Make your live is better

Make your live is better.

Your Fammily is Your live

Your Fammily is Your live.

Care your future

Be healty .

This is default featured post 4 title

Go to Blogger edit html and find these sentences.Now replace these sentences with your own descriptions.

This is default featured post 5 title

Go to Blogger edit html and find these sentences.Now replace these sentences with your own descriptions.

Showing posts with label physicians. Show all posts
Showing posts with label physicians. Show all posts

Friday, February 25, 2011

"Replace the RUC!"

We have frequently posted, first here in 2007, and more recently here and here, about the little-known group that controls how the US Medicare system pays physicians, the RBRVS Update Committee, or RUC.

Since 1991, Medicare has set physicians' payments using the Resource Based Relative Value System (RBRVS), ostensibly based on a rational formula to tie physicians' pay to the time and effort they expend, and the resources they consume on particular patient care activities. Although the RBRVS was meant to level the payment playing field for cognitive services, including primary care vs procedures, over time it has had the opposite effect, as explained by Bodenheimer et al in a 1997 article in the Annals of Internal Medicine.(1) A system that pays a lot for procedures, but much less for diagnosing illnesses, forecasting prognoses, deciding on treatment, and understanding patients' values and preferences when procedures and devices are not involved, is likely to be very expensive, but not necessarily very good for patients.

As we wrote before, to update the system, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) relies almost exclusively on the advice of the RBRVS Update Committee. The RUC is a private committee of the AMA, touted as an "expert panel" that takes advantage of the organization's First Amendment rights to petition the government. Membership on the RUC is allotted to represent specialty societies, so that the vast majority of the members represent specialties that do procedures and focus on expensive, high-technology tests and treatments. However, the identities of RUC members are opaque, and the proceedings of the group are secret.

To expand on the penultimate point, the current page on the AMA web-site that describes the RUC only lists its members in terms of their specialties and organizational affiliation. Their names do not appear. A response to a previous post by me on the subject by the then Chair and Chair-Elect of the RUC suggested that the RUC membership is not quite secret. They stated that "a list of the individual members of the RUC is published in the AMA publication, Medicare RBRVS 2009: The Physicians Guide." This publication is available from the AMA here for a mere $71.95 (although now with the notation that the product has been "discontinued.") However, the book is not on the web, or in my local or university library, and I have no other way to easily access it. Thus, the RUC membership is at best relatively opaque.

To expand on the ultimate point, as Goodson(2) noted, RUC "meetings are closed to outside observers except by invitation of the chair." Furthermore, he stated, "proceedings are proprietary and therefore not publicly available for review."

The fog surrounding the operations of the RUC seems to have affected many who write about it. We have posted (here, here, here, and here) about how previous publications about problems with incentives provided to physicians seemed to have avoided even mentioning the RUC. Up until 2010, after the US recent attempt at health care reform, the RUC seemed to remain the great unmentionable. Even the leading US medical journal seemed reluctant to even print its name.

That changed in October, 2010.  A combined effort by the Wall Street Journal, the Center for Public Integrity, and Kaiser Health News yielded two major articles about the RUC, here in the WSJ (also with two more spin-off articles), and here from the Center for Public Integrity (also reprinted by Kaiser Health News.) The articles covered the main points about the RUC: its de facto control over how physicians are paid, its "secretive" nature (quoting the WSJ article), how it appears to favor procedures over cognitive physician services, etc.

So the RUC became less anechoic.  Now, four months later, there is more news.  A new site called "Replace the RUC!" has now appeared, with the following introduction:
This site has been developed - see here for our backgrounds - to help primary care physicians and other interested individuals obtain verifiable background from reputable sources on:

* The evolution and structure of the US' medical payment system.
* How it came to devalue primary care and favor specialty services.
* How that has translated to lower quality care at far greater expense in the US.

We believe the overwhelming majority of American primary care physicians are deeply frustrated with the differences in how primary and specialty care are valued by the current system, and the havoc that system has wrought throughout health care and the nation.

The first step to remedying this situation is for the primary care medical societies to visibly and loudly withdraw from participation in the RUC, de-legitimizing the process.

That said, this effort is most decidedly NOT primarily about getting primary care physicians more money, but bringing our health system back into homeostasis.

We have previously noted that there are many unanswered questions about the RUC:
  • How did the government come to fix the payments physicians receive? Government price-fixing has not been popular in the US, yet this has caused no outcry.
  • Why is the process by which they are fixed allowed to be so opaque and unaccountable? Why are there no public hearings on the updates, and why is there no input from practicing physicians or organizations other than those related to the RUC?
  • How did the RUC become de facto in charge of this process?
  • Why does the AMA keep the membership of the RUC so opaque, and give no input into the RUC process to its general membership?
  • Why is the RUC membership so dominated by procedural specialists? Why were primary care physicians, who made up at least a sizable minority of physicians when the update process was started, not represented according to their numbers?
  • Why has there been so little discussion of the RUC and its responsibility for an extremely expensive health care system dominated by high-technology, expensive, risky and invasive procedures?
We welcome this new site as a way to answer these questions, and more importantly, as a way to develop more rational incentives within the health care system.

Note that "Replace the RUC!" will be added to our link list.

References



1. Bodenheimer T, Berenson RA, Rudolf P. The primary care-specialty income gap: why it matters. Ann Intern Med 2007; 146: 301-306. (Link here.)
2. Goodson JD. Unintended consequences of Resource-Based Relative Value Scale reimbursement. JAMA 2007; 298(19):2308-2310. (Link here.)

Thursday, October 28, 2010

RUC It Up - How the US Government Fixes Physicians' Payments Becomes Less Anechoic

We have frequently posted, first here in 2007, and most recently here and here, about the little-known group that controls how the US Medicare system pays physicians, the RBRVS Update Committee, or RUC. 

Since 1991, Medicare as set physicians' payments using the Resource Based Relative Value System (RBRVS), ostensibly based on a rational formula to tie physicians' pay to the time and effort the expend, and the resources they consume on particular patient care activities.  Although the RBRVS was meant to level the payment playing field for cognitive services, including primary care, vs procedures, over time it has had the opposite effect, as explained by Bodenheimer et al in a 1997 article in the Annals of Internal Medicine.(1)  A system that pays a lot for procedures, but much less for diagnosing illnesses, forecasting prognoses, deciding on treatment, understanding patients' values and preferences, when procedures and devices are not involved, is likely to be very expensive, but not necessarily very good for patients. 

As we wrote before, to update the system, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) relies almost exclusively on the advice of the RBRVS Update Committee. The RUC is a private committee of the AMA, touted as an "expert panel" that takes advantage of the organization's First Amendment rights to petition the government. Membership on the RUC is allotted to represent specialty societies, so that the vast majority of the members represent specialties that do procedures and focus on expensive, high-technology tests and treatments. However, the identities of RUC members are opaque, and the proceedings of the group are secret.


To expand on the penultimate point, the current page on the AMA web-site that describes the RUC only lists its members in terms of their specialties and organizational affiliation. Their names do not appear. A response to a previous post by me on the subject by the then Chair and Chair-Elect of the RUC suggested that the RUC membership is not quite secret. They stated that "a list of the individual members of the RUC is published in the AMA publication, Medicare RBRVS 2009: The Physicians Guide." This publication is available from the AMA here for a mere $71.95. However, the book is not on the web, or in my local or university library, and I have no other way to easily access it. Thus, the RUC membership as at best relatively opaque.

To expand on the ultimate point, as Goodson(2) noted, RUC "meetings are closed to outside observers except by invitation of the chair." Furthermore, he stated, "proceedings are proprietary and therefore not publicly available for review."

The fog surrounding the operations of the RUC seems to have affected many who write about. We have posted (here, herehere, and here) about how previous publications about problems with incentives provided to physicians seemed to have avoided even mentioning the RUC. Up until now in 2010, after the US recent attempt at health care reform, the RUC seems to remain the great unmentionable. Even the leading US medical journal seems reluctant to even print its name.

That has just changed.  A combined effort by the Wall Street Journal, the Center for Public Integrity, and Kaiser yielded two major articles about the RUC, here in the WSJ (also with two more spin-off articles), and here from the Center for Public Integrity (also reprinted by Kaiser Health News.)  The articles cover the main points about the RUC: its de facto control over how physicians are paid, its "secretive" nature (quoting the WSJ article), how it appears to favor procedures over cognitive physician services, etc.

So the RUC has suddenly become less anechoic.

However, despite the best efforts of some very good investigative reporters, there still are important unanswered questions, questions we have raised before:
  • How did the government come to fix the payments physicians receive? Government price-fixing has not been popular in the US, yet this has caused no outcry.
  • Why is the process by which they are fixed allowed to be so opaque and unaccountable? Why are there no public hearings on the updates, and why is there no input from practicing physicians or organizations other than those related to the RUC?
  • How did the RUC become de facto in charge of this process?
  • Why does the AMA keep the membership on the RUC so opaque, and give no input into the RUC process to its general membership?
  • Why is the RUC membership so dominated by procedural specialists? Why were primary care physicians, who made up at least a sizable minority of physicians when the update process was started, not represented according to their numbers?
  • Why has there been so little discussion of the RUC and its responsibility for an extremely expensive health care system dominated by high-technology, expensive, risky and invasive procedures?
Without discussing how the incentives for physicians became so unbalanced, do we really expect we can fix them?  If we do not fix them, do we really think we can "bend the cost curve?"  If we do not control our costs, do we really think that we will be able to make good health care accessible for all?  At least now I can say that the issue may really be in play for health care professionals, health care policy experts, and the public at large.
See also comments on other blogs: DBs Medical Rants, GoozNews, and Managed Care Matters.

ADDENDUM - Additionally, see comments on the Retired Doc's Thoughts blog, and the Running a Hospital blog.

References
1. Bodenheimer T, Berenson RA, Rudolf P. The primary care-specialty income gap: why it matters. Ann Intern Med 2007; 146: 301-306. (Link here.)

2. Goodson JD. Unintended consequences of Resource-Based Relative Value Scale reimbursement. JAMA 2007; 298(19):2308-2310. (Link here.)

Friday, September 17, 2010

Forest Pharmaceuticals Pleads Guilty to Obstruction of Justice, No Individual Pays Any Penalty

The parade of legal settlements marches on.  The latest story is about Forest Laboratories and its marketing of Celexa (citalopram ) and Levothyroid (l-thyroxin).  Here is the most complete version, courtesy of Natasha Singer reporting for the New York Times. First, the lead sentence:
A unit of Forest Laboratories, the maker of the antidepressant Celexa, agreed on Wednesday to pay more than $313 million to settle criminal and civil complaints, including a claim that it had illegally promoted the drug for use in children.

Here are the charges:
Among the criminal charges was one that the subsidiary, Forest Pharmaceuticals, marketed Celexa, which was approved only for adult depression, to treat children and adolescents. The government also claimed that, in conjunction with the company�s off-label promotion, Forest publicized the positive results of a study on Celexa in adolescents while failing to tell doctors about a similar study that had negative results.

'Forest Pharmaceuticals deliberately chose to pursue corporate profits over its obligations to the F.D.A. and the American public,' Carmen Ortiz, the United States attorney for the District of Massachusetts, said in a statement Wednesday.

In addition, federal prosecutors accused Forest of paying doctors to induce them to prescribe Celexa and another antidepressant, Lexapro. The remuneration included 'cash payments disguised as grants or consulting fees, expensive meals and lavish entertainment, and other valuable goods and services,' the government said in its civil complaint.

Among the items that Forest sales representatives gave to doctors from 1998 to 2005, the complaint said, were tickets to St. Louis Cardinal games, which were to be 'leveraged and sold as a reward for prescriptions'; a $1,000 gift certificate to Alain Ducasse, a gourmet French restaurant, for a high-prescribing child psychiatrist; a deep-sea fishing trip off Cape Cod for a doctor and his three sons; $400 in Broadway theater tickets for a doctor and his wife; and Red Sox tickets worth $2,276 to be used for doctors in the Boston area.

So we not just off-label marketing, but suppression of clinical research (of course, a study whose results were not favorable to the product being marketed), and payments to doctors as an "inducement to prescribe."

But wait, there is more:
As part of the criminal settlement, Forest Pharmaceuticals, which is based in St. Louis, agreed to plead guilty to one felony count of obstructing justice, acknowledging that employees had lied to F.D.A. officials during a plant inspection in 2003.

The company also agreed to plead guilty to two misdemeanors, one of which covers the company�s misbranding of Celexa by marketing the antidepressant for use in children from 1998 to 2002.

The other misdemeanor covers the illegal distribution from 2001 to 2003 of an unapproved drug, Levothroid, to treat a thyroid hormone deficiency. Such thyroid pills, made by various drug makers, had been sold in the United States since the 1950s without F.D.A. approval. But in 2001, the agency told drug makers that they needed to reduce their distribution of such medications until the companies obtained agency approval to market the pills.

The criminal charges accused Forest of making a deliberate decision to continue distributing the drug in quantities exceeding the F.D.A.�s directive. After the agency sent a warning letter to Forest, the company directed employees to work until 1 a.m. to continue shipping as much Levothroid as possible, according to the criminal complaint.

So there was also obstruction of justice in the form of lying to the FDA, and selling drugs that the FDA had ordered not to be sold.

So what are the penalties?
The criminal settlement calls for the company to pay a $150 million fine and to forfeit an additional $14 million in assets. Forest will also pay more than $88 million to the federal government and more than $60 million to the states to resolve a civil complaint that its actions caused false claims to be submitted to federal health care programs. In addition, two whistle-blowers will split $14 million from the federal share of the settlement.

Forest has also entered into a five-year corporate integrity agreement, requiring an independent expert to review the company�s compliance with drug marketing regulations.

So here we go again. A large drug company was up to no good, suppressing research, paying doctors for their prescriptions, lying to the FDA, and disobeying its orders.

The penalty seemed large, over $300 million. However, Celexa was a big revenue generator at the time the events above occurred, topping $1 billion in revenue first in 2002 (per Forbes here). Furthermore, as noted by Ed Silverman on Pharmalot, it seems no individual will suffer any negative consequences for authorizing, directing, or implementing the conduct described above. Finally, as best I can tell, despite the fact that a Forest subsidiary will plead guilty to a felony, the company is not going to be barred from doing business with the government. 

So, despite pleading guilty to a felony and three misdemeanors, neither Forest as a company nor any individual working for the company will really suffer very much.  On the other hand, the leaders of Forest have been doing very well.  The company's CEO, Howard Solomon, was number 18 on Wall Street Journal list of the 25 highest paid CEOs over the last decade.  His total realized compensation was over $385 million over the last 10 years.  According to the company's 2010 proxy statement, his total compensation in 2009 was $8,267,236.  The four other highest paid executives made from just over $2.5 million to $5.3 million.

So here we go again.  Another large health care organization has been found to have done wrong, but the only penalty is a fine that whose impact will be diffused across the whole company, and ultimately be paid by its employees, its customers, including patients, and its stockholders.  Meanwhile, the people who authorized, directed, or implemented the wrong doing apparently will pay nothing and receive no negative incentives.  Furthermore, the top leaders of the company, whose huge compensation in the past was increased by the results of the wrong doing, will continue to prosper.

As we have said again and again,  we will not deter unethical behavior by health care organizations until the people who authorize, direct or implement bad behavior fear some meaningfully negative consequences. Real health care reform needs to make health care leaders accountable, and especially accountable for the bad behavior that helped make them rich.

By the way, the current case offers an avenue for those who do not like what Forest did to ask those who are supposed to be ultimately responsible for its behavior how this was allowed to happen.  The board of directors of the company is supposed to be ultimately accountable for the company's actions.  As we have noted before, these directors are supposed to "demonstrate unyielding loyalty to the company's shareholders." [Per Monks RAG, Minow N. Corporate Governance, 3rd edition. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004. P.200.]

The current directors of Forest Laboratories, according to the company's 2010 proxy statement, include Dr Nesli Basgoz, "Associate Chief for Clinical Affairs, Division of Infectious Diseases, Massachusetts General Hospital (MGH)," and "Associate Professor of Medicine at Harvard Medical School."  Also, it includes Dr Lester B Salans, "Clinical Professor" at Mount Sinai Medical School, not to mention Dr Peter J Zimetbaum, "Director of Clinical Cardiology" at Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center in Boston (BIDMC), and "Associate Professor of Medicine at Harvard Medical School."   Maybe some enterprising student journalist will get to ask the good doctors how they let things at Forest get so ethically out of hand.

Tuesday, June 1, 2010

RUC Off - the New England Journal Once Again Fails to Mention the Unmentionable

Last week, the influential New England Journal of Medicine published an article by Bruce Vladek entitled "Fixing Medicare's Physician Payment System."(1)  Although only identified as working for Nexara, a health consulting business, Mr Vladek was a former administrator of what was then called the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) of the US Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), the part of the department that then ran the US Medicare program.  Vladek thus can reasonably be viewed as an expert on Medicare. 

Vladek identified two main problems with the current way physicians are paid by Medicare.  First,
Medicare is captive to an arbitrary, if elegantly conceived, formula for total payments to physicians � the sustainable growth rate (SGR). In the alternate reality of the Congressional budget process, the SGR will reduce Medicare's physician payments, which already trail those from private insurers, as far into the future as the eye can see.

Second,
there is widespread consensus that the relative fees in the current system are a significant cause of the growing imbalance in supply and utilization between primary care and specialty services in the U.S. health care system. That imbalance, in turn, is widely perceived as a major cause of both excessive costs and inadequate quality of care. This is not just a Medicare problem: the Medicare Resource-Based Relative Value Scale is used by most private insurers to set relative prices for physicians.

Vladek expanded on the second point as follows
the basic mechanics of the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule, which was supposed to change physician payment to increase rewards for primary care services at the expense of procedural and interventional services, appears to have gone totally off track. For various reasons, the fee schedule, which originally did increase the prices of evaluation and management services relative to those of surgery or invasive procedures, turned in the other direction through the process of annual updating of relative value units. Surgeons, radiologists, and some medical specialists are now paid two to three times as much per hour as providers of cognitive services, which is about where we began 20 years ago; this was the situation that the fee schedule was supposed to fix.

The question of the relative virtues of primary versus specialty care can be debated ad nauseam, but in other wealthy countries that serve their populations at least as well as we do, the ratio of primary care physicians to specialists is much higher than in the United States, and the gap in compensation is much smaller or the poles even reversed. Young physicians, burdened by increasing educational debts, may well choose a career path on the basis of a major difference in compensation, especially when the better-compensated positions require less ongoing responsibility for patients and offer better working hours.

This is about all that Vladek wrote about how the imbalance between how Medicare pays for primary care and other "cognitive services," and for procedures came about. Vladek, and many others have argued that this imbalance has lead to strong financial incentives that have been slowly destroying primary care, and strong incentives that have lead to the use of too many procedures, both strong drivers of rising costs in the most expensive health care system in the world.

Vladek noted vaguely that "through various reasons," the incentives were imbalanced by "the process of annual updating of relative value units."

However, as we have discussed in several blog posts, a lot more is known about how this process got "totally off track."

In fact, in 2007, an article by Bodenheimer et al in the Annals of Internal Medicine explained the problems in considerably more detail.(2)  As we wrote then, Its main points included
  • Proceduralists are often able to learn how to do their procedures more quickly, and thus increase the volume of procedures done, while office and hospital visits can only be sped up so much.
  • The process used to update the RBRVS system is biased towards procedures for three main reasons: 1. "specialty society influence in proposing RVU [relative value unit] increases," 2. the specialist-heavy RUC [Relative Value Scale Update Committee] membership," and 3. "the desire of RUC specialists to avoid increases in evaluation and management [that is, cognitive, or non-procedural] RVUs."
  • Medicare now uses a formula to limit increases in overall spending. The use of this formula leads to across the board cuts in all reimbursements. Since cognitive services reimbursements were never high to begin with, and have rarely been individually increased, these cuts tend to have disproportionate decreases.
  • Private insurers and managed care organizations tend to follow Medicare's lead in their reimbursement procedures, but tend to tilt the playing field even more in favor of procedures versus cognitive services. Several studies showed that such payers paid more for procedures than did Medicare, but about the same for office and hospital visits.
The role of the RBRVS Update Committee (RUC) is complex and in many ways mysterious.  As we wrote before, to update the system, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) relies almost exclusively on the advice of the RBRVS Update Committee. The RUC is a private committee of the AMA, touted as an "expert panel" that takes advantage of the organization's First Amendment rights to petition the government. Membership on the RUC is allotted to represent specialty societies, so that the vast majority of the members represent specialties that do procedures and focus on expensive, high-technology tests and treatments. However, the identities of RUC members are opaque, and the proceedings of the group are secret.

To expand on the penultimate point, the current page on the AMA web-site that describes the RUC only lists its members in terms of their specialties and organizational affiliation.  Their names do not appear.  A response to a previous post by me on the subject by the then Chair and Chair-Elect of the RUC suggested that the RUC membership is not quite secret. They stated that "a list of the individual members of the RUC is published in the AMA publication, Medicare RBRVS 2009: The Physicians Guide." This publication is available from the AMA here for a mere $71.95. However, the book is not on the web, or in my local or university library, and I have no other way to easily access it.  Thus, the RUC membership as at best relatively opaque.

To expand on the ultimate point, as Goodson(3) noted, RUC "meetings are closed to outside observers except by invitation of the chair." Furthermore, he stated, "proceedings are proprietary and therefore not publicly available for review."

The fog surrounding the operations of the RUC seems to have affected many who write about.  We have posted (here, here, and here) about how previous publications about problems with incentives provided to physicians seemed to have avoided even mentioning the RUC.  In 2010, post the US recent attempt at health care reform, the RUC seems to remain the great unmentionable.  Even the leading US medical journal seems reluctant to even print its name. 

Thus, as we noted before, however, the mysteries about it remain:
  • How did the government come to fix the payments physicians receive? Government price-fixing has not been popular in the US, yet this has caused no outcry.
  • Why is the process by which they are fixed allowed to be so opaque and unaccountable? Why are there no public hearings on the updates, and why is there no input from practicing physicians or organizations other than those related to the RUC?
  • How did the RUC become de facto in charge of this process?
  • Why does the AMA keep the membership on the RUC so opaque, and give no input into the RUC process to its general membership?
  • Why is the RUC membership so dominated by procedural specialists? Why were primary care physicians, who made up at least a sizable minority of physicians when the update process was started, not represented according to their numbers?
  • Why has there been so little discussion of the RUC and its responsibility for an extremely expensive health care system dominated by high-technology, expensive, risky and invasive procedures?
Without discussing how the incentives for physicians became so unbalanced, do we really expect we can fix them?  In this case, the persistence of the anechoic effect seems to be doing real damage to the discussion of the critical issues we in the US face today.
References


1. Vladek B. Fixing Medicare's physician payment system. N Engl J Med 2010; 362:1955-1957. (Link here.)
2. Bodenheimer T, Berenson RA, Rudolf P. The primary care-specialty income gap: why it matters. Ann Intern Med 2007; 146: 301-306. (Link here.)
3. Goodson JD. Unintended consequences of Resource-Based Relative Value Scale reimbursement. JAMA 2007; 298(19):2308-2310.  (Link here.)

Related Posts Plugin for WordPress, Blogger...