The Massachusetts Blue Cross Blue Shield CEO's Golden Parachute - "'Have's' Greasing One Another's Pockets"

We have frequently discussed the kind of compensation now frequently given to leaders of health care organizations.  Although often even the most disproportionately outrageous compensation only attracts transient interest, a recent regional story in this genre has really gotten legs.

How Big the Golden Parachute?
The story was about the severance package given to one Cleve L Killingsworth, the former CEO of not-for-profit health care insurance company Massachusetts Blue Cross Blue Shield.  While first reported as being worth $8.6 million,(1) the estimate of his total severance was soon raised to $11 million.(2)

This is a Way to Control Costs?

Immediately, that amount was contrasted with the supposed emphasis of the company on controlling costs, and its recent poor performance:

Killingsworth�s tenure at Blue Cross, which has nearly 3 million members, was marked by efforts to address skyrocketing medical costs by launching a 'global payment' pilot program, under which health care providers are given an annual budget and incentives to keep patients healthy and out of the hospital.

'Without Cleve�s leadership, we wouldn�t be where we are today in shifting from fee-for-service to global payments,' said senior vice president Jay McQuaide.

But the insurer stumbled financially in recent years, recording back-to-back operating losses totaling nearly $215 million in 2009 and 2010 as the economy weakened and state regulators acted to limit premium increases for policies covering small businesses and individuals.(3)

Then focus shifted to the company's board of trustees, which lead to recognition of some more striking contrasts. First, some prominent members of the board which approved the huge golden parachute had been vocal supporters of controlling health care costs:

Key members of the Blue Cross Blue Shield board that gave the nod to then-CEO Cleve Killingsworth�s controversial $11 million severance have been public advocates for trimming soaring health-care costs � even as they sat on a panel that quietly approved the departing chief�s golden parachute.

Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce President Paul Guzzi has crusaded to lower health-care costs in his day job representing the interests of local businesses, many of which struggle under the burden of rising premiums for their employee health plans.

'Advancing payment reform to bring health-care costs under control' is one of the Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce�s top policy agenda items, Guzzi said in a statement in January. Guzzi made $84,463 as the Blue Cross board chairman at the time of the Killingsworth vote.

Robert J. Haynes, president of the Massachusetts AFL-CIO who made $72,700 as a Blue Cross board member in 2010, has championed health-care cost reduction for the thousands of union members he represents.

'Unions stand ready to be part of the solution to the health-care cost crisis in which we all find ourselves,' Haynes said in an AFL-CIO statement in January. 'The only way to ensure we are part of the solution is to guarantee that we have a voice and meaningful role in how cost savings are achieved.'

Bentley University president Gloria Larson, who earned $76,400 as a Blue Cross board member last year, helped organize a confab of business, labor and political leaders in Ashland in January that addressed rising health-care costs. Those who planned to attend reportedly included two other Blue Cross board members � Haynes and former Suffolk District Attorney Ralph C. Martin II.(4)

Why Pay a Non-Profit's Trustees?

Also, as the quote above pointed out, it appears that the board members were themselves paid fairly well for a very part-time job, even though in general trustees of not-for-profit organizations serve as unpaid volunteers. However, it was soon revealed the paying board members is common practice for all Massachusetts non-profit health insurance companies.(5)

Some Blue Cross board members tried to defuse the issue by minimizing the impact of their pay on the organization's total budget:

Robert J. Haynes, president of the Massachusetts AFL-CIO and a critic of excessive corporate pay, was questioned about his role on the board following a State House news conference he held on a union-backed plan aimed at lowering health care costs. He said he would not give up his $72,000 annual payment from Blue Cross until the issue was reviewed by the company, and said the money given to board members does not play a role in rising health care costs.

'The cost of health insurance is not affected very much,' Haynes said. 'It�s about $1 million that board members get paid. On $13 billion in revenue, it�s like pennies a year.' (6)

What Should the New CEO Be Paid?
However, soon the board felt the need to suddenly stop paying itself.(7) The current Blue Cross CEO noted how little he would be paid:

Dreyfus emphasized that he has taken 'rock-bottom-of-the-market' compensation levels -- $800,000 in base pay with the opportunity for $1.6 million in severance � for comparable positions in the insurance industry.

'I will be one of the lowest paid Blue Cross executives in the country,' he said.... (8)

Things are tough all over.

What is Mr Killingsworth Now Up To?

Meanwhile, Mr Killingsworth seems to be weathering the storm. An enterprising reporter attempted to interview him in his house in New York, described as "a sprawling clapboard monstrosity with the charm of an assisted-living facility." However, "Mr Killingsworth was nowhere to be found," and Mrs Killingsworth "slammed the door" on the reporter.  (See picture in cited article.)  (9)

Possibly, Mr Killingworth was away tending his other responsibilities, which include serving on the Boards of Directors of The Traveler's Company and TIAA-CREF, and apparently despite their apparently competitive nature, on the boards of the Harvard Medical School and Boston University.

The Reaction

There were plenty of reactions, mostly vigorously unfavorable, to the contrast between the company's non-profit status, supposed commitment to reducing costs, and financial performance, on one hand, and the compensation given to executives, and board members:

"undermines the credibility of insurers when they say they're serious about bringing down the cost of care" Deidre Cummings, President of the Massachusetts Public Interest Research Group (3)

"If you lose $149 million and then you get paid $11 million for doing it, it is very clear to people where their health-care dollars are going.  And it is not to health care." - Ethan Rome, Health Care for America Now (2)

There were also judgments that health care had become the sandbox for wealthy and well-connected insiders, at the expense of everyone else:

"What we have here today is yet another enraging story of the 'haves'greasing one another's pockets while the 'have-nots' slip beneath the waves." Margery Egan, columnist for the Boston Herald(10)

"Therein lies the problem with boards.  They're supposed to provide oversight, but too often it's the same people tossing money at each other to serve on the boards of each other's companies, the operative word always being 'Yes!'" Brian McGrory, Boston Globe columnist (5)

Most pessimistically:

"If Massachusetts is the model, then national health care reform is ultimately doomed." Derrick Z Jackson, Boston Globe columnist (11)

I am actually now more optimistic.  The coverage of this story really shows that the anechoic effect may be fading .  There is starting to be frank discussion of the role of bad leadership of health care organizations as a cause of health care dysfunction.  If we start to admit these problems, maybe we can figure out solutions.

I will add just one opinion to those expressed in these articles.  The clear problem here is again perverse incentives.  The issue with how much this CEO was paid, and how his board members were paid was not mainly the diversion from direct health care of the funds involved.  Instead, the concerns ought to be: what sorts of people do these payments attract?  Are they the sorts of people who will uphold the organization's mission?  Once attracted, what sorts of incentives do the prospects of these payments supply for what sorts of decisions?  Do these sorts of incentives lead to decisions that uphold the mission in the long-term?

In this case, these concerns are underlined by the Blue Cross trustees' cavalier attitude to their own pay, and the new CEO's belief that $800,000 a year is "rock-bottom." 

I hope that the amount of discussion this case provoked might actually lead to some needed regional changes.

More globally, as we have said before, far too often the leaders of not-for-profit health care institutions seem more interested in padding their own bottom lines than upholding the institutions' missions. They often seem entirely unaware of their duty to put those missions ahead of their own self-interest. Like the financial services sector in the era of "greed is good," health care too often seems run by "insiders hijacking established institutions for their personal benefit." True health care reform would encourage leadership of health care who understand health care and care about its mission, rather than those who see a quick way to make a small fortune.

References


1.  Gil G. Former Blue Cross CEO got $8.6m last year.  Boston Globe, March 1, 2011. 
2. McConville C. Ex-Blue Cross CEO walks away with $11M. Boston Herald, March 2, 2011.
3. Weisman R. Blue Cross CEO got $8.6m in exit deal. Boston Globe, March 2, 2011.
4. McConville C, Chabot H. Trio publicly crusade against rising health costs: behind the shield. Boston Herald, March 3, 2011.
5. McGrory B. Such health pay, it's sick. Boston Globe, March 4, 2011.
6. Levenson M, Weisman R. 2 Blue Cross directors justify stipends. March 8, 2011.
7. Crimaldi L, Dwinnell J. Blue Cross board suspends pay, CEO perks cut. Boston Herald, March 8, 2011.
8. Cheney K. Amid outrage, Blue Cross chief fights to 'reclaim' company's standing. Enterprise News, March 10, 2011.
9. Gelzinis P. Cleve Killingsworth's New York castle not shielded from bad taste. Boston Herald, March 11, 2011.
10. Egan M. You call this health care? - it's nauseating.  Boston Herald, March 3, 2011.
11.  Jackson DZ. No wonder health costs are so high.  Boston Globe, March 5, 2011.

Read More

Hackensack University Medical Center CEO's $5 Million Golden Parachute: "the Public Will Perceive the Institution as a Kind of Insider's Group"

Last year was an embarassing one for Hackensack University Medical Center (HUMC), a large academic medical center affiliated with the University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey.  In April, former state senator Joseph Coniglio was convicted of fraud (against the public) and extortion for a scheme that involved him being paid $5000 a month for undefined consulting work for HUMC while he promoted the hospital's interests in the state legislature (see post here).  A subsequent investigative report revealed widespread self-dealing on the part of the HUMC board (see post here).  Soon after, the HUMC CEO, John Ferguson, announced his retirement, per the Newark Star-Ledger.

Scandal Leads to Apparent Reforms

So when I read an article from last week on NorthJersey.com entitled "Hackensack University Medical Center works to revamp reputation hurt by trial" I hoped that these travails lead to some real improvements in the leadership and governance of the institution.  Hope springs eternal, and the article did describe some apparent progress.

The medical center's board of trustees was streamlined:

the hospital's board of governors � once a 57-member behemoth run by a core group of powerful and politically connected members � was whittled to less than half its former size and is now overseen by what the hospital is calling a 'reinvigorated' parent company, Hillcrest Health Service System Inc.

Conflicts of interest and self-dealing were apparently banned

Members of the two boards may no longer do business directly with the hospital � a significant change because some of them own or work for companies that have been paid millions of dollars by Hackensack. In 2009 alone, these companies were paid $13.2 million by the hospital, according to its federal tax filings. They were paid $17.4 million in 2008.

The Devil in the Details
Although the board was reduced in size, it gained almost no new members, and the politically-connected members who previously were accused of self-dealing remained:

Serving as chairman of the board of governors is Joseph M. Sanzari, a construction magnate, multimillion-dollar donor and longtime board member. His company, a joint venture with former board Chairman J. Fletcher Creamer Jr., has been one of the highest-paid independent contractors at the medical center.

Also,

There were no new board members until Tuesday, when two were appointed. Many who held influential positions on the board of governors � including Sanzari, Creamer and Joseph Simunovich � are still in key roles.

Furthermore, there was a big loop-hole in the apparent ban on conflicts of interest and self-dealing:

members of both the board of governors and Hillcrest can still do business with the hospital as long as they work as subcontractors or move to the foundation board or a newly created advisory panel that doesn't have voting or fiduciary powers.

Also,

Members of the board of governors and Hillcrest still can be hired as subcontractors.

The ban on doing business with the hospital also doesn't cover members of the advisory panel or the board that oversees the foundation. About a dozen members of these two groups are affiliated with companies that have made money � millions, in some cases � in work with the hospital.

As one outside expert noted,

'They may have changed the structure, but if you don't change the people, you don't change the culture,' said Jamie Orlikoff, a governance expert who advises the National Hospital Association.

Furthermore,

'People who had influence and clout when they were members of a fiduciary board will still have influence and clout even if they are moved to an advisory board,' Orlikoff said.

So,

'The concern is that the public will perceive the institution as a kind of insider's group and things are being done to benefit them,' said Daniel Borochoff, president of the American Institute of Philanthropy.

The CEO's Golden Parachute

Hope spring eternal, but is too often crushed.  However, at least the former CEO is gone. But it turns out he got quite a going away present. As described in a companion article,

John P. Ferguson received a severance package of more than $5 million when he was forced out as president of Hackensack University Medical Center last year, bringing his total compensation for 2009 to $7.7 million, according to recent federal tax filings.

The other executives who presided over HUMC in 2009, the year that its former consultant was convicted, also did very well for themselves,

His senior vice president for operations, Doreen Santora, received $2.6 million � including more than $1.5 million in severance � when she left in the executive reshuffling that followed, the documents show.

In all, seven top executives at the non-profit hospital each received more than $1 million in total compensation in 2009, up from five the year before.

This extremely generous compensation could not be related to the financial success of the hospital at the time:

The compensation packages came in a year in which tax filings show the 775-bed medical center employed 317 fewer staff and Moody's Investors Service downgraded its credit rating to Baa1, leading to higher interest payments when new debt is issued.

If this was pay for performance, by what measure these executives' performance was measured was not clear. Actually, who even decided to award them such sumptuous pay was unclear:

only a handful of board members were aware of the millions of dollars in pay and perks that had been handed out to executives over the last few years. Several employees saw their overall compensation double or triple.

Board members expressed 'sticker shock' when they first learned of the compensation numbers at a fall 2009 meeting, said J. Fletcher Creamer Jr., who completed his term as chairman of the board of governors in March.

'We went through every single executive' whose salaries must be disclosed on the IRS form for non-profit institutions, Creamer said in an interview earlier this year. 'It's the first time they actually saw it. � We always made the numbers available if they wanted to come see it, but not everyone looked.'

Keep in mind that per the first NorthJersey.com article, Mr Creamer will still be in a "key role" at HUMC, his failure to think that top executives' compensation was something his fellow board members needed to consider notwithstanding.

Summary

Is this any way to run a hospital "which has a national reputation for quality care?" The hospital leadership did and still appears to be an "insider's group" which works to promote its own self-interest.

As we have said before, far too often the leaders of not-for-profit health care institutions seem more interested in padding their own bottom lines than upholding the institutions' missions. They often seem entirely unaware of their duty to put those missions ahead of their own self-interest. Like the financial services sector in the era of "greed is good," health care too often seems run by "insiders hijacking established institutions for their personal benefit." True health care reform would encourage leadership of health care who understand health care and care about its mission, rather than those who see a quick way to make a small fortune.

Read More

On the Interconnectedness of the Leadership of Health Care Organizations: the Abbott Laboratories Case

We just posted about some misbehavior by Abbott Laboratories: a physician Abbott paid as a "key opinion leader" to help market its cardiac stents was accused of inserting stents in many patients who had no need for them; Abbott settled for over $400 million a lawsuit alleging the company defrauded Medicare and Medicaid; and it settled an unrelated suit for over $40 million alleging the company paid kickbacks to physicians for prescribing its drugs.  I thus thought it would be interesting to see how well paid are the corporate leaders who presided over these activities, and who are the board members who were supposed to be providing stewardship of this company.

According to the company's 2010 proxy statement, the five highest-paid executives were:

Miles D White, Chairman of the Board and CEO - $26,213,966 total compensation
Thomans C Freyman, Executive Vice President, Finance, and CFO - $9,561,227
Olivier Bohuon, Executive Vice President, Abbott Pharmaceutica Group - $5,232,589
Laura J Schumacher, Executive Vice President, General Counsel, and Secretary - $5,724,060
James V Mazzo, Senior Vice President, Abbott Medical Optics - $10,394,085

Now, let us turn to the company's board of directors.  Note that I looked for board members who also held leadership positions in other health care organizations whose interests may not be aligned with the corporation.  I also looked for those who held leadership positions in the discredited financial services corporation who helped usher in the global financial collapse.  (I  used similar methodolgy here.)

Abbott currently has 12 board members, including

• Robert J Alpert MD - Ensign Professor of Medicine, Professor of Internal Medicine, and Dean of the Yale School of Medicine.  He also "serves as a Director on the Board of Yale-New Haven Hospital."
• Roxanne S Austin - President and Chief Executive Officer, Move Networks Inc, and President, Austin Investment Advisors
• William M Daley -"Vice Chairman and Head of the Office of Corporate Responsibility and Chairman of the Midwest, JP Morgan Chase & Co."  He is the board of directors of  "Loyola University of Chicago and Northwestern University."
• W James Farrell - Retired Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Illinois Tool Works Inc
• H Laurence Fuller - Retired Co-Chairman of BP Amoco, former chief executive officer of Amoco
• William A Osborne - Retired Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Northern Trust Corporation and the Northern Trust Company.  He is "Chairman of the Board of Trustees of Northwestern University."
• Rt Honorable Lord Owen - Chairman of Europe Steel Ltd
• Roy S Roberts - Managing Director, Reliant Equity Investors.
• Samuel C Scott III - Retired Chairman,  President and Chief Executive Officer of Corn Products International.  He "currently serves on the board of directors of Bank of New York Mellon Corporation."  He also is on the board of "Northwestern Healthcare."
• William D Smithburg - Retired Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer of Quaker Oats Company.  He is on the "board of trustees of Northwestern University."
• Glenn F Tilton - Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer of UAL Corporation and United Airlines Inc.  He is on the "board of directors of Northwestern Memorial Hospital."
• Miles D White - Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer, Abbott Laboratories, "is on the board of trustees of "Northwestern University." 

Of Abbott's 12 directors, seven have leadership positions at teaching hospitals, academic medical centers, medical schools or their parent universities (Northwestern University, its medical school and teaching hospitals, in particular, are stewarded by six Abbott directors). 

Two have leadership positions in  financial services corporations that were implicated in the global financial collapse.  (Note that JP Morgan Chase staffers helped to invent some of the kinds of financial derivatives widely viewed as causative of the collapse, but the firm itself did not fail. [See Tett G. Fool's Gold.]  Through TARP, the US government took preferred equity stakes in both JP Morgan Chase and Bank of New York Mellon.  [See Ritholtz B.  Bailout Nation. p. 222]) 

Two more are leaders of financial services firms.  All but one are current or former high-level hired executives (seven are or were CEOs), or chairpersons or co-chair persons of corporations (the one exception is a dean of a medical school.) 

Note how similar our findings were here to those found after our perusal of the boards of Genzyme and Medtronic (see post here).   So we find again that executives of health care organizations who preside over various questionable activities not only rarely pay any penalty, but usually become extremely wealthy in the process.

We also find how interconnected is the leadership of health care.  The boards and leadership of drug and device companies overlap with the boards and leadership of medical schools, teaching hospitals, and their parent universities. 

Yet, as we have noted before, there are obvious conflicts.  In particular, teaching hospitals and medical schools are supposed to provide unbiased teaching, including about issues relevant to drug and device corporations, such as choice of diagnostic strategies and treatments, and relevant health policy.  They are supposed to perform unbiased research, including research that evaluates drugs and devices.  They are supposed to provide the best possible patient care at a reasonable cost, which relates to choices of and prices paid for drugs and devices. 

On the other hand, drug and device companies are supposed to put making a profit for their share-holders first.  The directors of such companies, like the directors of all for-profit corporations, are supposed to show an unyielding loyalty to their companies' financial health and profits, although contemporary corporate directors have been accused of acting more like cronies of the hired management.  (See this post.)

Also, we note that the vast majority of people chosen as stewards of a given health care organization are current or former top hired executives of other corporations.  The board members, that is, stewards of health care organizations, to whom the top hired executives reports, are usually not people with large ownership interests in the organizations (in the case of public, for-profit corporations.)  For the most part, they also do not seem to be people with clearly demonstrated devotion to the values of health care, in particular, putting the care of individual patients first, and advancing health care teaching and research.  Instead, they seem to be people with the perspective of hired executives, who may be prone to putting the interests of hired executives, rather than patients, doctors, teachers, scientists or the public at large, first.

So here is another admittedly limited case study of the board of directors, that is, the ostensible stewards of a health care corporation, selected this time because of its history of ethical missteps, which showed  - that the leadership of health care organizations is incredibly interrelated, interlocked, incestuous.  Again, it appears that top leaders of various health care organizations may be more familiar with and identify more with each other, and with other hired executives and managers, than with their organizations, their organizations' missions, and their organizations' professionals, staff, students, clients, and patients.

So to repeat-

I strongly believe that there needs to be much more investigation, academic, journalistic, and perhaps legal, of the identity, nature, and culture of the leaders of health care, and their relationships. A few bloggers cannot do it all. Obviously, the anechoic effect mitigates against medical and health care academics looking into their own leaders. However, failing to understand who is leading our march to the brink of health care failure ought not to be something such academics would want on their conscience.

Finally, and obviously, health care organizations need leaders that uphold the core values of health care, and focus on and are accountable for the mission, not on secondary responsibilities that conflict with these values and their mission, and not on self-enrichment. Leaders ought to be rewarded reasonably, but not lavishly, for doing what ultimately improves patient care, or when applicable, good education and good research.

If we do not fix the severe problems affecting the leadership and governance of health care, and do not increase accountability, integrity and transparency of health care leadership and governance, we will be as much to blame as the leaders when the system collapses.

Read More

What a Conflicted Web We Weave: Academic Economists, Finance, the Global Economic Meltdown, and the Impending Health Care Collapse

We have been writing about conflicts of interest in health care now for a long time.  We started with a focus on academic physicians'  and leaders' financial ties to pharmaceutical/ biotechnology/ device companies, then went on to the intense conflicts generated by academic medical and other health care non-profit leader who also sit on boards of directors of for profit health care corporations, and to conflicts affecting various kinds of respected not-for-profit health care organizations, like medical societies and patient advocacy groups.

Meanwhile, we uncovered the curious dominance of the boards of some health care organizations by leaders in the finance world, including some of the leaders of the failed companies that brought us the "great recession."  This did seem like a leadership problem for health care, in terms of the dominance of health care leadership by the elite of another industry that did not exactly seem to share the values we physicians swear to uphold.  However, it did not seem to be a conflict of interest problem, until now.

The Chronicle of Higher Education just published an article by the director of a soon to be released documentary on conflicts of interest and academics, but this time academic economics.

Charles Ferguson, the author, used as an example the Larry Summers, the former President of Harvard University (and hence leader of the Harvard Medical School, School of Public Health, and Harvard's teaching hospitals).  We had commented here about Summers' poor fit for the role of an academic medical leader, and here and here about the dominance of Harvard leadership by leaders of (sometimes failed) financial institutions.  Ferguson summarized (bad pun, sorry) the problem thus:

Summers is unquestionably brilliant, as all who have dealt with him, including myself, quickly realize. And yet rarely has one individual embodied so much of what is wrong with economics, with academe, and indeed with the American economy.

The problem is essentially one of huge conflicts of interest:

the revolving door is now a three-way intersection. Summers's career is the result of an extraordinary and underappreciated scandal in American society: the convergence of academic economics, Wall Street, and political power.

Summers bear huge responsibility for the current economic mess:

Consider: As a rising economist at Harvard and at the World Bank, Summers argued for privatization and deregulation in many domains, including finance. Later, as deputy secretary of the treasury and then treasury secretary in the Clinton administration, he implemented those policies. Summers oversaw passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, which repealed Glass-Steagall, permitted the previously illegal merger that created Citigroup, and allowed further consolidation in the financial sector. He also successfully fought attempts by Brooksley Born, chair of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission in the Clinton administration, to regulate the financial derivatives that would cause so much damage in the housing bubble and the 2008 economic crisis. He then oversaw passage of the Commodity Futures Modernization Act, which banned all regulation of derivatives, including exempting them from state antigambling laws.

Also,

Over the past decade, Summers continued to advocate financial deregulation, both as president of Harvard and as a University Professor after being forced out of the presidency.

Not only did Summers set up the structure that allowed reckless bets with other people' money on opaque financial derivatives by finance leaders who stood to make huge gains if they won their bets, but could foist all losses on others, but he actively attempted those who tried to warn us all of the impending economic collapse.

Summers remained close to Rubin and to Alan Greenspan, a former chairman of the Federal Reserve. When other economists began warning of abuses and systemic risk in the financial system deriving from the environment that Summers, Greenspan, and Rubin had created, Summers mocked and dismissed those warnings. In 2005, at the annual Jackson Hole, Wyo., conference of the world's leading central bankers, the chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, Raghuram Rajan, presented a brilliant paper that constituted the first prominent warning of the coming crisis. Rajan pointed out that the structure of financial-sector compensation, in combination with complex financial products, gave bankers huge cash incentives to take risks with other people's money, while imposing no penalties for any subsequent losses. Rajan warned that this bonus culture rewarded bankers for actions that could destroy their own institutions, or even the entire system, and that this could generate a 'full-blown financial crisis' and a 'catastrophic meltdown.'

When Rajan finished speaking, Summers rose up from the audience and attacked him, calling him a 'Luddite,' dismissing his concerns, and warning that increased regulation would reduce the productivity of the financial sector. (Ben Bernanke, Tim Geithner, and Alan Greenspan were also in the audience.)

Amazingly, rather than ending up an economic pariah after that, Summers regained power over the economy in the last few years.

Then, after the 2008 financial crisis and its consequent recession, Summers was placed in charge of coordinating U.S. economic policy, deftly marginalizing others who challenged him. Under the stewardship of Summers, Geithner, and Bernanke, the Obama administration adopted policies as favorable toward the financial sector as those of the Clinton and Bush administrations�quite a feat. Never once has Summers publicly apologized or admitted any responsibility for causing the crisis. And now Harvard is welcoming him back.

Summers was tightly aligned with the finance world, and benefited from the dominance of financial leaders on Harvard's board (see post here):

After Summers left the Clinton administration, his candidacy for president of Harvard was championed by his mentor Robert Rubin, a former CEO of Goldman Sachs, who was his boss and predecessor as treasury secretary. Rubin, after leaving the Treasury Department�where he championed the law that made Citigroup's creation legal�became both vice chairman of Citigroup and a powerful member of Harvard's governing board.

Yet in between his government and academic leadership roles, Summers got rich from finance firms' money.

Summers became wealthy through consulting and speaking engagements with financial firms. Between 2001 and his entry into the Obama administration, he made more than $20-million from the financial-services industry. (His 2009 federal financial-disclosure form listed his net worth as $17-million to $39-million.)

Ferguson went on to list several other conflicted academic economists:

The route to the 2008 financial crisis, and the economic problems that still plague us, runs straight through the economics discipline. And it's due not just to ideology; it's also about straightforward, old-fashioned money.

Prominent academic economists (and sometimes also professors of law and public policy) are paid by companies and interest groups to testify before Congress, to write papers, to give speeches, to participate in conferences, to serve on boards of directors, to write briefs in regulatory proceedings, to defend companies in antitrust cases, and, of course, to lobby. [Ed: they are thus the "key opinion leaders" of economics and economic policy.]  This is now, literally, a billion-dollar industry. The Law and Economics Consulting Group, started 22 years ago by professors at the University of California at Berkeley (David Teece in the business school, Thomas Jorde in the law school, and the economists Richard Gilbert and Gordon Rausser), is now a $300-million publicly held company. Others specializing in the sale (or rental) of academic expertise include Competition Policy (now Compass Lexecon), started by Richard Gilbert and Daniel Rubinfeld, both of whom served as chief economist of the Justice Department's Antitrust Division in the Clinton administration; the Analysis Group; and Charles River Associates.

In my film you will see many famous economists looking very uncomfortable when confronted with their financial-sector activities; others appear only on archival video, because they declined to be interviewed. You'll hear from:

Martin Feldstein, a Harvard professor, a major architect of deregulation in the Reagan administration, president for 30 years of the National Bureau of Economic Research, and for 20 years on the boards of directors of both AIG, which paid him more than $6-million, and AIG Financial Products, whose derivatives deals destroyed the company. Feldstein has written several hundred papers, on many subjects; none of them address the dangers of unregulated financial derivatives or financial-industry compensation.

Glenn Hubbard, chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers in the first George W. Bush administration, dean of Columbia Business School, adviser to many financial firms, on the board of Metropolitan Life ($250,000 per year), and formerly on the board of Capmark, a major commercial mortgage lender, from which he resigned shortly before its bankruptcy, in 2009. In 2004, Hubbard wrote a paper with William C. Dudley, then chief economist of Goldman Sachs, praising securitization and derivatives as improving the stability of both financial markets and the wider economy.

Frederic Mishkin, a professor at the Columbia Business School, and a member of the Federal Reserve Board from 2006 to 2008. He was paid $124,000 by the Icelandic Chamber of Commerce to write a paper praising its regulatory and banking systems, two years before the Icelandic banks' Ponzi scheme collapsed, causing $100-billion in losses. His 2006 federal financial-disclosure form listed his net worth as $6-million to $17-million.

Laura Tyson, a professor at Berkeley, director of the National Economic Council in the Clinton administration, and also on the Board of Directors of Morgan Stanley, which pays her $350,000 per year.

Richard Portes, a professor at London Business School and founding director of the British Centre for Economic Policy Research, paid by the Icelandic Chamber of Commerce to write a report praising Iceland's financial system in 2007, only one year before it collapsed.

And John Campbell, chairman of Harvard's economics department, who finds it very difficult to explain why conflicts of interest in economics should not concern us.

I once naively thought that the primary conflict of interest problems affecting academia involved health care, the dependence of medical schools and academic medical centers on commercial research funding, the emphasis these schools placed on faculty ties to commercial firms, leading to faculty "key opinion leaders" functioning as marketers of drugs and devices operating under the cloak of academia, and the major conflicts of academic leaders who also sit on health care corporate boards.

Now I wonder if all this came to pass because academic leaders already were comfortable with conflicts of interest after having profited from conflicts generated by relationships with the finance industry.

This now suggests that the dominance of university boards of trustees by finance leaders is a conflict of interest issue, too.

It also suggests that we in medicine should be paying more attention to how conflicts of interest shape not only the marketing of drugs and devices, but the health care policy that has lead to our currently dysfunctional system. If economists paid by finance companies could have been a major cause of the global financial meltdown, could health care policy experts paid by health care corporations be a major cause of our collapsing health care system?

Hat tip to the Naked Capitalism blog. See additional comments on the University Diaries blog and on Felix Salmon's blog.

Read More

Health Care Leaders in Maine Fail to Learn from Past Experience

From down east Maine comes a telling story about the problems of contemporary health care leadership.  I assembled this case from three articles by Meg Haskell in the Bangor Daily News, links are below. (1-3)

Complaints About the CEO's Clinical Policies

The story begins with complaints about clinical policies instituted by the CEO of Acadia Hospital.

[Acadia CEO David] Proffitt has come under fire in recent weeks from current and former Acadia Hospital employees who say the incidence and severity of staff injuries have risen since he initiated a policy that essentially eliminates the use of mechanical and physical restraints with mentally ill patients who become violent. (2)

The concerns were raised with government agencies:

Since the end of July, the federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration has been conducting an on-site investigation into employee complaints of unsafe working conditions at Acadia. The state Department of Health and Human Services also recently has investigated conditions at Acadia, with a report due later this month. (2)

Furthermore,

The OSHA investigation was triggered earlier this summer by a complaint filed with the agency alleging an increase in patient assaults on staff after Proffitt implemented stricter standards against the use of mechanical and physical restraints, even when patients turn violent.(3)

Loss of Experienced Clinicians

There were also concerns that Mr Proffitt presided over the loss of experienced clinicians who were replaced by those with less experience

Employees also have alleged that Proffitt has fired or pushed out a number of clinical leaders at Acadia, including former Vice President for Medical Affairs Dr. Paul Tisher and former Chief Nursing Officer April Giard. They have criticized his replacements as lacking expertise in psychiatric care.(3)

Lack of Clinical Experience or Training, Questionable Educational Credentials

Given his direct involvement in clinical decision making, it surprising that Mr Proffitt has no clinical training or experience:

Proffitt�s academic qualifications also have been questioned.

Proffitt�s education includes a 1984 bachelor�s degree in therapeutic recreation from the University of Nebraska at Omaha, a 1989 master�s degree in recreational administration from Arizona State University, and a 2007 doctoral degree in health administration from Warren National University, now a defunct, unaccredited on-line program. His academic career has been criticized as being inadequate to prepare him for the top-level positions he has held at both Riverview and Acadia, although neither position requires a doctoral degree.(2)

Repeating the Past

It turns out that similar concerns were raised about Proffitt's performance in his previous position:

Psychiatrists formerly employed at Riverview said this week that both patient care and employee morale eroded under Proffitt�s leadership there.

'Over the course of David Proffitt�s tenure at Riverview, a significant number of long-standing and experienced staff left and were replaced with less experienced or temporary people,' said Dr. Bryan Woods, who was employed at Riverview from 2003 to 2006 and now practices in Portland. �\'In my opinion, this resulted in a decrease in the quality of patient care.'

Woods said Proffitt�s management style was often in conflict with the collaborative 'treatment team' approach commonly used in acute-care psychiatric settings.

'Ultimately, I left, because I simply could not work with him,' Woods said.

Woods� colleague Dr. Dan Filene, who also worked at Riverview under Proffitt, said direct-care staff at the state hospital were placed at increased risk by a stringent policy that all but eliminated the use of any kind of restraints.

'The staff at Riverview are heroic,' he said. 'It�s not just dangerous; it is emotionally challenging, fatiguing, low-paying work. When they are actively being injured, it can�t help but affect patient care.' Filene stressed that most people with mental illness are not dangerous or violent.

Sen. Stanley Gerzofsky, D-Brunswick, is chairman of the Legislature�s Criminal Justice Committee. The committee oversees the locked forensic unit at Riverview, where criminals with severe mental illness are housed and treated. Proffitt�s policy of doing away with restraints for even the most dangerous patients prompted a number of complaints, he said.

'We heard concerns that staff members were being injured [by patients],' Gerzofsky said in an interview this week. 'Staff were complaining that [Proffitt] didn�t have the right credentials and that he didn�t take the violence very seriously. We had him in front of our committee several times.'

Gerzofsky�s colleague on the committee, Sen. John Nutting, D-Leeds, said he heard from several Riverview patient families and staff members.

'Legislators were called to see if he could be replaced,' he said. 'There was really just one single reason � he was telling doctors how to treat their patients. He was trying to get between the patients and their doctors.

Nutting said parents of patients were especially concerned.

'They wanted their loved ones to get the care their doctors wanted them to receive, not the CEO of the hospital,' he said.(2)

Proffitt's credentials were also questioned before:

Proffitt�s degrees in recreational therapy and his online doctorate, Nutting observed, did little to reassure worried families.(2)

Proffitt's Defenders

The allegations made against Proffitt, which appear to be from clinical professionals and patients' relatives, were countered by support from, perhaps not surprisingly, managers and executives:

Michelle Hood, CEO of the hospital�s corporate parent Eastern Maine Healthcare Systems, says that under Proffitt, Acadia is 'moving in the right direction.' She lauded the progress he has made toward de-stigmatizing mental illness and ramping up Acadia�s outpatient and community services.

Note that Michelle Hood, although she has considerable health care management experience, appears not to have any clinical experience of expertise, from her official biography:

Before arriving at EMHS, Michelle was president and CEO of the Sisters of Charity of Leavenworth Health System, Montana Region, as well as president and CEO of its flagship hospital, St. Vincent Healthcare. She received her Bachelor of Science in 1978 at Purdue University and her Master of Health Care Administration at Georgia State University in 1981. Her early career included roles of associate hospital director at Emory University Hospital in Atlanta Georgia, executive vice president and chief operating officer of St. Vincent�s Hospital (of now Ascension Health) in Birmingham, Alabama and chief administrative officer of Norton Hospital in Louisville, Kentucky.

Somehow, the process that hired Mr Proffitt, presided over by Ms Hood, did not seem to consider his previous work at Riverview:

At EMHS, Michelle Hood said Proffitt�s troubles at Riverview 'did not come up' during his interviews for the position of CEO at Acadia.

One of 16 applicants in a nationwide search to replace outgoing CEO Dorothy Hill, he had appropriate letters of reference from former employers, she said.(2)

By the way, the process involved checking whether his educational credentials were accurate, but apparently was unconcerned with the meaning of an on-line degree from an unaccredited institution (subsequently closed down by state authorities, see here.)

His educational credentials checked out.... (2)

Hood dismissed concerns about losses of experienced staff:

Asked about the loss of key clinical administrators at Acadia, including Vice President for Medical Affairs Dr. Paul Tisher and Chief Nursing Officer April Giard, Hood said 'turnover is normal' with a new administration and that Proffitt has successfully recruited new talent and promoted qualified staff from within the organization.

The board of trustees of Acadia Hospital also supported their CEO

At the end of last week, John Bragg, chairman of the hospital�s board of directors, said the board supports embattled CEO David Proffitt, despite a deluge of concerns raised by current and former employees and unflattering revelations about Proffitt�s educational credentials and his leadership at his previous post.

At its regular meeting last Wednesday, the board went into executive session to discuss the situation, Bragg said Friday.

'We came out supporting Dr. Proffitt and the changes that are in place and the team he has put together,' he said.

As best as I can tell, Mr Bragg is the President of a local industrial firm, N H Bragg.

By the way, here is what George Eaton, chairman of the board of Eastern Maine Healthcare Systems, the parent not-for-profit corporation for Acadia Hospital, said about the executives that are accountable to him:

By making critical decisions, engaging in aggressive fundraising and other activities, 'exceptional senior executives can and should add many multiples of what they cost to the value of the institution,' he said. Eaton said CEO compensation packages within EMHS are determined using information from comparable institutions nationwide.(1)

Also,

The job of the CEO is 'incredibly complex,' working in 'the most regulated environment in any industry,' Eaton said.

'The prudent thing to do is to get the best people you can,' he said, 'and pay them what you need to in order to retain them � so long as they are achieving the performance goals set by their board.'

Note that Mr Eaton appears to be an attorney, according to the EMHS site, "George F. Eaton II, Esq.; Bangor; attorney, Rudman & Winchell."
Summary

This case illustrates much of what has gone wrong with leadership and governance of health care organizations.

We see health care organizations lead by people who have no experience or training in actually giving health care. Yet people who are not doctors, nurses, or therapists make clinical policies and control clinical care, even against the advice of experienced clinicians. In fact, some such leaders seem to regard clinicians as interchangeable widget-makers making interchangeable widgets. The ill-informed leaders of health care organizations often seem sensitive about their lack of knowledge and experience, and hence may be quick to punish any health care professional who protests their ill-informed decisions.  Moreover, the ill-informed leaders of health care seem to band together to support each other, even in the face of criticism from people with real expertise in health care, or from patients and relatives directly affected by health care and how it is delivered.  Higher level executives who are supposed to supervise lower level executives, and boards of directors which are supposed to exercise stewardship and support institutional values may seem more concerned with protecting the prerogatives of all executives rather than than the patient care mission.

As we have said again, again, again, health care desperately needs leadership that understand the context, and believes in the values.  It needs leaders that puts patients first, ahead of the pay and prerogatives of the executive and managerial class, our would-be new aristocracy.

References


1.  Haskell M. Maine's hospitals: big jobs, big pay. Bangor Daily News, March 6, 2009.  Link.


2.  Haskell M. Acadia CEO criticized at previous post.  Bangor Daily News, September 10, 2010.  Link.


3.  Haskell M. Acadia board supports CEO despite claims.  Bangor Daily News, September 20, 2010.  Link. 

Read More

More Than $1 Million to Run a Public Health Agency

After a well-publicized story that managers of small town in California were paid in the high six-figures, reporters in California have gotten interested in the pay of public officials.

Thus the San Diego Union-Tribune reported on the compensation received by CEOs of local public health agencies, called public health care districts, two of which run hospitals. One in particular received generous compensation:

The top official at Palomar Pomerado Health, a public agency serving health-care needs in Poway and Escondido, receives in excess of $1 million in compensation per year.


Michael Covert, who has run the North County hospital district since 2003, receives a base salary of $736,000 a year. Retirement, bonuses and other benefits push Covert�s total pay past $1.1 million.

One other public health CEO, also responsible for a hospital, made somewhat less:

Tri-City chief executive Larry Anderson collects a base salary of $480,000 and benefits that drive his total compensation past $625,000 a year. He also received a $50,000 relocation benefit when he arrived last year.

Two CEOs of health districts that did not run hospitals, having leased them out, made less still:

Grossmont chief executive Barry Jantz makes about $183,000 a year in base pay and benefits that increase his total compensation to just under $250,000 a year.

Fallbrook administrator Vi Dupre, ... is paid a base salary of $61,000 a year and benefits that raise her compensation to just over $69,000,....

Why is Mr Covert paid so much?

Bruce Krider, the health-care district chairman, said Covert does an excellent job managing a complex enterprise that includes two major hospitals. Covert juggles the interests of staff, physicians, patients, volunteers, board members and other stakeholders, he said.

'A million dollars sounds pretty good to anybody, but my view is, pay a lot and expect a lot,' said Krider, a management consultant who also is a former hospital executive. 'You can�t have some mediocre public servant. You need somebody that has got vision, that can see the issues that are most important and put it all together.'

So now even the managers of public health agencies have become million dollar babies. And of course, according to the boards of trustees who are supposed to supervise them, they all do excellent work and therefore are underpaid even then. As we have noted before, it seems that every board supervising every health care executive thinks their executives are above average, if not stellar. Note, though, that the chair of the board overseeing Mr Covert is himself a retired hospital administrator. So, as we have noted before, it seems that the boards of such organizations often have a preponderance of members who are not inclined to be critical of their hired executives, much less limit their pay.

So the rules for top leaders of health care organizations seem to be different from those for you and me.  All these managers seem to be entitled to be above average.  (The only ones who are eventually deemed below average seem to be those up to no good in ways that do not financially benefit their organizations, e.g., see this.)

In my humble opinion, it is unseemly for the leader of a government run public health organization to make so much. 

True health care reform would decrease perverse incentives throughout the systems, spread the power in organizations more broadly, and make leaders accountable.

Read More

A Golden Parachute for Captain Outrageous

A year ago, I posted about leadership and governance problems at Northeast Health Systems, a small hospital system located in neighboring Massachusetts.  The colorful story included leaders who solicited money from the community but concealed what they were doing from the same community, an adolescent pregnancy pact after the hospital system refused to provide confidential birth control information at the high school clinic it ran, a hospital vice-president accused of art theft, various cuts, some concealed, of medical services, accusations of conflicts of interest affecting the board of trustees, and no-confidence votes by nurses and physicians. Finally, Stephen Laverty, the CEO held responsible for much of the mess, resigned and things quieted down a bit.  However, he left a system in deficit, leading to further lay-offs, (e.g., see this story in the Boston Globe).  And the vice-president accused of art theft was also "arraigned on bribery and larceny charges" (also per the Boston Globe.)

Yet, Mr Laverty collected a tidy sum just to leave, as the Salem News just reported:

Former Northeast Health System President and CEO Stephen Laverty collected more than $1 million from the nonprofit hospital chain after he resigned under fire in the fall of 2008, newly released financial records show.

The earnings, $1.08 million in total, include a settlement package of more than a year's salary plus pay for the one month the controversial Laverty was at the helm of Northeast, which owns Beverly Hospital, as well as Gloucester's Addison Gilbert Hospital.

The documents provide the first details of how much Northeast, now laying off workers and cutting costs, was willing to pay to part ways with its CEO who had just endured no-confidence votes from nurses and doctors, plus the arrest of one of his top managers.

Neither the hospital system nor its former CEO was exactly forthcoming about the rationale for this payment:

As part of Laverty's resignation, both sides agreed not to discuss the settlement or any of the details that led them to part ways.

'I have no understanding of what you are talking about,' Laverty said yesterday afternoon from his home in Concord, when asked about his settlement package. He then hung up the phone.

A spokeswoman for Northeast Health System said she could not comment on Laverty or the terms of any agreements between the company and past employees.

So even the hired manager of a small community hospital system is entitled to a million dollar plus golden parachute when resigning in disgrace. This is another great example of the current perversity of the incentives given to hired health care managers. Even small community hospitals, the backbone of real community health care throughout the country, seem to feel obligated to make millionaires out of their managers, no matter how bad their performance.

As we said before, the problem is not just the money wasted paying for bad performance. These perverse incentives are likely to encourage worse performance.  They send the message to even the worst executives that they are wonderful people, they can do no wrong, and should stand for no criticism, all further diverting them from what they really are supposed to be doing: upholding the mission.

As an editorial in the Gloucester Times noted, although the nexus is perverse incentives given to paid managers, it is not only the paid managers who are to blame for this situation.

The other party to his contract was the Northeast Board of Trustees.

So,

Those who want to serve as trustees of Northeast need to get the notion out of their heads that their board seats are not just resume builders � with high-profile community roles and a few corporate dinners thrown in. These are positions of community leadership and responsibility that comes with a measure of accountability.

New Northeast CEO Ken Hanover has indeed seemingly ushered in a new era of relative openness in dealing with the community. But the same cannot be said for the Board of Trustees.

If Laverty's shameful buyout deal and these types of contracts are examples of their 'leadership' and responsibility, each and every one of them should step down now.

As we have said many times before, true health care reform would encourage leaders of health care who understand health care and care about its mission, rather than those who just see a quick road to riches or social respectability.

Read More

Making a Community Health Agency into the Leaders' Private Sand-Box

As we predicted, it seems that the US Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) increased reporting requirements for not-for-profit organizations are leading to more examples of the coziness now prevalent among the top leaders of such organizations.  The latest entry in this new parade comes from a story in the Bradenton (Florida) Herald about a not-for-profit community health agency whose mission is to provide health care to the poor and disenfranchised:

Providing medical services to the indigent and uninsured in Manatee and Sarasota counties has financially benefitted some of Manatee County Rural Health Services Inc.�s officers, board members and their families, records show.

The nonprofit agency has paid nearly $2 million in recent years to businesses owned by board members, officers, employees or their relatives, according to tax documents obtained by the Bradenton Herald. And its chief executive officer, Walter �Mickey� Presha Sr., has long been the highest-paid CEO of any such agency in Florida: His salary last year was $433,000 � $140,000 more than that of his closest counterpart, records show.

The article listed multiple examples self-dealing by the top leaders of Rural Health Services.

According to tax returns filed since 2004, Rural Health has paid:

- $558,121 to John Lewis, a board member, for optometry services.

- $536,591 to The Pinnacle Group of West Coast Florida Inc. for construction, maintenance and repair work. One of its principals is Trina Presha-Rosier, Presha�s daughter.

- $344,766 to The Lawn Authority of Manatee County Inc. for lawn care maintenance at the agency�s facilities. Wardell Jackson, the agency�s vice president of support services, is a principal in the business.

- $387,673 to A to Z Complete Property Management Inc. for janitorial cleaning and maintenance services. It is owned by Chris Mullinex, the agency�s facilities director.

- $96,000 to R & L Healthcare Advisors, whose principals include Marc Lazarus, a board member, for consulting services.

- $44,242 to More Power Properties and Investments LLC, co-owned by board Chairman J. Garry Lowe, for storage of agency files and equipment and the purchase of a modular building.

Leaders of rural health offered mostly the usual explanations:

>>As long as we say it is not a conflict, it is not a conflict<<

According to a conflict of interest statement that board members are required to sign, Rural Health prohibits them, management and their families from having any 'beneficial interest or substantial obligation to' any entity engaged in business with the agency. But some have been able to bypass that prohibition because of this loophole: 'Unless it has been determined by the board, on the basis of full disclosure of facts, that such interest does not give rise to a conflict of interest.'

>>We, our relatives, and our firms are the best possible source of the services<<

Jackson, Mullinex and Presha-Rosier�s businesses won competitive bids, which are reviewed by a board committee and approved by the full board, Lazarus said. Presha said he is not involved in reviewing bids for construction projects that his daughter might seek.

The agency chose to do business with the three board members� companies because of special circumstances, agency officials said.

Lewis is one of Manatee Rural Health�s founders and has overseen its optometry services since the beginning. Lowe offered the storage space for less than what commercial storage facilities charged, then sold one of the storage buildings to Manatee Rural Health for a reduced price. And Lazarus has 36 years� experience in the health care field, including as an executive at Sarasota Memorial Hospital.

They were hired because they provide needed services at a lower cost, thus allowing the agency to spend more money on patient care, officials said.

>>Trust us, because we are wonderful people<<

'It�s always disclosed to the board, so we always have the opportunity to not do it,' said Juanine Lowery, a board member since 1984. 'It hasn�t been a problem. It�s always been competitive.'

And a slightly more coherent version of that:

'Everything�s checked out and vetted,' Lazarus said. 'The arrangements are as good as or better than what we could get on the open market.'

The explanation for the CEO's out-sized salary should come as no surprise. He got that high salary because

>>I am a wonderful CEO and I deserve it<<

Rural Health board members also defend Presha�s $433,000 salary, which makes him the highest-paid chief executive officer of any federally qualified community health center in Florida. His job performance, managerial skills and the organization�s complexity and size are all reasons he makes the top salary, board members say.

Of course, the CEO himself thinks he is a wonderful CEO and deserves it:

'I know what I do,' said Presha, who said he took a pay cut to take the Manatee Rural Health job in 1984 and has turned down job offers with higher salaries since then. 'If I could do it for free, I would do it for free. But I earn my keep.'

So here we have another case of the cozy leadership of a not-for-profit health care organization, who all think they are doing just a wonderful job, who never seem to question their own actions, and who all believe all their buddies are also doing just a wonderful job. So naturally, since they are all such wonderful people doing a wonderful job, we should not begrudge them a few dollars here and there.

Of course, if they were the leaders of a privately held company that made widgets, it would be their own money that they are spending, and maybe no on else should care.

Even if the amounts involved seem relatively small relative to some of the cases that appear on Health Care Renewal, we should care particularly about how the leaders of Manatee County Rural Health Care Services throw around money (to each other), because of the nature of the organization's mission, as described by CEO Presha himself:

MCRHS has served the poor and underserved in our communities with the mentality of a 'provider of choice.'

Our group is not only compassionate, but also innovative,....

It is truly unseemly for a not-for-profit community health care organization dedicated to serving "the poor and undeserved" lead by people so complacent about their own entitlement.

So to repeat what I have written before, in my humble opinion, this sort of coziness, this sort of fuzziness at the boundaries of institutional duties and personal interests, may be a fundamental reason that our current health care system has become so solicitous of the interests and prerogatives of its leaders, and so cold to the needs of patients and the values of professionals.


The need for more transparent, accountable leadership of health care who explicitly are subject to clear ethical rules was never more apparent.

Stay tuned as more and more cases like this appear....

Read More

Where No Hospital CEOs are Below Average

In Lake Woebegon, all children are above average.  Now it seems that hospital CEOs have moved there. 

Ventura County, Where No CEO is Below Average

The Ventura County (California) Star reported on the uniformly high remuneration of the CEOs of local, mostly small, not-for-profit hospitals and hospital systems.

T. Michael Murray reaped $330,545 in 2008 as chief executive officer of St. John�s hospitals in Oxnard and Camarillo. He drew an additional $187,071 in bonuses with $73,113 more in benefits and other compensation.

His total package, according to IRS records, reached $590,729.

And he may have been underpaid, according to a statewide survey of 118 nonprofit hospitals. The report by the Payers & Providers healthcare business publication suggests the base salary for CEOs averaged $514,237.

Kick in bonuses, retirement money, reimbursement for education costs, expense accounts and the average total compensation hit $732,004.

Public records show similarly lofty numbers at Ventura County�s three nonprofit, tax-exempt hospital groups. Gary Wilde of Community Memorial Health System, which runs hospitals in Ventura and Ojai, was the highest paid CEO in 2008. He earned a base salary of $508,682 and his total compensation was $853,528, with much of the additional money placed into a retirement fund that won�t be paid out until Wilde serves six more years as CEO.

Simi Valley Hospital changed its leadership in 2008, with a total compensation of $1.25 million recorded in 990 tax forms for two different CEOs. That�s slightly more than the hospital provided in treatment for poor uninsured patients where there was no attempt to collect payment, though hospital leaders say charity care definitions encompass only a fraction of the total care they provide without pay.

Outside the county, tax records from the Cottage Health System in Santa Barbara showed a base salary of $848,826 for CEO Ronald Werft and other compensation of $546,846. His total topped $1.3 million.

Ken Anderson of the John Muir Health System, which operates hospitals in Walnut Creek and Concord, was the highest compensated CEO in the Payers & Providers study. He made $745,000 in base salary and nearly $7 million in other compensation, much of it deferred over his career for retirement.

Recall that these people are leading relatively small, not-for-profit community hospitals whose missions are to provide health care to the community.  Total compensation ranging from three-quarters of a million dollars to multi-millions seems vastly disproportionate to the jobs and their settings.

Explanations and Excuses
As expected, those supporting the CEOs have all sorts of explanations and excuses:

Hospital leaders in Ventura County and throughout California say the numbers are inflated by retirement plan accumulations that must be included on tax records even before executives qualify to receive the money. They defend the half-million-dollar salaries, with bonuses on top, as the only way to compete with for-profit hospitals for executives who can lead a facility that may employ more than 1,000 workers, drive a community�s economy, provide access to the uninsured and deliver care that saves lives.

'Given the context, it�s not out of line,' said Murray, a CEO with 28 years of experience who is now semiretired after resigning from St. John�s at the end of March. 'I think you need to retain and also attract sufficient talent. I�m not saying there aren�t inappropriate salaries out there. I don�t think mine was one of them.'

Also,

But [economist Sung Won] Sohn said that paying below average is risky.

'When you try to get somebody at $400,000 rather than $700,000 you will get plenty of takers but they�re not competent,' he said. 'Hospitals are so important in the community that you want to make sure it�s run properly.'

Nor does he see any problem with paying more than average if a hospital board wants to reward an executive.

Furthermore,

John Romley, an economist at the Schaeffer Center for Health Policy and Economics at USC, said the amount hospitals spend on executive pay is a sliver of their total expenses and can�t legitimately be blamed for driving the rising cost of healthcare.

'I guess I�m not shocked even though I�m jealous,' he said of the compensation.

Some people were not pleased about this use of health care dollars:

Others worry the compensation may push hospitals into spending more on executives than their nonprofit mission of providing care for the poor. Federal regulations already limit compensation for CEOs of corporations bailed out by the government to $500,000. Similar caps placed on nonprofit hospitals could create dramatic differences, said Ron Shinkman, author of the Payers & Providers statewide survey on CEO salaries.

'You�re looking at close to $39 million that could be used on uncompensated patient care,' he said. 'It�s a lot of money.'

Consumer advocates aim much of their concern at nonprofit hospitals that not only reward CEOs with lucrative paydays but also provide little charity care to poor, uninsured patients. The Payers & Providers research identifies 17 hospitals � all outside of Ventura County � where the total compensation to CEOs exceeded the cost of charity care.

'It would be outrageous if hospitals are paying more to their (entire) executive teams than in indigent care in their community,' said Anthony Wright of Health Access California. 'For some hospitals to provide more to one individual just seems wrong.'

The Mechanism: Ego Bias

The mechanism making CEO compensation constantly increase appears to be simple:

Typically, hospital boards hire consultants to conduct studies showing market averages for comparable hospitals in their regions. They often try to pay somewhere around the 50th percentile.

That�s a reasonable way to do it, but such studies tend to push up the salaries, said economist Sung Won Sohn, who was involved in setting compensation at two Minneapolis hospitals.

'People at the low end try to increase the CEO closer to the average,' said the professor at CSU Channel Islands. 'If everyone does that, the average CEO salary will go up.'

So there you have it. At no hospital is the CEO deemed by a sympathetic (and sometimes crony filled board) below average. If the CEO's compensation has somehow dropped below average one year, it is immediately raised to at least average the next. Apparently almost never is the CEO's pay deemed to be too high.

That notion is corroborated by the assumption by the CEO documented above that all CEOs have "sufficient talent," and the assertion above that anyone who would accept a lower salary would be "not competent."

So every year all the CEOs who had below average compensation the previous year get compensation increased at least to last year's average.  Almost no CEO gets a reduction.  So the average moves up relentlessly year after year. 

Of course, unless all CEOs are exactly alike, some CEOs must be below average. 

So this becomes a great example of the ego bias at work. Ego bias is a common cognitive bias usually discussed in the context of making probabilistic judgments. A simple definition is that people tend to believe that outcomes of what they do, or what a group with whom they identify does will be above average. A long time ago, colleagues and I showed that interns in an intensive care unit judged the survival of their patients on average to be better than their judgments of the mean survival of all patients in the ICU. On the other hand, ICU attending physicians displayed a slightly more sophisticated version of the bias. They judged their patients' survival accurately, but judged the mean survival of their ICU's patients to be higher than it really was. [Poses RM, McClish DK, Bekes C, Scott WE, Morley JN.  Ego bias, reverse ego bias, and physicians' prognostic judgments.  Crit Care Med. 1991 Dec;19(12):1533-9.  Link here.]

So we have the ego bias writ large in judgments made about the performance and compensation of hospital CEOs, at least in Ventura County, California.

The Implications

I agree that paying a CEO more than a hospital's entire expenditures for the care of the poor is unseemly.

However, in my humble opinion, the issue is even bigger than that. It is not so much how much of the hospital's budget goes to executive compensation, but what lessons this teaches CEOs.  I propose they are:
-  I am a wonderful person.   I can do no wrong.
-  If I do wrong, I cannot be punished.
-  I can get rich and powerful doing this.

Of course, as we have written many times, being the CEO of a small community hospital is supposed to be a calling, whose goal is to uphold the institution's mission.  Instead, CEOs are learning to be tin-pot dictators.  Some are probably sensible enough to resist learning this message.  I am afraid many are not.

Furthermore, there is no reason to think that this phenomenon is confined to Ventura County, California, or to small community hospitals.  We have discussed how the management of health care organizations have become unsympathetic to, or even hostile to the mission.  We have discussed their organizations' institutional conflicts of interests.   We have discussed how they have wound up with imperial CEOs. 

The resulting ill-informed, mission-ignorant or mission-hostile, self-interested, conflicted, or even corrupt leadership is a major, but still largely anechoic cause of our health care dysfunction.

As I have said endlessly, true health care reform will require finding well-informed leaders who understand and support the mission, put the mission before their own self-enrichment, and are unconflicted and honest.

Read More

At UPMC: Dealings with Board Members' Firms and Executives' Relatives, a $5 Million Plus CEO, and 8 $1 Million Plus Executives

Last year we noted that the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) required more detailed reporting starting in 2009 by US not-for-profit organizations.  Many US health insurance companies/ managed care organizations, most hospitals, nearly all medical associations, nearly all disease advocacy organizations, all health care charities, and nearly all medical schools are not-for-profit organizations.  We suggested then that this reporting might lead to more transparency about the leadership and governance of these organizations.  Some of these new 990 forms are now being publicly disclosed, with some interesting findings. 

The Pittsburgh Tribune-Review just reported some interesting findings about financial ties between the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center (UPMC) and its board members and hired executives.

Health giant UPMC paid more than $10 million last year to companies and individuals with ties to its directors and high-ranking executives, newly released tax records show.

The payments include more than $3 million in salaries and contracts to relatives of UPMC CEO Jeffrey Romoff, who earned $5.16 million in fiscal 2009.

It was no surprise that a UPMC spokesman pooh-poohed the significance of these relationships.

'Given that UPMC is the largest employer in Pittsburgh and attracts talent from across the world, it's easy to understand why there are hundreds of employees with family members who also work at UPMC,' said spokesman Paul Wood.

'We seek to hire the best and brightest in every position, regardless of family relationships, and take appropriate steps to manage any conflicts that those relationships might entail.'

The specifics about payments to the relatives of top hired executives were:

Tax records show UPMC paid $264,274 to Rebecca Kaul, the CEO's daughter. Wood said UPMC then billed a contractor for her services. Kaul now works for UPMC as executive director of the Technology Development Center, Wood said.

UPMC paid $259,488 to Scott Gilstrap, who joined the health care giant before marrying Romoff's daughter. Gilstrap, now divorced, no longer works for UPMC, Wood said.

Wood said UPMC's contract for $2.48 million with Paradise Group, an advertising firm owned by the CEO's brother, Douglas Romoff, was not renewed after its March 2009 expiration.

'Jeffrey Romoff was not involved in any of the decisions pertaining to this contract,' Wood said.

In addition to Romoff's family connections, the tax records show UPMC paid Scott Cindrich, son of its chief counsel Robert J. Cindrich, $141,599.

Wood said the younger Cindrich joined UPMC before his father left a federal judgeship in 2004 to become UPMC's top lawyer. Robert Cindrich was paid $1.86 million.

Cindrich did not return telephone calls seeking comment.

The specifics about dealings between UPMC and its board members were:

Tax records show companies affiliated with board member Anne V. Lewis do the most business with UPMC. Oxford Development Company, where Lewis is board chair, received $4.84 million from UPMC.

Lewis is affiliated with Central Securities Services, which received $201,198 from UPMC, and Central Property Services, which received $457,051. Lewis did not return repeated telephone calls from the Tribune-Review.

According to the returns, the Downtown law firm of Pietragallo Gordon Alfano Bosick and Raspanti earned $348,616 in legal fees. William Pietragallo is a UPMC board member. The law firm paid $792,215 to UPMC for heath insurance.

Pietragallo said he filled out a conflict-of-interest form, as he has in past years.

'It reminds me of how much I pay for health insurance,' he said.

IGate Mastech, the tech company founded by UPMC board member Sunil Wadhwani, received $204,215 for computer services. JJ Gumberg and Co., affiliated with board member Ira Gumberg, was paid $103,521, tax records show. Neither Wadhwani nor Gumberg returned telephone calls.

Board member John R. McGinley Jr.'s law firm, Eckert Seamans Cherin and Mellott, was paid $804,414 for legal services, according to the returns. McGinley and board member Robert A. Paul and members of their families are affiliated with Pittsburgh Steelers Premium Tickets LP, which was paid $129,425, tax returns show.

McGinley said he believed the figures UMPC reported are correct. Paul did not return telephone calls.

Also, in a separate article, the Tribune-Review noted transactions between UPMC's insurance subsidiary and its board members' firms

Recent federal tax filings show companies associated with some UPMC board members also buy their employee health insurance through the health care giant's insurance arm.

The tax returns show that health insurance premiums paid by the companies affiliated with board members totaled about $8 million in the fiscal year ending June 30, 2009. Nine firms affiliated with board members purchased UPMC health insurance.

That figure includes nearly $1.8 million by Bank of New York Mellon. UPMC board member Stephen Elliott is affiliated with the bank.

Oxford Development paid $2.1 million in premiums. The development firm's chairman is Anne Lewis, a UPMC board member.

The law firm headed by UPMC board member William Pietragallo paid $792,215 in premiums, according to the returns. AMPCO-Pittsburgh, which is affiliated with UPMC board member Robert A. Paul, paid a little more than $1 million in premiums.

Of course, Mr Wood pooh-poohed that too:

UPMC spokesman Paul Wood said the premiums paid by the companies were at "market rates."

He also apparently stated that the hospital system follows "strict conflict-of-interest rules. Board members are barred from voting or acting on matters relating to their business interests...." 

The standard approach of most not-for-profit organizations to conflicts of interests involving their board members or executives is to have these people recuse themselves from votes or actions that directly affect their own or their families' business interests.  I submit that whether this prevents the conflict of interest from influencing decision making by the organizations is questionable.  I doubt that the board members are unaware of their fellow members' and executives' direct or familial business interests.  The fact that certain individuals need to step out of meetings when votes come up on particular contracts would be a good reminder that they or their relatives have business interests at issue at these times.  Board members tend to keep their seats for a long time, and tend to get to know their fellow members pretty well.  Even if an individual member cannot vote on a contract or action relating to his or her business interests, would it be any surprise that his or her buddies on the board might look favorably on such a contract?

Furthermore, would it really be that hard to find development companies, property management firms, advertising agencies, law firms, or information technology companies in a large metropolitan area that are not affiliated with board members or top executives and their families?  Instead, UPMC seems to have found quite a few vendors affiliated with board members which do not seem particularly specialized in their organizational attributes.  Can we be sure that they are run by the best and the brightest?

Maybe board members who are too cozy with each other, and too cozy with the hired executives they are supposed to supervise, would be distracted from the attentiveness required to their organization's mission by their buddies' businesses? 

Perhaps coziness among board members and hired executives might have something to do with the munificent compensation given to numerous hired leaders of UPMC.  A separate article in the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette stated:

Jeffrey Romoff, president and CEO of the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, received $3.563 million in salary in 2009, a 24.4 percent decrease from his 2008 salary of $4.711 million.

However,

In addition to Mr. Romoff's $4.711 million in cash compensation in 2008, he received $428,214 in deferred compensation and $21,671 in nontaxable benefits, for a total package valued at $5.161 million.

In addition,

Other top UPMC earners include Elizabeth Concordia, executive vice president and president of the Hospital and Community Services Division, $2.139 million; Amin Kassam, the department of neurological surgery chair who resigned in July, $2.083 million; Robert Cindrich, senior vice president and chief legal officer, $1.869 million; neurosurgeon Ghassan Beijani, $1.798 million; neurosurgeon Adnan Abla, $1.620 million.

Also, Marshall Webster, executive vice president and chief medical officer, $1.514 million; Diane Holder, president and CEO of UPMC Health Plan, $1.485 million; James Luketich, co-director of surgical affairs at the University of Pittsburgh Cancer Institute, $1.442 million; Daniel Drawbaugh, senior vice president and chief information officer, $1.335 million; and David Farner, senior vice president and chief of staff in the office of the president, $1.253 million.

By my count, that was eight executives with yearly total compensation greater than $1 million (in addition to two very well paid neurosurgeons.)  These payments, which most people would say are sufficient to make their recipients rich, were handed out by a not-for-profit organization whose mission statement includes being "committed to providing premier health care services to our region and contributing to this community" at the end of a bog of business-speak.  I suspect most people would think "contributing to this community" means something in addition to contributing to the wealth of a few top executives, and contributing to the business income of board members and executives' relatives.  Again, are board members who have become cozy with each other and the executives they are supposed to supervise more likely to be distracted from their fiduciary duty to the not-for-profit organization by their buddies' friendships?

We often discuss conflicts of interest on this blog.  Many of these involve financial relationships among health care professionals and academics on one hand, and pharmaceutical, biotechnology, device and other health care corporations on the other.  However, I suspect that conflicts involving leadership of hospitals and local businesses and vendors may be more common.  The latter may not always have as much influence on the quality of care, teaching and research as former group of conflicts.  However, they may have more effects on the total costs of health care, and may contribute more to the coziness, sense of entitlement, and inattention to the mission that seem to characterize much of health care leadership.  They may contribute to the perception that health care, like finance, may now be about , as Prof Mintzberg said, "All this compensation madness is not about markets or talents or incentives, but rather about insiders hijacking established institutions for their personal benefit."

The new version of the IRS forms are just beginning to become public, so we expect to see many more juicy stories about the financial and family ties of leaders of health care not-for-profit organizations.  Watch your local newspapers for details about conflicts of interest at your local health care not-for-profit organizations.

Maybe as more is revealed, the need for more transparent, accountable, and ethical governance of health care organizations will become apparent.

Read More