It appears that device-maker Boston Scientific has a new set of troubles. The Boston Globe just reported:
The Boston Globe article noted that:
That summary actually soft-pedaled Boston Scientific's previous woes.
We started posting about the company's travails in 2005, starting with allegations that Guidant, which is now a Boston Scientific subsidiary, hid information about defects in the implantable cardiac defibrillators (ICDs) the company manufactured. As we noted in early 2005 here, Guidant executives allegedly knew that ICDs made from 2000-2002 were at risk for short-circuiting and failing, thus making them unable to deliver potentially life saving electrical shocks meant to prevent cardiac arrests, but the company only revealed the problem in 2005. By failing to notify physicians and the public, Guidant executives let expensive and profitable, but potentially useless devices to continue to be implanted, potentially increasing the risk of sudden death for the patients who received them. Then here we noted reports that Guidant continued to ship failure-prone devices even after it had designed and started to manufacture new ICDs that were supposed to be less likely to fail. By June, 2005 we posted that Guidant had recalled thousands of ICDs, including models that were previously not identified as likely to fail. Later that year, the case rated an article by Robert Steinbrook in the New England Journal of Medicine. Towards the end of 2005, we noted that Eliot Spitzer had sued Guidant for fraud. At the end of the year, more information appeared, suggesting that Guidant knew the ICDs were flawed, but continued to sell them. Still more appeared early in 2006. Then the business media became interested in the bidding war between Johnson and Johnson and Boston Scientific for Guidant, provoking a bit more interest in the tale of the suppression of data about the flawed ICDs.
Then all was quiet until 2009, when Guidant, now a Boston Scientific subsidiary, plead guilty to two criminal misdemeanor charges that it failed to properly notify the FDA about problems with its ICDs (see post here). Later, the Guidant subsidiary of Boston Scientific settled charges that it gave doctors kickbacks as part of a "seeding study" to use its devices. At that time, it came to light that Boston Scientific had made another settlement, in 2007, of civil lawsuits alleging that the company hid problems with its products (see post here).
However, just as the latest questions about Boston Scientific were revealed, the Boston Globe also reported about how the company compensated its new CEO, who started in the middle of 2009:
And by the way, the compensation paid both these men did not exactly correlate with the company's financial, as opposed to ethical performance:
You just cannot make this stuff up.
How could the company possible justify paying over $30 million for half a year's work by its CEO at a time when the company is facing multiple investigations, has had to settle civil cases and criminal charges, has had to stop production of one of its most important products due to its failure to meet regulatory requirments, and has lost money for four years?
This illustrates how leaders of big health care organizations are able to make themselves extremely rich at the expense of share-holders, employees, patients, and ultimately society, completely out of proportion to any claims they can make about their or their companies' performance. This indicates the collective lack of accountability of many health care leaders, and the perverse incentives that now drive health care.
But is it any wonder that health care costs continue to rise uncontrollably? Once again, I submit that true health care reform needs to make health care leaders accountable, and subject to clear ethical standards, and to eliminate the sorts of perverse incentives that are transforming them (and other corporate CEOs) into a new aristocracy. Without such measures, we in the US may have near universal health care insurance, but soon no one will be able to afford access to any sort of quality health care.
Stepped-up government scrutiny of Boston Scientific Corp. stems from heightened concern over medical safety and disappointment that the company made new missteps after resolving previous problems with the Food and Drug Administration, analysts said yesterday.
The Natick medical-device maker, which has been working to settle patent suits and federal investigations dating back years, recently was notified of fresh investigations begun by the Department of Justice and the Securities Exchange Commission into problems that forced it to recall implantable heart defibrillators this month.
Boston Scientific said March 15 that it had halted shipments and recalled unsold units of seven brands of cardioverter and cardiac resynchronization therapy defibrillators. The products represented roughly 15 percent of the company�s $8.2 billion in 2009 sales.
On March 15, the company belatedly filed a notice informing the FDA of the production changes.
Larry Biegelsen, a senior analyst for Wells Fargo Securities, estimated Boston Scientific could lose $5 million in revenue every business day until defibrillator sales resume.
The Boston Globe article noted that:
Boston Scientific�s latest woes are reminiscent of an earlier round of friction with the FDA when defibrillator problems came to light after the company bought Guidant. The agency issued a 'warning letter' in 2006, citing multiple manufacturing violations and limiting Boston Scientific�s ability to get new devices approved until it fixed the problems. The restrictions were gradually loosened over the next two years, as the company strengthened its compliance, and the letter was lifted in 2008.
That summary actually soft-pedaled Boston Scientific's previous woes.
We started posting about the company's travails in 2005, starting with allegations that Guidant, which is now a Boston Scientific subsidiary, hid information about defects in the implantable cardiac defibrillators (ICDs) the company manufactured. As we noted in early 2005 here, Guidant executives allegedly knew that ICDs made from 2000-2002 were at risk for short-circuiting and failing, thus making them unable to deliver potentially life saving electrical shocks meant to prevent cardiac arrests, but the company only revealed the problem in 2005. By failing to notify physicians and the public, Guidant executives let expensive and profitable, but potentially useless devices to continue to be implanted, potentially increasing the risk of sudden death for the patients who received them. Then here we noted reports that Guidant continued to ship failure-prone devices even after it had designed and started to manufacture new ICDs that were supposed to be less likely to fail. By June, 2005 we posted that Guidant had recalled thousands of ICDs, including models that were previously not identified as likely to fail. Later that year, the case rated an article by Robert Steinbrook in the New England Journal of Medicine. Towards the end of 2005, we noted that Eliot Spitzer had sued Guidant for fraud. At the end of the year, more information appeared, suggesting that Guidant knew the ICDs were flawed, but continued to sell them. Still more appeared early in 2006. Then the business media became interested in the bidding war between Johnson and Johnson and Boston Scientific for Guidant, provoking a bit more interest in the tale of the suppression of data about the flawed ICDs.
Then all was quiet until 2009, when Guidant, now a Boston Scientific subsidiary, plead guilty to two criminal misdemeanor charges that it failed to properly notify the FDA about problems with its ICDs (see post here). Later, the Guidant subsidiary of Boston Scientific settled charges that it gave doctors kickbacks as part of a "seeding study" to use its devices. At that time, it came to light that Boston Scientific had made another settlement, in 2007, of civil lawsuits alleging that the company hid problems with its products (see post here).
However, just as the latest questions about Boston Scientific were revealed, the Boston Globe also reported about how the company compensated its new CEO, who started in the middle of 2009:
Boston Scientific Inc. gave its new top executive an unforgettable welcome gift.
The Natick medical device maker said it paid chief executive J. Raymond Elliott, who replaced former CEO James Tobin last summer, $33.5 million in total compensation last year, making him one of region�s highest-paid corporate leaders.
Elliott�s pay package includes a salary of more than $598,000 for six months, a $1.5 million signing bonus, nearly $608,000 in other incentive awards, and $29.4 million in stock awards and options that will vest over the next few years. He also received other benefits, including a $12,500 executive allowance, nearly $198,000 for personal use of the corporate jet, and more than $1 million in relocation expenses.
Tobin, who retired last year after running the medical device company for about a decade, earned $13.7 million last year, roughly six times his pay level in 2007 and 2008.
And by the way, the compensation paid both these men did not exactly correlate with the company's financial, as opposed to ethical performance:
In February, the company agreed to pay $1.7 billion to settle patent infringement charges from rival Johnson & Johnson.
And for years, the company has struggled with anemic sales growth. Last year, the company reported it lost $1 billion, its fourth straight year in the red. Sales rose 2 percent to $8.2 billion.
The company�s stock rose 16 percent in 2009, reflecting the broader stock market recovery. But shares have slipped 20 percent this year.
You just cannot make this stuff up.
How could the company possible justify paying over $30 million for half a year's work by its CEO at a time when the company is facing multiple investigations, has had to settle civil cases and criminal charges, has had to stop production of one of its most important products due to its failure to meet regulatory requirments, and has lost money for four years?
This illustrates how leaders of big health care organizations are able to make themselves extremely rich at the expense of share-holders, employees, patients, and ultimately society, completely out of proportion to any claims they can make about their or their companies' performance. This indicates the collective lack of accountability of many health care leaders, and the perverse incentives that now drive health care.
But is it any wonder that health care costs continue to rise uncontrollably? Once again, I submit that true health care reform needs to make health care leaders accountable, and subject to clear ethical standards, and to eliminate the sorts of perverse incentives that are transforming them (and other corporate CEOs) into a new aristocracy. Without such measures, we in the US may have near universal health care insurance, but soon no one will be able to afford access to any sort of quality health care.
