, and unforeseen software design issues; all of which have varying impact on the patient�s clinical care and outcome, which included 6 death and 43 injuries. The absence of mandatory reporting enforcement of H-IT safety issues limits the number of relevant MDRs and impedes a more comprehensive understanding of the actual problems and implications.


This is especially true considering the FDA's own noted limitations of their information sources:

Limitations of the MAUDE search and final subset of MDRs include the following:

1. Not all H-IT safety issue MDRs can be captured due to limitations of reporting practices including
... (a) Vast number of H-IT systems that interface with multiple medical devices currently assigned to multiple procodes making it difficult to identify specific procodes for H-IT safety issues;
... (b) Procode assignments are also affected by the ability of the reporter/contractor to correctly identify the event as a H-IT safety issue;
... (c) Correct identification by the reporter of the suspect device brand name is challenged by difficulties discerning the actual H-IT system versus the device it supports.
2. Due to incomplete information in the MDRs, it is difficult to unduplicate similar reports, potentially resulting in a higher number of reports than actual events.
3. Reported death and injury events may only be associated with the reported device but not necessarily attributed to the device.
Memo: H-IT Safety Issues
4 Correct identification by the reporter of the manufacturer name is convoluted by the inability to discern the manufacturer of the actual H-IT system versus the device it supports.
5 The volume of MDR reporting to MAUDE may be impacted by a lack of understanding the reportability of H-IT safety issues and enforcement of such reporting.

If HIT were VIOXX or Phen-Fen, the class action lawsuits would likely be starting already.


(Note: for more on why there is a scarcity of data on HIT related adverse events, see my paper "Remediating an Unintended Consequence of Healthcare IT: A Dearth of Data on Unintended Consequences of Healthcare IT" at this Scribd link. This paper was not accepted on first draft by the medical informatics peer review process. I received anonymous review comments such as one that paradoxically stated that the paper "did not contain anything that could not be read in any big city newspaper", an odd comment indeed considering the topic. On that basis I decided not to attempt a revision but to post the paper publicly. -- SS)

One has to ask why this internal FDA report has not been made public until the Huffington Post article, nor been acted upon vigorously. The term of art is "double standard" compared to pharmaceuticals and other medical devices.

When the NEJM starts publishing unreferenced statements of absolute certainty like this from ONC Chair Blumenthal:

The widespread use of electronic health records (EHRs) in the United States is inevitable. EHRs will improve caregivers� decisions and patients� outcomes. Once patients experience the benefits of this technology, they will demand nothing less from their providers. Hundreds of thousands of physicians have already seen these benefits in their clinical practice.

and the HuffPo Investigative Fund quotes him as follows:

�We know that every study and every professional consensus process has concluded that electronic health systems strongly and materially improve patient safety. And we believe that in spreading electronic health records we are going to avoid many types of errors that currently plague the healthcare system,� Blumenthal said when unveiling new regulations in Washington on July 13.

... a statement easily demonstrable to be without merit, in fact, then one has to wonder where science has gone.

One also has to wonder if someone is short-circuiting the FDA's role in regulating this technology.

Could Blumenthal (in essence a family doctor), Sibelius (a trial lawyer), DeParle, or others, or the White House itself be telling FDA how to conduct its business? Are they impeding FDA's regulatory role in the irrationally exuberant multi-billion $$$ race to HIT utopia?

Finally, it is my belief that numerous health IT/medical informatics academics and talking heads who've steadfastly avoided the issue of health IT-related patient harm, or scoffed at it in legally-discoverable forums, might find themselves as defendants in upcoming plaintiff lawsuits. "Knew, or should have known" is the phrase that might apply.

As I learned from my pre-informatics Transit Authority medical management experience, juries will likely not take kindly to academic and marketing arguments akin to Scott Adam's sarcastic example of the logical fallacy of "ignoring all anecdotal evidence":

"I always get hives immediately after eating strawberries. But without a scientifically controlled experiment, it's not reliable data. So I continue to eat strawberries every day, since I can't tell if they cause hives."

-- SS

Wednesday, August 4, 2010

More on Huffington Post Investigative Fund: "FDA, Obama Digital Medical Records Team at Odds over Safety Oversight"

Re: today's Huffington Post Investigative Fund article "FDA, Obama Digital Medical Records Team at Odds over Safety Oversight."

(I'd written some preliminary comments at an earlier post entitled "Huffington Post Investigative Fund: FDA, Obama Digital Medical Records Team at Odds over Safety Oversight.")

First, some relatively obvious questions about the Cerner health IT crashes at the Trinity Health System chain of hospitals featured in the story:

  • How many patients were affected? Is the number actually known?
  • Were affected patient charts corrected?
  • What restrictions, if any, have been placed on physicians, other clinicians, employees, contractors, staff, etc. about speaking to the press on the Trinity Health HIT malfunctions?
  • If any restrictions were placed, are they in violation of Joint Commission Safety Standards as in my July 22, 2009 JAMA letter to the editor "Health Care Information Technology, Hospital Responsibilities, and Joint Commission Standards" at this link?
  • Did this healthcare system sign "hold harmless" clauses with Cerner, as per Koppel and Kreda's 2009 JAMA article "Health Care Information Technology Vendors' Hold Harmless Clause - Implications for Patients and Clinicians, JAMA 2009;301(12):1276-1278, at this link?
  • Did this healthcare system sign a gag clause with Cerner, the vendor of their affected systems according to the Huffington Post article?
  • Medical adverse events from medical record errors can occur quickly, or be more delayed. If patient harm comes of the IT errors that occurred, will the healthcare system file a public report?

Now, on to some specific comments and observations on the Huffington Post Investigative Fund article.

The Huffington Post article begins:

Computers at a major Midwest hospital chain went awry on June 29, posting some doctors� orders to the wrong medical charts in a few cases and possibly putting patients in harm�s way.

The digital records system �would switch to another patient record without the user directing it to do so,� said Stephen Shivinsky, vice-president for corporate communications at Trinity Health System. Trinity operates 46 hospitals, most in Michigan, Iowa and Ohio.

The bolded passage sounds like obfuscatory PR language, as if the EMR system changed the window focus to another patient's window (people do this all the time when they have multiple windows open in a GUI). If so, that would not be a major problem - the user would just switch back via clicking on the desired window.

Let's state what it sounds like the problem really was with crystal clarity:

Data a clinician entered into the window of primary focus (say, on Mary Jones) would end up in the electronic record of a window that was not the window of primary focus and in the background (say, that of Tom Smith).

The clinician would be unaware this had occurred, and two errors would then occur. The first error was that appropriate data would be missing for Mary. The second is that inappropriate data would be present for Tom. These events put both patients at risk of medical error.

Less than two weeks later, an unrelated glitch caused Trinity to shut down its $400 million system for four hours at 10 hospitals in the network because electronic pharmacy orders weren�t being delivered to nurses for dispensing to patients, he said.

Was this 'glitch' [a code word for "we are not in control of our system, it is in control of us" - ed.] related to the problem above? If so, that would suggest major system problems deep within its code. If not, it suggests lax overall quality control of this IT.

�As soon as it was brought to our attention, we moved to fix the problem,� Shivinsky said of Trinity�s system

This statement says nothing. One would not expect them to wait to fix a potentially dangerous problem.

He said nobody was injured in either event, ...

As in my prior post, the correct statement would be:

Nobody was injured, yet, due to the errors.

... the Cerner Corp. system now works properly,

Does that mean all the problems are fixed? The article implies not via its ending where Shivinsky is quoted that:

... Meanwhile technicians are still trying to figure out the root cause. �We�ll get to the bottom of it and fix it,� he said.

By the way, I note the following employee reporting site on Cerner's environment: link. Could this be a factor in Richard Granger, the former head of the UK's NHS national IT programme saying that:

"Sometimes we put in stuff that I'm just ashamed of ... Some of the stuff that Cerner has put in recently is appalling ... Cerner and prime contractor Fujitsu had not listened to end users ... Failed marriages and co-dependency with subcontractors ... A string of problems ranging from missing appointment records, to inability to report on wait times ... Almost a dozen cancelled go-live dates ... Stupid or evil people ... Stockholm syndrome -identifying with suppliers' interests rather than your own ... A little coterie of people out there who are "alleged experts" who were dismissed for reasons of non-performance."

I can only wonder.

... and the hospital chain determined that �technician error� led to the system shutdown and that the mixing up of patients was the result of a �Cerner coding issue� involving software that occurred after an upgrade.

What was the "technician" doing that led to the shutdown, what was the technician's background and qualifications to be doing it to a mission critical medical device?

Further, what, exactly, was the "Cerner coding issue?" Was it Cerner's fault? Trinity's? Both?

Were other organizations using the same software similarly affected?

How will other healthcare organizations learn if the cause of the problems is not revealed?

Even absent any harm to patients, such incidents underscore possible risks faced by even large health organizations that have eagerly embraced new medical software to track patient records and treatment. As the Obama administration ramps up plans to create a digital medical file for every American by 2014 � at an anticipated tab to taxpayers of up to $27 billion � technology�s boosters tend to tout its potential benefits to patients and ability to slow runaway medical costs.

That's not been my observation. Look at the UK for instance:

The UK Public Accounts Committee report on disastrous problems in their 12.7 billion national EMR program is here.

Gateway reviews of the UK National Programme for IT from the Office of Government Commerce (OGC) are here (released under the UK�s Freedom of Information Act), and a summary of 16 key points is here.


I wish there were strong documentary evidence on the latter point about major savings, and that there wasn't evidence to the contrary. The healthcare system doesn't have enough spare capital to throw away on the hopes some touted technology (from which an industry stands to make billions) is a panacea.

Yet despite the high political and financial stakes, the administration has established no national mandatory monitoring procedure for the new devices and software. That no process exists to report and track errors, pinpoint their causes and prevent them from recurring is largely the result of two decades of resistance by the technology industry, a review of government records and interviews by the Huffington Post Investigative Fund shows. The industry argues that even with flaws, digital systems are an improvement over current paper records.

That is no excuse for decades of toleration of the flaws. It is an amoral position. As at my July 28 post "An Open Question on Moral Authority and Healthcare IT", it is playing God.

The HuffPo article continues:

�There�s an assumption that just because you have an electronic system, it�s going to be safer, so people let down their guards,� said Vimla Patel, who directs research on the topic at the University of Texas Health Science Center in Houston.

It's not an "assumption." This meme has been pushed so long by the HIT industry and its irrationally exuberant, uncritical supporters, it's become an accepted statement of fact - as per my July 14 post "Science or Politics? The New England Journal and "The 'Meaningful Use' Regulation for Electronic Health Records" where the Chairman of ONC states it as fact in the New England Journal of Medicine, with nary a footnote to back it up:

Blumenthal - The widespread use of electronic health records (EHRs) in the United States is inevitable. EHRs will improve caregivers� decisions and patients� outcomes. Once patients experience the benefits of this technology, they will demand nothing less from their providers. Hundreds of thousands of physicians have already seen these benefits in their clinical practice.

That's pretty definitive. If there's a trace of doubt, I don't see it.

Monitoring could help others learn from problems faced by early users of the technology, which is being sold nationally, or how they were remedied. Shivinsky said he wasn�t sure if federal officials had been notified of the difficulties at Trinity � or would be. No rule requires it.

Why is there no rule? What if this were a medical device such as a CT scanner, or heart defibrillator? Why does health IT get special accommodation when it is now a regulator and governor of clinician communications and actions, placed in between clinician and patient?

Almost a month after the first event at Trinity, David Blumenthal, the government�s top medical health information technology official, didn�t know about it. �First I�ve heard about it,� Blumenthal said when told by a reporter July 20, as he left a Capitol Hill hearing. Since then, Blumenthal has declined to discuss the incident or its implications.

That's perhaps because it conflicts with his other assertions on health IT technological determinism, noted above. How many other "events" is he aware of?

Kelli Christman, a spokesman for Cerner, the manufacturer of the software used at Trinity, did not respond to repeated emails and phone calls over the past week seeking comment.

What are they hiding? Perhaps other affected healthcare systems?

... Many industry groups contend that FDA regulation would �stifle innovation� and stall the national drive to wire up American medicine. That view resonates among the dozens of health information technology experts serving as consultants to Blumenthal�s office and on advisory groups. Blumenthal also has been skeptical of the need for regulation and argued that even if some miscues occur, digital systems are far less prone to error than paper ones.

In an industry with contractual gag clauses and clinician fear of speaking about HIT problems (e.g., of retaliation by hospital officials), how can anyone be sure of this? Is this a scientific statement, or a marketing position?

See may paper "Remediating an Unintended Consequence of Healthcare IT: A Dearth of Data on Unintended Consequences of Healthcare IT" for more on this issue.

�We know that every study and every professional consensus process has concluded that electronic health systems strongly and materially improve patient safety. And we believe that in spreading electronic health records we are going to avoid many types of errors that currently plague the healthcare system,� Blumenthal said when unveiling new regulations in Washington on July 13.

This statement is without merit, as per my prior post "Huffington Post Investigative Fund: FDA, Obama Digital Medical Records Team at Odds over Safety Oversight."


Further: note to Dr. Blumenthal: Consensus is not science:

[Chrichton, Caltech Michelin Lecture, 2003] ... I want to pause here and talk about this notion of consensus, and the rise of what has been called consensus science. I regard consensus science as an extremely pernicious development that ought to be stopped cold in its tracks. Historically, the claim of consensus has been the first refuge of scoundrels; it is a way to avoid debate by claiming that the matter is already settled. Whenever you hear the consensus of scientists agrees on something or other, reach for your wallet, because you're being had.

Let's be clear: the work of science has nothing whatever to do with consensus. Consensus is the business of politics. Science, on the contrary, requires only one investigator who happens to be right, which means that he or she has results that are verifiable by reference to the real world.

In science consensus is irrelevant. What is relevant is reproducible results. The greatest scientists in history are great precisely because they broke with the consensus. There is no such thing as consensus science. If it's consensus, it isn't science. If it's science, it isn't consensus. Period

Blumenthal goes on:

In public remarks that day, Blumenthal said he �expects� an eventual certification process for the digital systems to �collect information about the problems that occur with the implementation of electronic health records, if any.� He did not say when that would happen.

Eventual? Why not NOW, considering that the HIT industry has been in business for decades? The infrastructure for such reporting already exists, such as the FDA MedWatch system and Manufacturer and User Facility Device Experience (MAUDE) database - where, by the way, an HIT-related death was reported (link).

Imagine the aviation, nuclear energy industry or pharma making such outrageous statements about getting around to collecting information on potentially hazardous flaws "eventually."

In a later interview, Blumenthal said �safety concerns are not being ignored,� but wouldn�t comment further.

Yes, they are being ignored. Worse, they're being suppressed as in this case example, "A Lawsuit Over Healthcare IT Whistleblowing and Wrongful Discharge: Malin v. Siemens Healthcare."

... Dozens of other health information technology insiders, from academics to front-line users who believe digital medical records can promote better and cheaper health care, told the Investigative Fund in interviews that they nonetheless fear safety issues will mount as doctors and hospitals move quickly to install the systems and collect stimulus checks.

Just anecdotal, according to ONC and others.

�People just assume that computers will make things safer,� said Nancy Leveson, a safety engineering expert at Massachusetts Institute of Technology. �While they can be designed to eliminate certain kinds of hazards, they increase others and sometimes they introduce new types of hazards.�

This is a principle direct from the discipline of Social Informatics. Social Informatics (SI) refers to the body of research and study (e.g,, as collected here) that examines social aspects of computerization, including the roles of information technology in social and organizational change, the uses of information technologies in social contexts, and the ways that the social organization of information technologies is influenced by social forces and social practices.

Some experts are calling for closer government monitoring of the systems to protect the public. �We need to have some scrutiny at the front end and have an approval process to make sure they are safe before they�re deployed,� said Sharona Hoffman, a law professor at Case Western Reserve University, who has written about the issue in academic journals.

I am one of those experts, and I agree.

... In 2004, digital record keeping got a boost when President George Bush signed an executive order to create a digital medical file for every American within a decade, a goal officials said at the time they could reach �without substantial regulation.�

�The time wasn�t right at that time to move forward or the support wasn�t there (for safety regulations),� said Robert Kolodner, who ran the national coordinator�s office during some of the Bush years.

Again, I ask - why the hell not? When is a good time to discuss healthcare and HIT safety? Would such attitudes be tolerated in other industries? I dare say, hell no.

Edward H. Shortliffe, president of the American Medical Informatics Association and a longtime industry figure, agreed that safety issues weren�t a �primary concern� as tech companies began to expand their offerings.

That is a startling revelation - it could be the basis for medical malpractice plaintiff lawsuits on the basis of negligence, all the way to criminally negligent homicide if a patient dies of an HIT-related event.

Criminal negligence: The failure to use reasonable care to avoid consequences that threaten or harm the safety of the public and that are the foreseeable outcome of acting in a particular manner.

The HuffPo article further observes:

Earlier this year, the [health IT] trade group convened an expert panel to study the issues for the first time, but its findings have yet to be made public. Shortliffe said he didn�t think the organization would take a stand on government regulation of the industry, but said: �We recognize that there are significant challenges that the field as a whole is facing.�

The "first time" in an industry messing with people's medical care for decades? How is this possible?

... ONC director Blumenthal, the point man for the administration, has called the FDA�s injury findings �anecdotal and fragmentary.�

Just how many "anecdotes" do we need in an industry that places gag clauses on health IT users?

He told the Investigative Fund that he believed nothing in the report indicated a need for regulation [i.e., absence of evidence in a tight-lipped industry as evidence of absence - ed.] Yet others see anecdotes as a starting point for a more methodical look at problems that arise.

Who is more attuned to risk mitigation when they see red flags? Who are the clinician scientists, and who are the "see no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil" politicians?

The same day that Blumenthal, Sebelius and other federal health officials unveiled their digital records plan in Washington, an obscure government agency held a conference less than 20 miles away in suburban Maryland to discuss the state of quality controls.

Ben-Tzion Karsh, an engineering professor at the University of Wisconsin in Madison who attended the National Institute of Standards and Technology conference said he heard a �broad consensus� among experts that electronic medical records need to function better and safer. �The truth is that we do not at this time know what would make an EHR (electronic health record) safe,� he said.

Others said that despite the rosy view taken by many political figures in Washington, many systems on the market today aren�t designed in ways that prevent and limit new errors�and that nobody is holding the industry accountable.


Again I ask: how is this possible after decades of this industry's selling of products to hospitals for use on actual patients?

Also, the simple question arises: is this technology truly ready for the ambitious national roll out plans of the past two administrations?

I've touched on many of these issues in past years on this blog and at my academic website on HIT problems.

I see a clear runaway train and train wreck headed down the tracks.

The next few years in health IT should prove interesting indeed.

-- SS

Related Posts Plugin for WordPress, Blogger...