Despite Poor Financial Results, Diminishing Pipeline, Multiple Settlements of Legal Cases, Outgoing Pfizer CEO Got Over $24 Million

It is the season for share-holders' meetings of big US publicly held corporations, and as the proxy statements prepared for these meetings, prepare for more eye-popping, jaw-dropping examples of executive compensation. 

Pfizer's 2010 CEO Compensation
The AP (via the Wall Street Journal) just noted the compensation given to Jeffrey Kindler, the outgoing (in 2010) CEO of Pfizer, Inc, the world's largest pharmaceutical company:

Former Pfizer Inc. Chairman and CEO Jeffrey B. Kindler may have left the world's largest drugmaker abruptly last December, but he didn't leave empty-handed thanks to a compensation package valued almost $22 million.

Kindler received a 60 percent increase last year over his 2009 compensation, according to an Associated Press analysis of a Pfizer regulatory filing Tuesday.

The New York-based drugmaker gave Kindler a salary and performance-related bonus totaling $4.9 million, a $4.5 million severance payment and more than $12 million in stock and option awards. The company also will continue his health coverage for 12 months 'at active employee rates,' the filing said.

In fact, perusal of the new 2011 Pfizer proxy statement shows that Kindler, who stepped down on 5 December, 2010, made even more based on Pfizer's own calculations, $24,688, 849. Curiously, Ian Read, the CEO after 5 December, and previously Group President, Worldwide Pharmaceutical Business, received $17,396,112, despite only being CEO for 26 days.

Pay for What Kind of Performance?

These opulent pay packages stand in contrast to Pfizer's performance under Kindler and its financial results in 2010:

Kindler was ousted by Pfizer's board unexpectedly Dec. 6 after four years of languishing share prices and several failures of promising drugs in late testing, including a successor to cholesterol fighter Lipitor, the world's top-selling drug. Pfizer will lose U.S. patent protection in November for Lipitor.

Also,

Pfizer's 2010 net income fell 4 percent to $8.26 billion, or $1.02 per share. Revenue totaled $67.81 billion, up 36 percent, thanks to $18.1 billion from sales of Wyeth products.

Its stock price slipped 4 percent to close 2010 at $17.31, while the Standard & Poor's 500 index climbed 12.8 percent.

Furthermore, the compensation given the former and current CEO also stood in sharp contrast to Pfizer's amazing track record of recent unethical behavior.   Pfizer paid a $2.3 billion settlement in 2009 of civil and criminal allegations and a Pfizer subsidiary entered a guilty plea to charges it violated federal law regarding its marketing of Bextra (see post here).  Pfizer was involved in three other major cases from then to early 2010, including two involving settlements of fraud charges, and one in which a jury found the company guilty of violating the RICO (racketeer-influenced corrupt organization) statute (see post here).  The company was listed as one of the pharmaceutical "big four" companies in terms of defrauding the government (see post here).  Pfizer's Pharmacia subsidiary settled allegations that it inflated drugs costs paid by New York in early 2011 (see post here).   Just yesterday a settlement was announced in a long-running class action case which involved allegations that another Pfizer subsidiary had exposed many people to asbestos (see this story in Bloomberg).

Despite Pfizer's recent dismal financial performance, clotted drug pipeline, and unfortunate ethical/ legal track record, the company's board compensation committee reported thus:

The Committee believes that Pfizer�s executive compensation program implements and achieves the goals of our executive compensation philosophy. Pfizer�s executive compensation philosophy, which is set by the Committee, is to align each executive�s compensation with Pfizer�s short-term and long-term performance and to provide the compensation and incentives needed to attract, motivate and retain key executives who are crucial to Pfizer�s long-term success.

Who Provided "Stewardship" of Pfizer?
So I had to ask: who were these people who thought that compensation of over $24 million was somehow "aligned" with declining profits, declining revenues, little output of new drugs, and multiple legal settlements of charges like fraud and violating the RICO act?

Here is a list of Pfizer's board of directors in 2010, and some relevant affiliations, taken from Pfizer's web-site, and where indicated, elsewhere (color coding to be explained below)

- Dennis A. Ausiello, M.D. -
Jackson Professor of Clinical Medicine at Harvard Medical School and Chief of Medicine at Massachusetts General Hospital since 1996.
Member of the Institute of Medicine....
Director of TARIS BioMedical, Inc.
(per Research!America bio) advisor to drug delivery and biosensing start-up companies Entra, BIND Biosciences, and Seventh Sense Biosystems, Inc., to drug-discovery startup companies Promedior and Pulmatrix, to Proventys, an evidence-based medicine delivery system, and to Ore Pharmaceuticals and Polaris, investment and venture capital companies working in the biotech and device area.

- Michael S. Brown, M.D. -
Distinguished Chair in Biomedical Sciences since 1989 and Regental Professor since 1985 at the University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center at Dallas.
Member of ... the Institute of Medicine,....
Director of Regeneron Pharmaceuticals, Inc.

- M. Anthony Burns -
Chairman Emeritus since 2002, Chairman of the Board from 1985 to 2002, Chief Executive Officer from 1983 to 2000, and President from 1979 to 1999 of Ryder System, Inc., a provider of transportation and logistics services.
Life Trustee of the University of Miami.

- Robert N. Burt -
Retired Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of FMC Corporation, a chemicals manufacturer, and FMC Technologies Inc., a machinery manufacturer....
Life Trustee of the Rehabilitation Institute of Chicago

- W. Don Cornwell -
Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of Granite Broadcasting Corporation from 1988 until his retirement in August 2009 and Vice Chairman until December 2009.
(per Wallace Foundation web-site) He previously served as vice president, investment banking division, of Goldman Sachs.

- Frances D. Fergusson, Ph.D. -
President Emeritus of Vassar College since 2006 and President from 1986 to 2006. Served on the Mayo Clinic Board for 14 years, the last four years as its Chairman, and as President of the Board of Overseers of Harvard University from 2007 through 2008.

- William H. Gray III -
Co-Chairman of GrayLoeffler, LLC (formerly the Amani Group), a business advisory and consulting firm. Chairman of the Amani Group from 2004 through September 2009.
Currently Director of ... J. P. Morgan Chase & Co.

- Constance J. Horner -
Guest Scholar from 1993 until 2005 at The Brookings Institution....

- James M. Kilts -
Founding Partner, Centerview Partners Management, LLC, a private equity firm, since 2006.
(Per Centerview Partners web-site) Centerview Partners' investment banking advisory business serves some of the largest companies globally in a broad range of industries, with particular expertise in Food & Consumer Products, Financial Institutions, General Industrials, Healthcare, Media & Entertainment ....
The firm has executed many significant transactions in recent years, including:
Altria's $113 billion spin-off of Philip Morris International, its $62 billion spin-off of Kraft and its $11.7 billion acquisition of UST...
Facet Biotech's $722 million sale to Abbott Labs;
OSI Pharmaceuticals' $4.0 billion sale to Astellas Pharma;

- George A. Lorch -
Chairman Emeritus of Armstrong Holdings, Inc., a global manufacturer of flooring and ceiling materials,....

- John P. Mascotte -
Retired President and Chief Executive Officer of Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Kansas City, Inc.,...

- Suzanne Nora Johnson -
Retired Vice Chairman, Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.,...
Director of American International Group, Inc., .... Board member of the American Red Cross, The Brookings Institution, ... and the University of Southern California.
(per Milken Institute web-site) on the board of numerous not-for-profit organizations, including ... RAND Health ....
She is on the Advisory Board of Councilors of Harvard Medical School

- Ian C. Read -
President and Chief Executive Officer since December 2010.

- Stephen W. Sanger -
Chairman of General Mills, Inc.
Currently Director of ... Wells Fargo & Company.

- William C. Steere, Jr. -
Chairman Emeritus of Pfizer Inc. since 2001.
Currently Director of Health Management Associates, Inc.
Director of the New York University Medical Center ...; and Member of the Board of Overseers of Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center.

Of Pfizer's 14 directors (excluding its CEO), seven have or had leadership positions at teaching hospitals, academic medical centers, medical schools or their parent universities. Three have or had leadership positions at other influential non-profit health care organizations. 


Two had leadership positions at potentially competing pharmaceutical or biotechnology companies.

Two had leadership positions at companies that finance pharmaceutical, biotechnology and other health related companies.

One had a leadership position at a health insurance company.

One had a leadership position at a for-profit hospital operating company.

Four had leadership positions in financial services corporations, including some that were implicated in the global financial collapse, and/or required massive federal bail-outs to avoid collapse.

It seems that every time we look at the boards of directors or trustees who are supposed to provide stewardship to a troubled health care organization, we see a similar pattern.  Just as we recently said about the Johnson and Johnson board, ....
 
Summary
 
So here we have the latest striking case that indicates the confluence of forces that can lead to health care dysfunction. Not only has the compensation given to health care leaders got so large that it is per se a cause of increased health spending, but also, and more importantly, such compensation often provides perverse incentives that perpetuate mismanagement, raising costs and lowering quality. This situation appears to be enabled by governance (or "stewardship") by individuals who are often fellow members of the CEOs' club, and hence who may feel more sympathy with the executives they are supposed to supervise than the stockholders whose financial interests they are supposed to protect, or the public whom the companies' products and services are supposed to benefit. Moreover, these individuals often have conflicts of interest which may mitigate against objective scrutiny of the executives they are supposed to oversee. Finally, these individuals often may come from corporate cultures which do not espouse the values that we in health care are supposed to uphold. (See this post and its links for other examples of the sorts of people who are supposed to provide stewardship to health care organizations.)


So to repeat once more-

I strongly believe that there needs to be much more investigation, academic, journalistic, and perhaps legal, of the identity, nature, and culture of the leaders of health care, and their relationships. A few bloggers cannot do it all. Obviously, the anechoic effect mitigates against medical and health care academics looking into their own leaders. However, failing to understand who is leading our march to the brink of health care failure ought not to be something such academics would want on their conscience.

Finally, and obviously, health care organizations need leaders that uphold the core values of health care, and focus on and are accountable for the mission, not on secondary responsibilities that conflict with these values and their mission, and not on self-enrichment. Leaders ought to be rewarded reasonably, but not lavishly, for doing what ultimately improves patient care, or when applicable, good education and good research.

If we do not fix the severe problems affecting the leadership and governance of health care, and do not increase accountability, integrity and transparency of health care leadership and governance, we will be as much to blame as the leaders when the system collapses.

ADDENDUM (23 March, 2011) - See also comments by Merrill Goozner on the GoozNews blog.

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Millions to Health Insurance CEOs, But Blame Everyone Else for Rising Health Care Costs

The revelations about the huge golden parachute given the outgoing CEO of ostensibly non-profit Massachusetts Blue Cross Blue Shield induced some public discussion about the disconnect between executive compensation and the mission of health care organization (see most recent post here).  Several other recent stories should generate more discussion on these issues. 

First, new proxy statements revealed the compensation of executives of two large for-profit health care insurers/ managed care companies.  In alphabetical order,

Cigna

As reported by the AP, via ABC news, the CEO got a big raise:

Cigna Corp. CEO David M. Cordani's total compensation more than doubled in 2010, his first year as leader of the nation's fourth-largest health insurer, and a period in which the company's earnings, revenue and enrollment all climb.

Cordani, 45, received compensation valued at $15.1 million last year from the Philadelphia managed-care company, according to an Associated Press analysis of a regulatory filing Friday.

That included a $1 million salary, a performance-related bonus totaling more than $7.3 million and stock and option awards adding up to $6.7 million.

In 2009, Cordani's compensation was $6.5 million, but he did not serve for the entire year. Note that according to the 2009 proxy, the previous CEO, H Edward Hanway, received $12,236,740 in total compensation in 2008, his last year as CEO.

What was the rationale for the huge rise in Cordani's compensation from 2009 to 2010? (And implicitly, the fairly large increase compared to Hanway's compensation in his last year?)

The company said in its proxy statement filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission that Cigna 'effectively executed on its growth strategy under Cordani's leadership last year.

'Revenue rose significantly in 2010, reflecting strong premium growth in (Cigna's) ongoing business segments,' the proxy said.

Cigna earned about $1.35 billion, or $4.89 per share, on $21.25 billion in revenue in 2010. That was up from $1.3 billion, or $4.73 per share, on $18.41 billion in revenue in 2009. The insurer's medical membership climbed 4 percent to 11.4 million people compared to the final quarter of 2009, when it fell more than 5 percent. That helped raise premiums and fees in health care, the insurer's largest segment.

Also,

Cigna shares climbed 4 percent to close 2010 at $36.66, while the Standard & Poor's 500 index rose 12.8 percent.

So to recap, Cigna's current CEO's total compensation doubled in a year while earnings and the stock price rose about 4%.

WellPoint

Also reported by AP, via the Washington Post, the CEO got a small raise (but ended up with compensation similar to Mr Cordani's above):

The president and CEO of health insurer WellPoint Inc. received a 3 percent boost in total compensation in 2010 even as the company�s profit and enrollment numbers slipped during a transitional year for U.S. health care companies.

The Indianapolis-based insurer awarded Angela Braly a total pay package worth $13.4 million up from $13.1 million in 2009. Wellpoint disclosed the compensation � which includes salary, bonus and other awards � in a filing with federal financial regulators late Friday.

On the other hand, the company did not do so well financially:

The insurer�s profit fell sharply last year compared with 2009, when the sale of its NextRx subsidiary contributed $2.2 billion in after-tax income. Medical enrollment also slid 1 percent last year to 33.3 million members.

So what was the rationale for even a small raise (over an already huge compensation package)?

In the company�s filing, Wellpoint�s board of directors highlighted accomplishments by management, including reducing general expenses by 3 percent.

Also,

A Wellpoint spokeswoman stressed Friday that the company�s pay formula rewards executives for improving enrollee health, boosting share prices and meeting other pre-set goals.

'For the CEO, almost 90 percent of total target compensation is based on company performance and is tied to meeting established goals,' Kristin Binns said in a statement.

So while Cigna did slightly better financially than last year, its CEO's total compensation doubled to well over $10 million, and while WellPoint did slightly worse financially than last year, its CEO's total compensation increased, again remaining well over $10 million.  It seems that the leaders of top health care organizations will continue to get richer, no matter how well their organizations performed financially, let alone what effect they had on patients' and the public's health.
So What Drives Up Health Care Costs?

Just to distract from CEOs getting increases in their already huge compensation that seem disproportionate to any reasonable measure of their companies' financial performance, health care insurers continued to deny any responsibility for the rise in health care costs.

For example, the San Francisco Chronicle published a story entitled, "Insurer Wants Focus on What Drives Up Health Costs," which had a familiar ring:

When health insurers notify members that rates are going up - often in the punishing double-digits - they typically blame rising medical costs.

They say the problem really isn't theirs; it's all the other pieces of the health-care puzzle that drive up costs that must be passed on to customers.

Don't blame you, don't blame me, blame that fella behind the tree.
It went on to name all the usual suspects (color-coded for comparison below):

Insurers say their costs grow in part because of new medical technologies and the rising price of pharmaceutical products and medical equipment.

The consolidation of hospitals and doctors into large networks also makes it hard to keep prices low, as do waste, fraud and malpractice, they say. The system also lacks incentives for hospitals and doctors to curb costs. For example, they can charge twice by repeating tests and procedures, and by readmitting patients.

Insurers also say they lose money with policies people buy on their own, as opposed to group coverage from employers. Because the individual policies are more expensive, healthier people tend to avoid them, leaving insurers with a sicker pool.

Poor reimbursement from government programs such as Medi-Cal also forces insurers to raise private insurance prices to make up the slack, they say.

Finally, as people get older and fatter, they gobble up more health care resources.

'When you're looking at growth in premiums, the largest engine of that growth are those medical costs,' said Charles Bacchi, executive vice president of the California Association of Health Plans, which represents health insurers. He said critics who claim that insurers raise prices to increase profits and pad executive salaries are wrong, and that insurers' average profit margin has remained at 3 to 5 percent for years.

First, note that the executive compensation, the administrative costs, the marketing, public relations and lobbying costs all come off the top of revenues before any profits are generated, and before any possible dividends get paid to stock-holders.   I suspect that the insurance industry spokespeople immediately switch the topic to profits and investors' results to distract from those who really make money from health insurance companies, the top executives, and all those managers, bureaucrats, marketers, public relations people, and lobbyists who never touch patients and never deliver any care.  As Wendell Potter has written, many people like to blame government bureaucrats for health care's problems. They may deserve some blame, but not any more, and perhaps less than corporate bureaucrats and executives.

Recall further what Wendell Potter described in Deadly Spin. All those health insurance corporate public relations people were earning good salaries in part based on their ability to distract the public and policy-makers from the insurance companies' roles in health care dysfunction. Potter wrote (p. 110):

Rather than admit responsibility for the failures, insurance executives pointed the finger of blame at their customers, the 'consumers' of health care, and, of course, the providers of care. In introducing the concept of their new silver bullet - consumer driven health care - insurance executives claimed that the 'real drivers of health care costs' (one of my CEO's favorite expressions) were the people who sought care when they really didn't need it and the doctors and hospitals who were all too willing to provide this unnecessary care. Sure, the aging population and expensive new technology were also factors, but the main culprits were people who just didn't realize how expensive health care had become.

Note the similarities among the "real drivers of health care costs" promulgated by the corporate PR people and the defense of the health insurers' role mounted above (some of the more obvious color-coded). Note that the defenses never explain why the insurance companies seem unable to negotiate prices down, and why they all use the physician payment schedule derived from the recommendations of the secretive RUC.

For some final irony, the Chronicle found an academic who was not too hard on the health insurance companies:

Glenn Melnick, a health economist at the University of Southern California, sympathizes with many of the insurers' arguments.

He blamed rising costs mainly on higher prices charged by hospitals and doctors, which account for the largest portion of health care spending.

The reporter did not note Prof Melnick's full title, Professor and Blue Cross of California Chair in Health Care Finance. Oops.

So in summary, health care costs continue rising, access keeps declining, and there is no evidence of improvements in quality. Large health care organizations blame each other for the problems, but nearly all of them continue to make their top executives extremely rich. Although the amounts diverted to these executives cannot solely account for the rise in health care costs, the perverse incentives given those who lead health care are likely a major cause of the problems. A health care system run by leaders who are comfortable becoming extremely rich while the health care crisis worsens is a likely recipe for dysfunction.

We now know commercial health insurers deploy well paid public relations departments to use stealthy if not downright deceptive means to distract those who want to address what really causes health care dysfunction (see this post.) It is likely that all large health care organizations use similar stealth advocacy strategies. These strategies have successfully distracted the conversation away from problems with health care leadership and governance, at least until now.

As we have said before, far too often the leaders of not-for-profit health care institutions seem more interested in padding their own bottom lines than upholding the institutions' missions. They often seem entirely unaware of their duty to put those missions ahead of their own self-interest. Like the financial services sector in the era of "greed is good," health care too often seems run by "insiders hijacking established institutions for their personal benefit." True health care reform would encourage leadership of health care who understand health care and care about its mission, rather than those who see a quick way to make a small fortune.

Furthermore, we need an open discussion of the real issues related to health care dysfunction, not one stifled by the anechoic effect, spun by corporate PR, and dominated by "third parties" whose conflicts of interest are hidden. 

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Health Care Executives' Compensation: Head's, They Win, Tail's, You Lose

It seems to be the season for stories about the pay of health care leaders to appear in the press. Here is our latest round-up.

Novant Health

First the Winston-Salem (NC) Journal reported hefty pay received by executives of a regional hospital system:

Four of the top five executives at Novant Health Inc. received substantial salary increases during 2010, according to the health-care system.

However, the overall compensation and benefits for the top three executives were down for the fiscal year.

Paul Wiles, the chief executive and president of the not-for-profit system, got a $129,000 raise, or 14 percent, to $1,029,000 in salary. He got a bonus of $836,800, up $9,338. His total compensation was down 3 percent to a little more than $2 million.

Also,

Greg Beier, the president of Novant Health Operations, received a 15 percent salary increase to $659,000, but total compensation was down 8 percent to $1.48 million.

Carl Armato, the president of Novant Health Markets, got a 5 percent salary increase to $638,000, but total compensation decreased 3 percent to $1.26 million.

Jacque Gattis, the system's chief administrative officer, had a 19 percent salary increase to $490,000 and a 5 percent total compensation increase to $951,975.


Stephen Wallenhaupt, its chief medical officer, received a 20 percent increase in salary to $481,000 and an 8 percent increase in total compensation to $935,525.

This article made it seem that the substantial compensation received by these executives was related to the system's financial performance:

[Senior Vice President of marketing and communication Jim] Tobalski said Novant will release its fiscal 2010 financial report in April. The system likely will report a better overall performance because of the stock market's surge in 2010.

However, as reported eight days later again by the Winston-Salem (NC) Journal, there are other ways to look at these executives' compensation. First, their bonuses can be compared to those given less exalted employees:

Novant Health Inc. has paid two separate bonuses, including a one-time 'thank you' offering, to its Forsyth Medical Center employees recently, but that has not dampened the complaints of some employees that executive payments were too high.

Jeff Lindsay, the hospital's president, notified employees of the bonuses in an internal memo Feb. 28.

Lindsay's memo said the thank-you bonus was for 'efforts above and beyond the achievement of our 2010 goals.' It was worth $120 for employees who worked more than 1,500 paid hours in 2010 and $60 for those who worked 750 to 1,499 paid hours.

Novant also paid a 'discretionary' bonus ranging from $120 to $300, depending on the employee's length of service and employment status. That bonus was contingent on Novant achieving goals in quality, financial vitality, employee commitment and patient satisfaction.

By comparison, the top five executives of Novant received a combined $2.62 million in executive bonuses for 2010. The combined bonuses were up $151,713 from 2009.

Furthermore, it is not clear that the system's financial performance has been as good as its spokesman implied above:

Several Forsyth Medical employees criticized Novant's decision to pay the executive bonuses after the hospital cited financial challenges and lower demand for services in cutting 48 jobs there in July.

'How can any executive with a conscience accept a $129,000 raise and an $836,800 bonus while the company lays off employees who desperately need income to support their families?' said one posting to JournalNow.com.

So, in summary, some useful comparisons are: top executives' bonuses were approximately one-thousand times the size of those given to regular employees; and top executives' total compensation was justifed by "financial performance" during a year the system had to lay off workers due to "financial challenges."

University of Massachusetts Medical Center

The Worcester (MA) Telegram reported on the leader's compensation contrasted with the hospital's financial status:

While facing a $54 million budget shortfall for next fiscal year, the University of Massachusetts last month hiked UMass Medical School Chancellor Michael F. Collins� salary by more than $60,000 a year � almost a 12 percent pay raise.

The three-year contract signed by Dr. Collins and outgoing University of Massachusetts President Jack Wilson on Feb. 14 raises the medical school chancellor�s annual base salary and deferred compensation from $524,300 to $585,290.

Under the deal, Dr. Collins will no longer get a separate $32,000-a-year housing allowance and instead is required to live rent-free in the furnished and remodeled Grenon House on Flagg Street. The five-bedroom, four-bathroom home has an assessed value of $736,600 and is owned by the University of Massachusetts Foundation, according to city property records.

Dr Collins' total compensation, however, will be considerably larger than his salary:

Dr. Collins, who also serves as the university�s senior vice president for health sciences, will continue to be eligible for additional performance pay of up to 30 percent of his base salary a year, which works out to $164,100 in potential performance pay in the new contract, up from $147,000 under his previous salary.

The chancellor also will continue to receive $15,000 a year for his choice of life insurance or an extended care health insurance policy, as well as supplemental retirement contributions totaling $98,000 a year � the IRS maximum for those type of retirement accounts, according to the contract and the medical school.

All together, the chancellor�s compensation package and benefits could be worth as much as $862,000 a year if he receives the maximum performance pay. That figure does not include the value of living at Grenon House.

His raise can be contrasted with those received by lower-level employees:

The chancellor�s pay hike stands in contrast to 2 percent raises negotiated late last year with some union workers at the medical school and with a previous salary freeze for all university employees earning $120,000 a year or more.

In announcing that pay freeze two years ago, Mr. Wilson noted, 'We are living at a time when few people are seeing their financial circumstances improve and most are happy to preserve what they have as we ride out the current fiscal and economic storm.'

Despite the budget short-fall, and consequent salary freezes, the criterion for the Chancellor's salary seemed to be what other top executives were getting at other organizations, even if those organizations were having better financial results:

'The university does try to set salaries for senior administrators in relation to what people are paid for discharging comparable duties at comparable institutions,' [university spokesman] Mr. Connolly said. 'In this case, Chancellor Collins would be slightly under the median salary paid at comparable institutions.'

Another university spokesman justified the Chancellor's compensation by citing his performance:

'The chancellor has a record of success in Worcester,' said [university spokesman] Mr. Keohane, who provided an eight-page medical school report titled 'Accomplishments of Michael F. Collins, MD.'

The report lists dozens of improvements to the medical school during the tenure of Dr. Collins, including items such as: leading the campaign to make the university a partner in the state�s $1 billion life sciences initiative; increasing medical school class enrollments by 25 percent; presiding over improving academic performance; growing revenue by more than 27 percent; instituting more formal performance reviews among executive staff; and improving collaboration with UMass Memorial Health Care Inc.

Oddly enough, he did not mention UMass Memorial's aggressive recruiting campaign for bone marrow donors in part implemented by "flirtatious models" that failed to disclose how the donors would be charged for their generosity as one of the Chancellor's achievements related to "improving collaboration" with UMass Memorial (see this post).

So, in summary, a budget shortfall was the justification for freezing line employees' pay, but not the Chancellor's pay, which was raised.  One rationale for the raise was that the Chancellor's pay had to be increased to keep up with pay of executives elsewhere, but the pay of line employees was not compared with such employees elsewhere.  Another rationale for the raise was a list of positive developments at the medical center, but negative developments were ignored, as were the contributions of any employees other than the Chancellor to the positive developments.

Summary: Head's, They Win, Tail's, You Lose 

Juxtaposing these two examples shows how justifications for executive compensation in health care often seem to be ad hoc, after the fact, and inconsistent with any rationale for compensation for more mundane employees.  If outcomes have been good lately, then the good outcomes may be the rationale for better executive compensation.  If the outcomes have been bad, then the executives must deserve more because they are struggling so hard under tough conditions. 

The rules for everyone else, of course, seem to be more stark. 

So, once more with feeling, as we have said before, far too often the leaders of not-for-profit health care institutions seem more interested in padding their own bottom lines than upholding the institutions' missions. They often seem entirely unaware of their duty to put those missions ahead of their own self-interest. Like the financial services sector in the era of "greed is good," health care too often seems run by "insiders hijacking established institutions for their personal benefit." True health care reform would encourage leadership of health care who understand health care and care about its mission, rather than those who see a quick way to make a small fortune.

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Despite Recalls, Legal Settlements, Guilty Plea, Johonson & Johnson Board Paid CEO $29 Million, Says He "Met Expectations"

For our latest story about the tremendous disconnect between the pay and performance of leaders of health care organizations, we turn to Reuters. 

Astronomical Pay

Despite having a very bad 2010, Johnson and Johnson continued to reward its CEO royally:

After a year in which Johnson & Johnson's product quality control was deemed such a shambles that the U.S. government will oversee some plants, the board had praise for Chief Executive William Weldon and awarded him almost $29 million in overall compensation.

The once golden reputation of the diversified healthcare giant was severely tarnished by seemingly endless recalls of widely used consumer products as well as recalls of medical devices and products from other units in 2010.

U.S. consumer product sales fell by more than 19 percent in 2010 and the company's 2011 forecast for earnings growth of only 1 percent to 3 percent fell shy of Wall Street projections.

Weldon's compensation was trimmed 7 percent, but in what appears to be a disconnect with the reality of its situation, J&J's (JNJ.N) board, in a year-end regulatory filing, said his performance 'generally met expectations' despite a year in which 'operational sales declined and fell below the goals for the year.'

'The board believes that Mr Weldon provided strong leadership during a very demanding year and has worked to resolve multiple challenging issues and position the company for future growth,' it said in the filing.

The rash of consumer medicine recalls in 2009 and 2010 were largely responsible for the first back-to-back years of company sales declines since World War Two.

Last week, U.S. health regulators filed a consent decree against J&J's McNeil consumer unit that will put some of its manufacturing plants under government supervision for at least five years.
The McNeil unit has recalled more than 300 million bottles and packages of Tylenol, Motrin, Rolaids, Benadryl and other products in the past year over faulty manufacturing and quality control problems.
The recalls cost the company $900 million in sales last year and hurt earnings, and Weldon was called to testify before Congress about problems that left pharmacy and supermarket shelves without Children's Tylenol.

But Weldon's 2010 compensation fell just 7 percent to $28.7 million from the $30.8 million he received in 2009. His performance bonus for 2010 was down 45 percent to $1.98 million.

The Wall Street Journal article on Weldon's pay also mentioned that Weldon also received " perquisites and other benefits in 2010 [which] included personal use of company aircraft, valued at $89,796; a car and driver for commuting and other personal transportation valued at $29,635; and a nominal amount of home security system monitoring fees."

The 2011 Johnson and Johnson proxy statement also noted that the other four of the five most highly paid Johnson and Johnson executives received compensation valued from $5,632,285 to $8,851,965 in 2010. In particular, Ms Colleen A Goggins, who retired under fire as head of the embattled Johnson and Johnson consumer group, walked away with $7,738,614 in 2010.

Other Aspects of Bad Company Performance

The WSJ Health Blog has been keeping an eye on the running total of Johnson and Johnson recalls. On 9 March, 2011, the list included 18 separate recalls of various different drugs and devices since July, 2009, from over-the-counter cold medications to sutures and hip replacements.

While suffering such a massive breakdown of the ability to perform the company's most basic function, to supply pure, unadulterated medicines and well-made devices, the company has also suffered from ethical lapses which were not listed in the Reuters article. In 2010, these included a jury verdict that the company had committed marketing fraud in its promotion of the atypical anti-psychotic drug Respirdal (see post here), and a guilty plea to a misdemeanor for and civil settlement of charges of "misbranding" Topamax by Johnson and Johnson subsidiary Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharmaceuticals (see post here).

Of course, we once speculated that the Johnson and Johnson CEO commanded such astronomical pay in part based on his ability to influence US government health policy in favor of his and his company's interests (see this post).

Who Made Up the Board Who Was Responsible?

Responsible for the astronomical amounts paid to Mr Weldon despite his company's ongoing inability to make pure, unadulterated medicines, and to other executives who presided over the company's recalls, guilty plea, and legal settlements was the company's board of directors.  Its members are listed below.  For explanation of the color coding, see the explanation below:

• Mary Sue Coleman - President, University of Michigan.
• James G Cullen - Retired Chairman and CEO, Bell Atlantic Corp
• Ian E L Davis - Senior Advisor, Apax Partners; Former Chairman and Worldwide Managing Director, McKinsey & Company, non-executive director, BP plc
• Michael M E Johns - Chancellor, Emory University, Past Chair of the Council of Teaching Hospitals, member of the editorial board, JAMA, chair of the publication committee, Academic Medicine
• Susan L Lindquist - Member and Former Director, Whitehead Institute for Biomedical Research, Co-Founder of FoldRx Pharmaceuticals, Inc, a subsidiary of Pfizer Inc.
• Anne M Mulcahy - Former Chairman and CEO, Xerox Corp, director of the Washington Post Company, previously director of Citigroup Inc, and Federal National Association (Fannie Mae)
• Leo F Mullin - Retired Chairman and CEO, Delta Airlines, director of Education Management Corporation
• William D Perez -Senior Advisor, Geenhill & Co, Inc, Trustee of Cornell University and Northwestern Hospital
• Charles Prince - Senior Counselor, Albright Capital Management LLC, Retired Chairman and CEO, Citigroup
• David Satcher - Director, Center of Excellent on Health Disparities, Director, Satcher Health Leadership Institute and Poussaint-Satcher-Crosby Chair in Mental Health, Morehouse School of Medicine, and trustee of the Kaiser Family Foundation

Of Johnson and Johnson's 10 directors (excluding its CEO), four have leadership positions at teaching hospitals, academic medical centers, medical schools or their parent universities.  Of these, two also had leadership positions at other influential non-profit health care organizations, including medical journals, a teaching hospital association, and a charitable foundation.

One had a management position at a competing pharmaceutical company.

Four had leadership positions in  financial services corporations, including some that were implicated in the global financial collapse, and/or required massive federal bail-outs to avoid collapse.

Three had had leadership positions in other organizations now under fire , that is, McKinsey, for the role of one of its former executives in an alleged insider trading scandal (e.g., latest coverage in the NY Times); several for-profit higher education companies caught up in allegations of luring students destined to fail in order to collect tuition funded by government loans;  and BP, under investigation for its role in a massive oil spill.

Summary

So here we have the latest striking case that indicates the confluence of forces that can lead to health care dysfunction.  Not only has the compensation given to health care leaders got so large that it is per se a cause of increased health spending, but also, and more importantly, such compensation often provides perverse incentives that perpetuate mismanagement, raising costs and lowering quality.  This situation appears to be enabled by governance by individuals who are often fellow members of the CEOs' club, and hence who may feel more sympathy with the executives they are supposed to supervise than the stockholders whose financial interests they are supposed to protect, or the public whom the companies' products and services are supposed to benefit.  Moreover, these individuals often have conflicts of interest which may mitigate against objective scrutiny of the executives they are supposed to oversee.  Finally, these individuals often may come from corporate cultures which do not espouse the values that we in health care are supposed to uphold.  (See this post and its links for other examples of the sorts of people who are supposed to provide stewardship to health care organizations.)

So to repeat once more-

I strongly believe that there needs to be much more investigation, academic, journalistic, and perhaps legal, of the identity, nature, and culture of the leaders of health care, and their relationships. A few bloggers cannot do it all. Obviously, the anechoic effect mitigates against medical and health care academics looking into their own leaders. However, failing to understand who is leading our march to the brink of health care failure ought not to be something such academics would want on their conscience.

Finally, and obviously, health care organizations need leaders that uphold the core values of health care, and focus on and are accountable for the mission, not on secondary responsibilities that conflict with these values and their mission, and not on self-enrichment. Leaders ought to be rewarded reasonably, but not lavishly, for doing what ultimately improves patient care, or when applicable, good education and good research.

If we do not fix the severe problems affecting the leadership and governance of health care, and do not increase accountability, integrity and transparency of health care leadership and governance, we will be as much to blame as the leaders when the system collapses.

ADDENDUM (17 March, 2011) - Also see comments on by Jim Edwards on the Placebo Effect blog: "heads he wins, tails shareholders lose," as do patients and doctors. 

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Some Dare Call It "Corruption" - the Massachusetts Blue Cross Blue Shield Golden Parachute Scandal Continues

We have discussed many cases of health care organizations' leaders reaping rewards disproportionate to any concept of their performance, and especially to any concept of the effect of their conduct on patients' or the public's health.  Most of these cases have been pretty anechoic, but for some reason, the case of the huge golden parachute given to the outgoing CEO of Massachusetts Blue Cross Blue Shield despite a tenure  marked by financial losses and no particularly brilliant advances in patients' care or outcomes, (see this post) continues to generate responses. 

One editorial suggested that should the non-profit health insurance company continue to pay so lavishly, it should lose its tax exemption.  Another noted that the company should start putting its stakeholders, defined as its policy-holders "first and its funding of overly generous compensation packages to board members and outgoing CEOs somewhere far below."  Finally, an editorial in the local Providence Journal used the "c" word, "corruption," to define the company's and its CEO's behavior.

So it should not be surprising that defenders of the company have appeared.  The Boston Globe published an article which featured attempts to minimize the importance of the CEO's golden parachute. Further analysis of the points are in order.

Executive Salaries are a Minimal Component of Cost

The article quoted an expert who asserted executive salaries are not themselves a big component of cost:

The outcry grew big enough to force Blue Cross board members to vote to suspend their own payments and to lead the insurer to make promises to curb excessive payouts to executives. There�s just one problem: Those steps will do little to fix soaring health care costs.

'I have the same outrage,' Stuart H. Altman, a national health policy professor at Brandeis University, said about Blue Cross�s payments. But, 'We need to put executive pay and board salaries in perspective. It is not the major force, or even close to the major force, in driving up health care costs.'

My comment is that just because administrative costs are not the largest component of health care costs does not mean they do not drive health care costs.

As I have argued before, the biggest problem created by excess compensation for health care organizations' leaders is not the amount of money they get, per se.  The problem is the effect of the perverse incentives created by the money.  One concern is that people paid that much may make decisions that support their pay in the short-term, but damage the organizations' mission in the long-term.  Another is that the sorts of people attracted by the possibility of big pay packages are those least likely to uphold the mission in the first place.  Another is that the huge disparity between the pay of the top leaders and of everybody else is demoralizing for the relatively poorly paid staff who actually must do the work.

Finally, it may be worth quoting the former President of Princeton University, just interviewed about what academic leadership was like in the days before giant pay packages:

I�m not a fan of huge salaries for presidents of academic institutions. These are hard jobs. But people don�t really do them for the money. What kind of message do you really want to convey concerning the nature of the institution and its leadership? I always thought that it was important to convey a message of we�re all in this together. If you as president earn so much more than everyone else, it�s hard to argue that we�re all in this together.

Focusing on Executive Compensation Distracts from the Real Issues

The final argument in the Boston Globe piece was that huge executive compensation just is a distraction from the real issues:

Yet [current Massachusetts Blue Cross Blue Shield CEO Andrew] Dreyfus said he is concerned that the focus on executive and director pay will distract insurers, providers, and policy makers from addressing factors driving health care costs higher. Those factors range from an aging population to increases in obesity to expensive tests, drugs, and treatments that cure diseases and prolong lives.

'If you had a dozen health economists sitting in this room and you asked them what�s driving health care [costs], you know executive and board compensation wouldn�t be at the top of the list,' he said. 'It would be chronic illness and prices of hospitals and doctors and medical advances and discoveries and technology.'

That list of the "real" drivers of health care costs sounds very familiar.

Wendell Potter's Deadly Spin, is an expose of how how insurance and managed care corporations' public relations departments used deception, propaganda, and outright disinformation campaigns to make sure health policy supported the companies' interests.

Potter wrote (p.110) about how PR campaigns were designed to distract the public and policy makers from the industry's responsibility for health care dysfunction:

Rather than admit responsibility for the failures, insurance executives pointed the finger of blame at their customers, the 'consumers' of health care, and, of course, the providers of care. In introducing the concept of their new silver bullet - consumer driven health care - insurance executives claimed that the 'real drivers of health care costs' (one of my CEO's favorite expressions) were the people who sought care when they really didn't need it and the doctors and hospitals who were all too willing to provide this unnecessary care. Sure, the aging population and expensive new technology were also factors, but the main culprits were people who just didn't realize how expensive health care had become.

I color coded the factors listed by the current Blue Cross CEO as the real "drivers" of health care using the same colors with which I coded Mr Potter's list the specific distractors created by insurance company executives to deflect attention from the companies' inability (and probable) disinclination to control costs.
So it appears that Andrew Dreyfus is working from the same playbook that Wendell Potter described, down to the "drivers of health care costs" terminology. 

Summary

The Massachusetts Blue Cross Blue Shield kerfuffle seems to be enlarging into a good case to teach about what health care dysfunction is really all about.  It shows how the leaders of large health care organizations seem to be putting their self-interest ahead of the missions they are supposed to uphold.  Without governance structures that hold them accountable for upholding these missions, they have set up perverse incentives to pay themselves very well regardless of the effects of their actions on patients' or the public's health. 

So it appears, as the Providence Journal editorial asserted, that the leadership of health care organizations is increasingly corrupt, at least using the Transparency International definition of corruption, abuse of entrusted power for private gain. 

True health care reform would make leaders of health care organizations accountable for upholding their missions, and for patients' and the public's health.  Leaders of health care organizations ought to get reasonable incentives for improving health, but not incentives so large as to demoralize the people who actually do the work and take care of the patients. 

Post Script: More Undisclosed Conflicts of Interest

It is obvious why Andrew Dreyfus, the new CEO of Massachusetts Blue Cross Blue Shield might quote the health insurance industry public relations party line about drivers of health care costs that conveniently do not include insurance company practices and executive compensation. 

It was not obvious when reading the Boston Globe article why Professor Altman might be susceptible to that party line.  Perhaps his conclusions were only based on his scholarship.

However, the Boston Globe article failed to disclose Prof Altman's part-time jobs.  As per this 2010 proxy statement, he is a member of the board of directors of Lincare, a company that provides respiratory care services, including disease management, and of Aveta Inc, a privately held health insurance company.  Prof Altman's total compensation from Lincare in 2009 (per the latest proxy statement available, i.e., that issued in 2010), was over $1.7 million.   Note that corporate directors, as we have discussed previously, have a fiduciary duty to exhibit "unyielding loyalty" to the stockholders of the company and their interests  [Per Monks RAG, Minow N. Corporate Governance, 3rd edition. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004. P.200.].  Given Prof Altman's membership in the board of directors of a health insurance company, and his towering compensation as a director of a health care company that may need to maintain good relationships with health care insurers, it would seem that he has multiple financial relationships that could lead to sympathy with the health insurance industry's public relations party line.

So it seems that regardless of the intent of the reporter who wrote it, the latest Boston Globe article about the Massachustts Blue Cross Blue Shield CEO golden parachute scandal ended up being an apologia for excess compensation of health care insurance executives that followed the script written years ago by health care insurance corporate public relations.

So I need to add another conclusion.  The discussion of health care policy needs to be informed by disclosure of the financial interests of those participating, particularly those participating as experts in the media.   True health care reform would lead to such disclosure.  However, in our currently dysfunctional health care environment, be very skeptical about the interests of "health policy experts" who seem eager to support the powers that be.

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The Massachusetts Blue Cross Blue Shield CEO's Golden Parachute - "'Have's' Greasing One Another's Pockets"

We have frequently discussed the kind of compensation now frequently given to leaders of health care organizations.  Although often even the most disproportionately outrageous compensation only attracts transient interest, a recent regional story in this genre has really gotten legs.

How Big the Golden Parachute?
The story was about the severance package given to one Cleve L Killingsworth, the former CEO of not-for-profit health care insurance company Massachusetts Blue Cross Blue Shield.  While first reported as being worth $8.6 million,(1) the estimate of his total severance was soon raised to $11 million.(2)

This is a Way to Control Costs?

Immediately, that amount was contrasted with the supposed emphasis of the company on controlling costs, and its recent poor performance:

Killingsworth�s tenure at Blue Cross, which has nearly 3 million members, was marked by efforts to address skyrocketing medical costs by launching a 'global payment' pilot program, under which health care providers are given an annual budget and incentives to keep patients healthy and out of the hospital.

'Without Cleve�s leadership, we wouldn�t be where we are today in shifting from fee-for-service to global payments,' said senior vice president Jay McQuaide.

But the insurer stumbled financially in recent years, recording back-to-back operating losses totaling nearly $215 million in 2009 and 2010 as the economy weakened and state regulators acted to limit premium increases for policies covering small businesses and individuals.(3)

Then focus shifted to the company's board of trustees, which lead to recognition of some more striking contrasts. First, some prominent members of the board which approved the huge golden parachute had been vocal supporters of controlling health care costs:

Key members of the Blue Cross Blue Shield board that gave the nod to then-CEO Cleve Killingsworth�s controversial $11 million severance have been public advocates for trimming soaring health-care costs � even as they sat on a panel that quietly approved the departing chief�s golden parachute.

Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce President Paul Guzzi has crusaded to lower health-care costs in his day job representing the interests of local businesses, many of which struggle under the burden of rising premiums for their employee health plans.

'Advancing payment reform to bring health-care costs under control' is one of the Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce�s top policy agenda items, Guzzi said in a statement in January. Guzzi made $84,463 as the Blue Cross board chairman at the time of the Killingsworth vote.

Robert J. Haynes, president of the Massachusetts AFL-CIO who made $72,700 as a Blue Cross board member in 2010, has championed health-care cost reduction for the thousands of union members he represents.

'Unions stand ready to be part of the solution to the health-care cost crisis in which we all find ourselves,' Haynes said in an AFL-CIO statement in January. 'The only way to ensure we are part of the solution is to guarantee that we have a voice and meaningful role in how cost savings are achieved.'

Bentley University president Gloria Larson, who earned $76,400 as a Blue Cross board member last year, helped organize a confab of business, labor and political leaders in Ashland in January that addressed rising health-care costs. Those who planned to attend reportedly included two other Blue Cross board members � Haynes and former Suffolk District Attorney Ralph C. Martin II.(4)

Why Pay a Non-Profit's Trustees?

Also, as the quote above pointed out, it appears that the board members were themselves paid fairly well for a very part-time job, even though in general trustees of not-for-profit organizations serve as unpaid volunteers. However, it was soon revealed the paying board members is common practice for all Massachusetts non-profit health insurance companies.(5)

Some Blue Cross board members tried to defuse the issue by minimizing the impact of their pay on the organization's total budget:

Robert J. Haynes, president of the Massachusetts AFL-CIO and a critic of excessive corporate pay, was questioned about his role on the board following a State House news conference he held on a union-backed plan aimed at lowering health care costs. He said he would not give up his $72,000 annual payment from Blue Cross until the issue was reviewed by the company, and said the money given to board members does not play a role in rising health care costs.

'The cost of health insurance is not affected very much,' Haynes said. 'It�s about $1 million that board members get paid. On $13 billion in revenue, it�s like pennies a year.' (6)

What Should the New CEO Be Paid?
However, soon the board felt the need to suddenly stop paying itself.(7) The current Blue Cross CEO noted how little he would be paid:

Dreyfus emphasized that he has taken 'rock-bottom-of-the-market' compensation levels -- $800,000 in base pay with the opportunity for $1.6 million in severance � for comparable positions in the insurance industry.

'I will be one of the lowest paid Blue Cross executives in the country,' he said.... (8)

Things are tough all over.

What is Mr Killingsworth Now Up To?

Meanwhile, Mr Killingsworth seems to be weathering the storm. An enterprising reporter attempted to interview him in his house in New York, described as "a sprawling clapboard monstrosity with the charm of an assisted-living facility." However, "Mr Killingsworth was nowhere to be found," and Mrs Killingsworth "slammed the door" on the reporter.  (See picture in cited article.)  (9)

Possibly, Mr Killingworth was away tending his other responsibilities, which include serving on the Boards of Directors of The Traveler's Company and TIAA-CREF, and apparently despite their apparently competitive nature, on the boards of the Harvard Medical School and Boston University.

The Reaction

There were plenty of reactions, mostly vigorously unfavorable, to the contrast between the company's non-profit status, supposed commitment to reducing costs, and financial performance, on one hand, and the compensation given to executives, and board members:

"undermines the credibility of insurers when they say they're serious about bringing down the cost of care" Deidre Cummings, President of the Massachusetts Public Interest Research Group (3)

"If you lose $149 million and then you get paid $11 million for doing it, it is very clear to people where their health-care dollars are going.  And it is not to health care." - Ethan Rome, Health Care for America Now (2)

There were also judgments that health care had become the sandbox for wealthy and well-connected insiders, at the expense of everyone else:

"What we have here today is yet another enraging story of the 'haves'greasing one another's pockets while the 'have-nots' slip beneath the waves." Margery Egan, columnist for the Boston Herald(10)

"Therein lies the problem with boards.  They're supposed to provide oversight, but too often it's the same people tossing money at each other to serve on the boards of each other's companies, the operative word always being 'Yes!'" Brian McGrory, Boston Globe columnist (5)

Most pessimistically:

"If Massachusetts is the model, then national health care reform is ultimately doomed." Derrick Z Jackson, Boston Globe columnist (11)

I am actually now more optimistic.  The coverage of this story really shows that the anechoic effect may be fading .  There is starting to be frank discussion of the role of bad leadership of health care organizations as a cause of health care dysfunction.  If we start to admit these problems, maybe we can figure out solutions.

I will add just one opinion to those expressed in these articles.  The clear problem here is again perverse incentives.  The issue with how much this CEO was paid, and how his board members were paid was not mainly the diversion from direct health care of the funds involved.  Instead, the concerns ought to be: what sorts of people do these payments attract?  Are they the sorts of people who will uphold the organization's mission?  Once attracted, what sorts of incentives do the prospects of these payments supply for what sorts of decisions?  Do these sorts of incentives lead to decisions that uphold the mission in the long-term?

In this case, these concerns are underlined by the Blue Cross trustees' cavalier attitude to their own pay, and the new CEO's belief that $800,000 a year is "rock-bottom." 

I hope that the amount of discussion this case provoked might actually lead to some needed regional changes.

More globally, as we have said before, far too often the leaders of not-for-profit health care institutions seem more interested in padding their own bottom lines than upholding the institutions' missions. They often seem entirely unaware of their duty to put those missions ahead of their own self-interest. Like the financial services sector in the era of "greed is good," health care too often seems run by "insiders hijacking established institutions for their personal benefit." True health care reform would encourage leadership of health care who understand health care and care about its mission, rather than those who see a quick way to make a small fortune.

References


1.  Gil G. Former Blue Cross CEO got $8.6m last year.  Boston Globe, March 1, 2011. 
2. McConville C. Ex-Blue Cross CEO walks away with $11M. Boston Herald, March 2, 2011.
3. Weisman R. Blue Cross CEO got $8.6m in exit deal. Boston Globe, March 2, 2011.
4. McConville C, Chabot H. Trio publicly crusade against rising health costs: behind the shield. Boston Herald, March 3, 2011.
5. McGrory B. Such health pay, it's sick. Boston Globe, March 4, 2011.
6. Levenson M, Weisman R. 2 Blue Cross directors justify stipends. March 8, 2011.
7. Crimaldi L, Dwinnell J. Blue Cross board suspends pay, CEO perks cut. Boston Herald, March 8, 2011.
8. Cheney K. Amid outrage, Blue Cross chief fights to 'reclaim' company's standing. Enterprise News, March 10, 2011.
9. Gelzinis P. Cleve Killingsworth's New York castle not shielded from bad taste. Boston Herald, March 11, 2011.
10. Egan M. You call this health care? - it's nauseating.  Boston Herald, March 3, 2011.
11.  Jackson DZ. No wonder health costs are so high.  Boston Globe, March 5, 2011.

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After Manufacturing Problems, Genzyme CEO's Golden Parachute Means "Failure = Success"

In late 2009, I posted about problems at a Genzyme plant that manufactured some fabulously expensive drugs, e.g. Cerezyme whose cost to patients approximated $160,000 a year. We thought then that for a drug costing that much, the company ought to have figured out a conservative process to provide pure and unadulterated product. In a later post I asked why a company that could afford to make its CEO very rich could not afford to adequately maintain its manufacturing facilities. In May, 2010, I posted about a legal settlement of charges related to its manufacturing problems requiring Genzyme to pay a $175 million fine and function under US government supervision.  And in August, 2010, I posted about how this series of management missteps could lead to the company's CEO becoming even richer because they lead to a declining stock price, which increased the likely that the company would be bought out, which could trigger the CEO's golden parachute.  I suggested then that were this to happen, it would be a gross example of how massively perverse incentives stupendously reward the top brass of health care organizations for mediocre, or worse leadership and bad results for both patients/ clients/ customers and stock-holders alike.

Now it  looks like this will happen.  Yesterday, the Boston Globe reported:

Ggenzyme Corp., the largest biotechnology company in Massachusetts and one of the industry�s historic pioneers, has struck a definitive agreement to be bought by French pharmaceutical giant Sanofi-Aventis SA, in a deal valued at about $20.1 billion.

As a result of this deal,

Genzyme�s high-profile president and chief executive, Henri A. Termeer, who has run the company for 28 years, will resign following the close of the transaction. But he will advise Sanofi on integrating the two companies. Termeer built the company into a global operation with 10,000 employees worldwide and a business model that has been the envy of the biotechnology industry. He turns 65 on Feb. 28.

Termeer, though fiercely proud of Genzyme�s independence, stands to make more than $23 million when the sale is completed, according to a 'change of control' clause in his employment contract. In addition, as a major Genzyme shareholder, he would be in a position to cash out shares that last year were worth more than $275 million.

That and several other articles s noted that it was Genzyme's manufacturing problems that lead to the buy-out:

the string of events that made Genzyme vulnerable to a takeover began in the summer of 2009 when workers discovered viral contamination at Genzyme�s Allston Landing plant overlooking the Charles River.

Genzyme was forced to temporarily shut down and clean up the plant and ration shipments of its best-selling Cerezyme and Fabrazyme drugs, both of which treat enzyme deficiencies. The events created an opening for competitors such as Shire and Israel�s Protalix Biotherapeutics and sent Genzyme�s stock tumbling on the Nasdaq.

The dip in Genzyme�s share price drew activist investors, including Carl C. Icahn of New York and Ralph Whitworth of San Diego, who accumulated shares they hoped to sell at a rich premium. They pressured management to take steps to boost shareholder value, including a stock buyout and the elimination of 1,000 jobs worldwide.

Ultimately, the company gave Whitworth a seat on its board, and, after Icahn threatened to unseat Genzyme directors in a proxy battle, it granted two seats to his associates.

In many ways, industry watchers said, an acquisition became inevitable once Genzyme stumbled at its Allston plant.

A Bloomberg article noted that this sequence of events would lead to

The departure package [which] makes him 'one of the biggest all- time winners in biotech,' said [University of Michigan business professor Erik] Gordon, who has studied the pharmaceutical industry for three decades.

Our criticism of the Genzyme CEO's potential for reaping hugely perverse incentives was paralleled by Jim Edwards' critique of what actually happened:

Here�s how crazy CEO incentive compensation is: Genzyme (GENZ) CEO Henri Termeer walked away from his company with a payout that may be worth $300 million yesterday when Sanofi-Aventis (SNY) acquired his company. But the only reason Genzyme was acquired � triggering Termeer�s gargantuan change-of-control package � is because Termeer nearly ran his company into the ground, making his stock cheap enough for Sanofi to buy.

In other words, failure = success when it comes to change-of-control packages for CEOs.

So let me just repeat my conclusion from last August: As long as being a health care CEO is effectively a license to loot the company, is it any wonder that health care organizations continue to be badly lead, and health care costs soar while quality and access suffer?

Once more with feeling: real health care reform would require us to make health care executives truly accountable for their actions, and penalize them for those that are ill-informed, contemptuous of health care values, self-interested, or corrupt.

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"You Can't Say That" - Non-Disparagement Clauses and the Anechoic Effect

Here is another example of why health care organizations' leaders are different from you and me, and why that may not be a good thing for health care.  A few days ago, the San Jose (California) Mercury News reported on the upcoming departure of a local hospital CEO:

El Camino Hospital's handsomely-paid president and CEO Kenneth Graham is out of a job, the hospital announced Thursday afternoon.

Graham's contract will end June 30 'without cause, at the request of the hospital's Board of Directors,' according to a statement released to the media.

Until then, Graham will continue to fulfill his duties as the hospital's top administrator, according to the statement. Graham has been president and CEO of the hospital for 4� years.

The brief statement did not explain why Graham has been ousted, focusing instead on his accomplishments. Graham earns an annual base salary of $632,640.

Not only was the CEO "handsomely paid," he will be handsomely paid to depart, as reported two days later by the same newspaper:

Former El Camino Hospital president and CEO Ken Graham may be out of a job, but he won't be hurting for a paycheck anytime soon.

Fired 'without cause' by the hospital's board of directors on Wednesday, Graham is now entitled to nearly $1 million in severance pay, according to his contract, which the hospital provided to The Daily News on Friday.

Specifically, the hospital will pay Graham a lump sum of 18 months' salary when he officially steps down June 30. Based on his annual salary of $632,640, he would receive $948,960.

The reporter could not get any clearer fix on the reason for his departure:

Hospital officials Friday were tight-lipped about their decision to drop Graham. Reached by phone, board Chairman Wesley Alles would only say it was 'without cause.'

'I guess as a generic (explanation) the only thing I can say is it's without cause, that (the board wants to take) some different directions, perhaps, as a generic (explanation),' Alles said.

El Camino Hospital spokeswoman Chris Ernst said she couldn't say more than what was written in a statement released to the media Thursday, which simply stated Graham's contract was ended 'without cause, at the request of the hospital's Board of Directors.'

'I know everyone wants to know if there's something really there, but it was clearly without cause,' Ernst said. 'It's not like you can point to one particular thing and say this is why this action was taken.'

Now wasn't that informative? It appears the CEO was let go "without cause." But reporter Diana Samuels did uncover why nobody was saying anything meaningful about this lucrative departure:

The contract also includes a 'non-disparagement' clause, which says the hospital and Graham cannot make any statements about each other that could cause 'any embarrassment or humiliation or otherwise reflect negatively on the other party(ies).'

I discussed the subject of executive contracts with one of our Health Care Renewal scouts who knows about such things. For high level executives in business, seemingly tidy severance packages are the rule.  We have discussed the problem with excess executive compensation in health care here.

Furthermore, various confidentiality, non-compete, and non-disparagement clauses are often common.

However, whether or not these are common practices in the larger business world, these contract provisions, especially non-disparagement clauses, pose problems in health care.  As we have discussed, there are lots of good reasons that the governance and leadership of health care ought to be maximally transparent.

Just to provide one example, consider the problem of medical errors, a subject which has received unending discussion since the report by Institute of Medicine entitled "To Err is Human."  One widely espoused doctrine about medical error prevention is that such errors ought to be disclosed and discussed openly so that their root causes can be found, and methods to prevent them developed.  Now suppose, for example, that the CEO of a hospital had discovered some medical errors, but made himself unpopular by pursuing them.  Were he to have a bilateral non-disparagement clause in his contract, and were this unpopularity to cause him to lose his job, he could say nothing about these errors, possibly allowing them to recur, but more seriously.  Of course, the example could be turned on its head.  Suppose the CEO had introduced a new process that was thought to be the cause of such errors.  Were he to lose his job because of this, hospital officials could say nothing about the problem, etc, etc.  Similarly, other problems at the hospital either discovered by the CEO or possibly caused by the CEO could remain anechoic due to non-disparagement clauses in hospital executives' contracts.

Of course, in the current case, the CEO might have left due to simple personality differences, and his departure might have nothing to do with medical errors, etc, etc.

However, this case suggests that the sort of non-disparagement clauses that may appear in contracts for executives in various type of businesses have metastasized to contracts for hospital executives.  These clauses, and their cousins, confidentiality clauses and non-compete clauses, may be major reasons for the anechoic effect, and the general lack of transparency of hospital leadership and governance. 

However, up to now, such clauses seem to be, you guessed it, anechoic in discussions of health care policy and health care reform. 

Thus, one step to true health care reform would be for there to be some open discussion of the reasons we cannot openly discuss many important issues in health care, particularly the likely increasing use of contractual clauses such as non-disparagement clauses.  Likely an even more important step would be discrediting such contractual provisions that reduce transparency.

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Why Weren't Existing Laws About Hospital CEO Compensation Enforced in Washington State?

Public radio station KUOW reported on the generous compensation given hospital CEOs in Washington:

KUOW has learned that 15 hospital executives in Washington made $1 million or more in 2009. That elite group includes 14 nonprofit executives and one head of a government hospital. CEOs at Multicare, Providence, Virginia Mason and Valley Medical each made more than $2 million.

Those numbers can be found in the hospitals' latest tax filings and other public records. The pattern was more lopsided in the two prior years. Nobody working at a public hospital cracked the top 10 list of the state's highest hospital paychecks in 2007 or 2008.

But then the story takes an interesting twist:

Most of Washington's largest hospitals are nonprofit organizations. The state gives the nonprofits a break on their business taxes to help reduce the cost of health care.

The hospitals have to jump through some hoops to qualify for the reduced taxes. For one thing, state law limits how much the hospitals can pay their executives. Their pay has to be comparable to what public servants in Washington make in similar jobs � or else no break on their B&O taxes.

Somehow everyone seems to have forgotten about this part of the law:

The limit on executive pay has been on the law books for 30 years.

Gowrylow: 'Frankly, I don't think it's something that's been on our radar since the mid�80s.'

Mike Gowrylow is a spokesman for the Washington Department of Revenue. He says the recent million�dollar incomes were news to the department.

Gowrylow: 'But it's certainly something that I think we need to take a look at again and examine whether these nonprofits are paying their executives excessively or not.'

Gowrylow says the agency only audits 2 or 3 percent of tax returns. It mostly relies on businesses to comply voluntarily with the state's tax laws.

Gowrylow: 'We can't be everywhere. If we become aware of a nonprofit or any other business that's underreporting their taxes, we investigate those complaints, and if tax is due, we will assess it.'

He says the agency can recover back taxes for the past four years, along with penalties and interest.

Although the article cited an unsuccessful legal action to enforce the law in a particular case in 1986, why the state government seemed to forget about it after that is unclear, and maybe deserving of further investigation.
Right  now, hospital management seems to be trying to avoid the issue, or is arguing about the meaning of "comparable,"

Several present day hospital officials declined to be interviewed on tape. They told KUOW they believe they are in compliance with the state law. But they generally provided little detail to back up that claim.

Providence and Group Health representatives both said their organizations are so large and complex that there may not be any comparable public service jobs in Washington.

Swedish spokeswoman Melissa Tizon told me that CEO Rodney Hochman's pay was generally comparable to what the highest paid public hospital executives made, at Valley and Evergreen hospitals.

On the other hand,

Harborview is the state's largest hospital. Eileen Whalen is its head and an employee of the University of Washington. She makes about $470,000.

[State Senator Karen] Keiser: 'That's really not comparable to the million dollar and more salaries of other hospital directors in our state. We are paying attention here in Olympia to that.'

Other executives at UW Medicine did make more than Whalen. Still, none of them, not even the president of UW, made as much as any of the 15 highest paid executives at nonprofit hospitals in 2009.

I searched high and low to find any public officials making as much as the top nonprofit CEOs.

The only one I found who consistently did so was the UW football coach. But it might be hard to argue that Steve Sarkisian's job is comparable to running a hospital system.

We have discussed numerous cases of executives of not-for-profit hospitals and hospital systems receiving lavish compensation and benefits that seem out of proportion to any reasonable measure of their performance or of their positions' difficulties.  (Remember that advocates of corpulent executive compensation love to cite the size of the company and the number of employees, but the CEO really has only to manage the next tier of executives, rarely numbering more than a dozen.)

As we have said before, far too often the leaders of not-for-profit health care institutions seem more interested in padding their own bottom lines than upholding the institutions' missions. They often seem entirely unaware of their duty to put those missions ahead of their own self-interest. Like the financial services sector in the era of "greed is good," health care too often seems run by "insiders hijacking established institutions for their personal benefit." True health care reform would encourage leadership of health care who understand health care and care about its mission, rather than those who see a quick way to make a small fortune.

However, the twist in this story is that it appears the lavish compensation of hospital executives in this particular state may have violated state law, or at least the tax breaks these hospitals got may have violated the law, given their leaders excessive compensation, and that the law in question is over 30 years old.  However, the law seems to have been forgotten or ignored for nearly all that time, for reasons that are unclear. 

This seems reminiscent of how the Responsible Corporate Officers' Doctrine seems to have been forgotten and ignored.  this post from June, 2010).  However, in the last 30+ years, this notion has been ignored and abandoned by US government regulators at least in so far as it applies to health care organizations, particularly drug, biotechnology and device companies.

The big question is why have such laws and legal practices, which have not been repealed or refuted, instead been ignored and forgotten?  Surely this cries out for investigation.

Of course, It seems that somehow in the brave new world of laissez faire, anything goes capitalism foisted on health care over the last 30 plus years, old practices and customs that limited the power and enrichment of top leaders may have seemed increasingly prudish, and those advocating them may have seemed to be old fuddy duddies to those bent on personal gain.  But unhipness and scorn of prudishness are not reasons to ignore an existing law. 

So it is not that there are no legal tools to prevent abuses by leaders of health care organizations.  Instead, there has been increasing forgetfulness of the existence of such tools, and perhaps a growing effeteness of enforcement that has lead to a reluctance to even try to use them.  So we can start truly reforming health care by simply enforcing the laws that are already there. 
  

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